scholarly journals Stackelberg Game for Product Renewal in Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Luo ◽  
Yamin Lou ◽  
Shizhao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Shift Function ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Renewal Rate ◽  
Original Product ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

The paper studied the process of product renewal in a supply chain, which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. There are original product and renewal product in the supply chain. A market share shift model for renewal product was firstly built on a increment function and a shift function. Based on the model, the decision-making plane consisting of two variables was divided into four areas. Since the process of product renewal was divided into two stages, Stackelberg-Nash game model and Stackelberg-merger game model could be built to describe this process. The optimal solutions of product pricing strategy of two games were obtained. The relationships between renewal rate, cost, pricing strategy, and profits were got by numerical simulation. Some insights were obtained from this paper. Higher renewal rate will make participants’ profits and total profit increase at the same margin cost. What is more important, the way of the optimal decision making of the SC was that RP comes onto the market with a great price differential between OP and RP.

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Guanbing Zhao ◽  
Yangyang Qiu ◽  
Muhammad Imran ◽  
Fazal Manan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Consumer Electronics ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Consumer Electronic ◽  
Market Launch ◽  
Optimal Decision Making ◽  
New Consumer

Pricing and promotion are two important decisions during the market launch of new consumer electronics products. Nowadays, the pricing and promotion of consumer electronic products are often not made separately but at the same time. This study focuses on the pricing-promotion coordination mechanism of a secondary supply chain of new consumer electronics products (which consists of a manufacturer and a seller). Price and the degree of promotion together affect the demand for products. Manufacturers give sellers a sales target. Manufacturers and sellers set prices and promotions separately, introduce repurchase penalty joint contracts, and establish supply chain profit models to compare and analyze optimal pricing, promotion efforts, and maximum profit of supply chains under different decision-making situations. We prove that the repurchase penalty joint contract can coordinate the supply chain under the assumptions of a single-period game and a multiperiod repeated game. The results show that under the repurchase penalty joint contract, when manufacturers and sellers choose high prices and high promotions at the same time, the supply chain of new consumer electronics products has the largest profit. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to study the influence of parameters on optimal decision-making and supply chain profits.

Design of coordination contract for quality control-based supply chain under consumer balking behavior with fuzzy environment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chongfeng Lan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Quality Control ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Fuzzy Environment ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

Considering the ubiquity of consumer balking behavior (CBB) in real-life economics and the importance of product quality control (QC) to supply chain (SC) competitiveness, this paper explores the SC coordination under both the QC and the CBB. Specifically, the consumer’s loss aversion behavior was illustrated at a fixed balking probability, and the SC models were created for centralized and decentralized decision-making modes. After that, the optimal strategies for the retailer and the manufacturer were identified, and the comparative static analysis was adopted to explore the effects of the CBB and QC on the optimal decision-making of the SC. The research results show that the QC-based SC under the CBB cannot be coordinated by wholesale price contract alone, but can be coordinated perfectly by this contract when the retailer shares the quality effort and the manufacturer shares the oversupply cost and analyzed through the fuzzy environment with the formulation. This finding sheds new light on the theory and application of wholesale price contract in SC coordination. Finally, the parameter sensitivity analysis was performed on balking probability and product qualification rate (PQR) through numerical experiments, which further discloses the impacts of the CBB and product QC on the optimal decision-making and profit of the SC.

Optimal Decision-Making of Low-Carbon Supply Chain Incorporating Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangxing Wei ◽  
Yanling Yao ◽  
Yanhong Qin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Optimal Decision Making ◽  
Fairness Concern

Abstract The optimal decision-making of the low-carbon supply chain incorporating fairness concerns, such as the effort of reducing carbon emissions, the whole sale price and retail price, is analyzed by taking the Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point. The following conclusions are found. Firstly, the wholesale price is strongly influenced by the fairness concern of the manufacturer but weakly influenced by that of the retailer, although both statistically significantly. Secondly, both the manufacturer’s and retailer’s fairness concerns reduce carbon emissions dramatically to nearly the same extent. Thirdly, the effect of the manufacturer’s fairness concern on the retail price is so tiny that it can almost be ignored, while the retailer’s fairness concern changes the retail price remarkably.

scholarly journals Environmental Investment Decision of Green Supply Chain considering the Green Uncertainty

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Shaobo Wu ◽  
Xun Yao ◽  
Guangdong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Threshold Value ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Investment Decision Making ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Green Investment

The uncertainty of eco-friendly intermediate components has an important impact on green supply chain decisions. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model of green investment decision-making among enterprises is established by considering the case of the supplier’s green investment alone and the case of the manufacturer and the supplier’s joint green investment. The influence of green uncertainty on enterprise’s decision-making is analyzed, and the green investment decision-making strategies of both sides in two cases are compared. There are four main conclusions derived from the results: (i) with the increase in the supplier’s green cost coefficient, the supplier will reduce the green investment and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (ii) with a decrease in uncertainty for eco-friendly intermediate components and the increase in their feasibility factor, the supplier will increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase the investment in environment, and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (iii) the increase in the manufacturer’s share of green costs will promote the supplier to increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase its green investment, which shall increase the supplier’s optional choice space of for green investment; (iv) in the case of the manufacturer and the supplier jointly making a green investment, the threshold value for the environmental input of the supply chain members (i.e., the manufacturer and the supplier) is lower, and the supply chain members will have more choice space. At the same time, the care for environment in the case of a cooperative is higher than that in the case of a supplier investing alone.

scholarly journals Decision and Coordination of Cross-Border E-Commerce Supply Chain: Based on Four Modes of Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Wei Yan ◽  
Huijun Zhou ◽  
Hui Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Transportation Cost ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Growth Trend ◽  
Promotion Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Scientific Decision ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

Due to the explosive growth trend of cross-border e-commerce, a series of problems such as high transportation costs and insufficient publicity are to be solved urgently by researching on supply chain from both decision-making and coordination perspectives. Under the four-incomplete cooperative Stackelberg decision-making modes of cross-border e-commerce supply chain members, the transportation cost of overseas suppliers and the promotion strategy of domestic retailers determine the profit of the supply chain together and further influence the choice of the optimal decision-making plan. Furthermore, the Shapley value method and full cooperative income incremental sharing mechanism are used to redistribute the profits under different cooperation modes, and it is expected to provide scientific decision-making reference for domestic cross-border e-commerce enterprises to rationally choose cooperative relationships.

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