scholarly journals Impact of Asymmetric Carbon Information on Supply Chain Decisions under Low-Carbon Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Yang ◽  
Jingna Ji ◽  
Chenshi Zheng

Through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game model under asymmetric carbon information, this paper investigates the misreporting behaviors of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance. Based on “Benchmarking” allocation mechanism, three policies are considered: carbon emission trading, carbon tax, and a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism. The results show that, in the three models, the leader in the supply chain, even if he has advantages of carbon information, will not lie about his information. That is because the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior has no effect on supply chain members’ performance. But the retailer will lie about the information when he has carbon information advantage. The high-carbon-emission retailers under the carbon trading policy, all the retailers under the carbon tax policy, and the high-carbon-emission retailers under combined quotas and tax policy would like to understate their carbon emissions. Coordination of revenue sharing contract is studied in supply chain to induce the retailer to declare his real carbon information. Optimal contractual parameters are deduced in the three models, under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized.

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Zheng ◽  
Quangui Pang ◽  
Tianpei Li ◽  
Guizheng Wang ◽  
Yiji Cai ◽  
...  

This paper examines a farmer’s channel selection in a supply chain led by a retailer, considering carbon emissions and products’ deterioration. Three channels—online channels, retail channels, and dual channels—are proposed. The inventory model of perishable products and the two-stage Stackelberg game model are used to illustrate the operational process. To compare performances of the three channel structures, we further determine the critical points consisting of the profits and the carbon emissions among these channels. The results provide useful insights for supply chain members and the government. Farmers can choose a channel to optimize profit with respect to deterioration rate and product yield, but it might conflict with the aim of least carbon emissions. When the deterioration rate is high, the online channel is not a suitable choice. For the government, the carbon tax contributes to the reduction of carbon emissions, but it also leads to the loss of the farmer’s profit. Additionally, numerical results further illustrate that, from the perspective of the government, transporting and inventory processes are two major sources of emissions, and it is essential to implement carbon tax and exploit low-carbon transportation.


Kybernetes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Qiaoyu Peng ◽  
Lang Xu

Purpose This paper aims to explore how upstream supply chain companies will control the carbon emissions and price decisions of products when the government implements environmental tax policy on consumers. It provides some suggestions to control carbon emissions for the government and manufacturers. Design/methodology/approach This study establishes two-echelon Stackelberg game models with and without the implementation of environmental tax policy on consumers in a centralized scenario and a decentralized scenario. Through the comparative analysis of the four models, the optimal emission abatement and pricing strategies are obtained. Findings This paper concludes that implementing environmental tax policy on consumers within the market’s acceptable range is more beneficial to the retailer and the environment, as well as the overall social welfare, except for the manufacturer. Moreover, consumer’s low-carbon preference always has a broader impact on carbon abatement and corporate profits than environmental tax coefficient. Finally, the side-payment self-executing contract can effectively ensure that the supply chain members make rational decisions spontaneously while achieving a win-win solution of centralized scenario. Originality/value This paper first considers how the government’s environmental tax policy on consumers will affect the decision-making of supply chain companies, and proposes an improved side-payment self-enforcing contract to maximize environmental and economic benefits of centralized scenario. In addition, it provides a reference for the government to adopt both the carbon cap policy and the environmental tax policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3597
Author(s):  
Fei Zou ◽  
Yanju Zhou ◽  
Caihua Yuan

In the current low-carbon economy, the government has adopted carbon taxes and carbon trading policies to control the carbon emissions of manufacturers. As consumers become increasingly aware of low-carbon, some retailers have also started investing in low-carbon to shape their public image and increase their competitiveness to attract more customers. In this paper, the Stackelberg game method is utilized to solve the model, and the graphs are used to analyze the benefits of retailers' low-carbon investment on the supply chain through numerical analysis. It is found that when the emission reduction cost coefficient of manufacturers is relatively low, manufacturers are willing to reduce carbon emissions. At this time, increasing carbon tax and the carbon emission permits price can effectively promote the emission reduction behavior of manufacturers, because it increases demand for products and the profit of manufacturers and retailers. However, when the emission reduction cost coefficient of the manufacturers is quite high, increasing carbon tax and carbon emission permits price cannot effectively promote the emission reduction behavior, because this situation of the emission reduction reduces the profit of manufacturers. The main contribution of this paper discovers that the green cost coefficient of retailers' low-carbon investment will adjust the impact of the carbon tax and the carbon trading price on the profits of retailers and manufacturers which proves that retailers’ low-carbon investment is beneficial to the supply chain. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is high and the green cost coefficient is low, increasing the carbon tax or carbon emission permits price can increase the profit of manufacturers and retailers. Finally, we design a supply chain coordination of comprehensive sharing contact for retailers and manufacturers. The result shows that this contract has economic and environmental benefits, and that it is beneficial for the environment and economy of sustainable development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1675-1689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Zhuang Miao ◽  
Jihong Chen

The carbon emission reduction has become an inevitable trend. Under the low-carbon environment, the government has been acting as an important role in the operation and management of supply chain. This paper considers four different governmental subsidy strategies, which includes none of members is subsidized (NS Scenario), only retailer is subsidized (RS Scenario), only manufacturer is subsidized (MS Scenario) and both members are subsidized (SS Scenario). A Stackelberg game model, which incorporates both governmental regulation and consumer’s awareness of carbon emission, is developed to present the pricing and emission reduction behaviors for the supply chain members as well as the subsidy policies of government under different governmental subsidy strategies, and analyze the impact of relevant coefficients on the decisions and supply chain profits. It can be concluded that subsidizing to both members is more profitable for supply chain members and government in terms of environment protection and economic development. The results provide some managerial insights for the decision-makers and policy-makers to implement sustainability initiatives.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chao-qun Han ◽  
Hua-ying Gu ◽  
Li-hui Sui ◽  
Chang-peng Shao

Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangang Feng ◽  
Jiaxin Shen ◽  
Xiaomei Li

Carbon tax is an emission regulation, which widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms need to determine an optimal carbon reduction level and optimal product prices. To address firms’ decision-making challenges, this paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under carbon tax policy; it establishes a Stackelberg game model with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer who is the leader of the game. The paper studies the influence of the government’s carbon tax policy and retailer’s risk-averse attitude on the optimal decision of the supply chain. The result shows that when the retailer is risk aversion, the degree of risk aversion of the retailer is positively correlated with the wholesale price of the manufacturer and unit carbon emission reduction, and within a certain range of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, it is positively correlated with the price of products; with the increase of the carbon tax rate imposed by the government, the retail price of unit products, the wholesale price of the manufacturer, and the carbon emission reduction of unit products also increase. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.


Open Physics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xueying Li ◽  
Ying Peng ◽  
Jing Zhang

AbstractUnder the background of a low carbon economy, this paper examines the impact of carbon tax policy on supply chain network emission reduction. The integer linear programming method is used to establish a supply chain network emission reduction such a model considers the cost of CO2emissions, and analyses the impact of different carbon price on cost and carbon emissions in supply chains. The results show that the implementation of a carbon tax policy can reduce CO2emissions in building supply chain, but the increase in carbon price does not produce a reduction effect, and may bring financial burden to the enterprise. This paper presents a reasonable carbon price range and provides decision makers with strategies towards realizing a low carbon building supply chain in an economical manner.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chong Xin ◽  
Yunzhu Zhou ◽  
Xiaochen Zhu ◽  
Lin Li ◽  
Xin Chen

This paper integrates carbon emission reduction via technological innovation with consumer channel preferences in both single- and dual-channel supply chains selling low-carbon products. Linear demand functions which simultaneously reflect the consumers’ channel preferences and low-carbon sensitivity are developed by considering the consumers’ segmentation. On this basis, we present two Stackelberg game models: one for each of the single- and dual-channel supply chains. In the first, the manufacturer sells low-carbon products through a traditional retailer who has a physical store, while in the second the manufacturer opens an online direct channel to compete with the traditional retailer. For the two models developed, the optimal pricing decisions, carbon emission reduction level, and profits are derived and discussed. Numerical examples are given to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models and solutions. The results show that supply chain members’ profits are affected by system parameters such as the carbon price, consumers’ low-carbon sensitivity, channel preference, etc. Furthermore, although the aforementioned parameters stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emission, this does not always benefit the retailer. Comparison of the two models indicates that dual-channel selling is only the better choice for both the manufacturer and the retailer under certain conditions.


Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
He Zhang ◽  
Jingyi Peng ◽  
Dahlia Yu ◽  
Lie You ◽  
Rui Wang

Low-carbon governance at the county level has been an important issue for sustainable development due to the large contributions to carbon emission. However, the experiences of carbon emission governance at the county level are lacking. This paper discusses 5 carbon emission governance zones for 1753 counties. The zoning is formed according to a differentiated zoning method based on a multi-indicator evaluation to judge if the governance had better focus and had formulated a differentiated carbon emission governance system. According to zoning results, there is 1 high-carbon governance zone, 2 medium-carbon governance zones, and 2 low-carbon zones. The extensive high-carbon governance zone and medium-carbon zones are key governance areas, in which the counties are mainly located in the northern plain areas and southeast coastal areas and have contributed 51.88% of total carbon emissions. This paper proposes differentiated governance standards for each indicator of the 5 zones. The differentiated zoning method mentioned in this paper can be applied to other governance issues of small-scale regions.


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