Governmental subsidy policies and supply chain decisions with carbon emission limit and consumer’s environmental awareness

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1675-1689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Zhuang Miao ◽  
Jihong Chen

The carbon emission reduction has become an inevitable trend. Under the low-carbon environment, the government has been acting as an important role in the operation and management of supply chain. This paper considers four different governmental subsidy strategies, which includes none of members is subsidized (NS Scenario), only retailer is subsidized (RS Scenario), only manufacturer is subsidized (MS Scenario) and both members are subsidized (SS Scenario). A Stackelberg game model, which incorporates both governmental regulation and consumer’s awareness of carbon emission, is developed to present the pricing and emission reduction behaviors for the supply chain members as well as the subsidy policies of government under different governmental subsidy strategies, and analyze the impact of relevant coefficients on the decisions and supply chain profits. It can be concluded that subsidizing to both members is more profitable for supply chain members and government in terms of environment protection and economic development. The results provide some managerial insights for the decision-makers and policy-makers to implement sustainability initiatives.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Shan Yu ◽  
Qiang Hou

Due to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emission-reducing measures are urgently needed. Important emission-reduction measures mainly include carbon trading and low-carbon cost subsidies. Comprehensive consideration of these two policies is a research hotspot in the field of low-carbon technology investment. Based on this background, this paper considers the impact of consumer low-carbon preferences on market demand and the impact of uncertainty in carbon emission-reduction behaviour. We construct a stochastic differential game model with upstream and downstream enterprises based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy. From a dynamic perspective, this paper researches the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics of the joint emission-reduction mechanism in a supply chain. This paper discusses the sensitivity of the parameters and uses numerical simulation to verify the impact of each parameter on the emission-reduction decision-making activities of stakeholders after introducing the cost subsidy. The results show that a cost subsidy policy can promote carbon emission-reduction investment and supply chain profit. Thus, it is important to strengthen technical cooperation and exchange among enterprises.


Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao

To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government’s choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Zhihong Zhang

With the implementation of national carbon emission reduction policies and the development of online shopping, manufacturers are making low-carbon efforts and selling products through dual channels. This paper constructs a dual-channel supply chain decision-making model composed of low-carbon emission reduction manufacturers and retailers and studies the optimal decision-making problem of the supply chain under subsidies by the government based on emission reduction R&D and per unit product emission reduction. The research results show the following: (1) when the government subsidizes emission reduction R&D, the emission reduction will have an impact on retailers’ optimal prices, manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices, and optimal direct sales channel sales prices. The profit of the manufacturer increases with the increase in carbon emissions, and the profit of the manufacturer increases to a certain level and then appears to decline. (2) When the government adopts a subsidy method based on the emission reduction per unit product, the manufacturer’s wholesale price and the selling price of direct sales channels, as well as the retailer’s own optimal price, will increase with the increase in emission reductions. Retailers’ profits will increase linearly with the increase in carbon emissions. Manufacturers’ profits will first increase in a straight line and then increase in a curve.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 246
Author(s):  
Fan Dandan ◽  
Xu Qi

This paper focuses on analyzing the impact of power structures of supply chain enterprises on their carbon emission reduction decisions. First, three game models (Nash, Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are constructed according to members’ different bargaining power, respectively. Then, the optimal carbon emission reduction decisions and profits of supply chain enterprises in different game models are solved and compared. The research results show that supply chain enterprises have the lowest carbon emission reduction rate in Nash game, and their corresponding profits are the least. As for Stackelberg game, the carbon emission reduction rate as a leader is greater than that as a follower, but the profit as a leader is less than that as a follower. The total profit of the entire supply chain system in Manufacturer Stackelberg model is always greater than that in Retailer Stackelberg model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3597
Author(s):  
Fei Zou ◽  
Yanju Zhou ◽  
Caihua Yuan

In the current low-carbon economy, the government has adopted carbon taxes and carbon trading policies to control the carbon emissions of manufacturers. As consumers become increasingly aware of low-carbon, some retailers have also started investing in low-carbon to shape their public image and increase their competitiveness to attract more customers. In this paper, the Stackelberg game method is utilized to solve the model, and the graphs are used to analyze the benefits of retailers' low-carbon investment on the supply chain through numerical analysis. It is found that when the emission reduction cost coefficient of manufacturers is relatively low, manufacturers are willing to reduce carbon emissions. At this time, increasing carbon tax and the carbon emission permits price can effectively promote the emission reduction behavior of manufacturers, because it increases demand for products and the profit of manufacturers and retailers. However, when the emission reduction cost coefficient of the manufacturers is quite high, increasing carbon tax and carbon emission permits price cannot effectively promote the emission reduction behavior, because this situation of the emission reduction reduces the profit of manufacturers. The main contribution of this paper discovers that the green cost coefficient of retailers' low-carbon investment will adjust the impact of the carbon tax and the carbon trading price on the profits of retailers and manufacturers which proves that retailers’ low-carbon investment is beneficial to the supply chain. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is high and the green cost coefficient is low, increasing the carbon tax or carbon emission permits price can increase the profit of manufacturers and retailers. Finally, we design a supply chain coordination of comprehensive sharing contact for retailers and manufacturers. The result shows that this contract has economic and environmental benefits, and that it is beneficial for the environment and economy of sustainable development.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chao-qun Han ◽  
Hua-ying Gu ◽  
Li-hui Sui ◽  
Chang-peng Shao

Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chong Xin ◽  
Yunzhu Zhou ◽  
Xiaochen Zhu ◽  
Lin Li ◽  
Xin Chen

This paper integrates carbon emission reduction via technological innovation with consumer channel preferences in both single- and dual-channel supply chains selling low-carbon products. Linear demand functions which simultaneously reflect the consumers’ channel preferences and low-carbon sensitivity are developed by considering the consumers’ segmentation. On this basis, we present two Stackelberg game models: one for each of the single- and dual-channel supply chains. In the first, the manufacturer sells low-carbon products through a traditional retailer who has a physical store, while in the second the manufacturer opens an online direct channel to compete with the traditional retailer. For the two models developed, the optimal pricing decisions, carbon emission reduction level, and profits are derived and discussed. Numerical examples are given to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models and solutions. The results show that supply chain members’ profits are affected by system parameters such as the carbon price, consumers’ low-carbon sensitivity, channel preference, etc. Furthermore, although the aforementioned parameters stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emission, this does not always benefit the retailer. Comparison of the two models indicates that dual-channel selling is only the better choice for both the manufacturer and the retailer under certain conditions.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Zhang ◽  
Tianshan Ma ◽  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan

This research is to investigate the decision making of the members of remanufacturing supply chain under the government involvement. Different scenarios are analyzed in this research, and it is found that the subsidy for carbon emission reduction can increase the WPs (waste products) reusing. When the recycler participates in remanufacturing supply chain, the cost of remanufacturer will be shared and through centralizing the decision making, the carbon emission reduction will be enhanced and the whole supply chain’s profit will decrease. So it is suggested that the government need to adjust the subsidy for carbon emission reduction in terms of the quality level of WPs and the cooperation between recycler and remanufacturer is suggested, especially in the high-value waste remanufacturing supply chain.


Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 1810
Author(s):  
Kaitong Xu ◽  
Haibo Kang ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Ping Jiang ◽  
Na Li

At present, the issue of carbon emissions from buildings has become a hot topic, and carbon emission reduction is also becoming a political and economic contest for countries. As a result, the government and researchers have gradually begun to attach great importance to the industrialization of low-carbon and energy-saving buildings. The rise of prefabricated buildings has promoted a major transformation of the construction methods in the construction industry, which is conducive to reducing the consumption of resources and energy, and of great significance in promoting the low-carbon emission reduction of industrial buildings. This article mainly studies the calculation model for carbon emissions of the three-stage life cycle of component production, logistics transportation, and on-site installation in the whole construction process of composite beams for prefabricated buildings. The construction of CG-2 composite beams in Fujian province, China, was taken as the example. Based on the life cycle assessment method, carbon emissions from the actual construction process of composite beams were evaluated, and that generated by the composite beam components during the transportation stage by using diesel, gasoline, and electric energy consumption methods were compared in detail. The results show that (1) the carbon emissions generated by composite beams during the production stage were relatively high, accounting for 80.8% of the total carbon emissions, while during the transport stage and installation stage, they only accounted for 7.6% and 11.6%, respectively; and (2) during the transportation stage with three different energy-consuming trucks, the carbon emissions from diesel fuel trucks were higher, reaching 186.05 kg, followed by gasoline trucks, which generated about 115.68 kg; electric trucks produced the lowest, only 12.24 kg.


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