scholarly journals Modeling the Impacts of Driver Income Distributions on Online Ride-Hailing Services

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yuru Wu ◽  
Weifeng Li ◽  
Qing Yu ◽  
Jinyu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Death Process ◽  
Flow Process ◽  
Income Distributions ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Average Travel Time

The online ride-hailing taxi brings new vitality into the traditional taxi market, as well as new issues and challenges. The pricing and profit distribution of online ride-hailing services is one of the major concerns. This study focuses on the pricing and income distribution in the online ride-hailing system. Queuing system model and birth and death process theory are introduced to describe the driver’s flow process in the network. The social welfare maximization model and the platform profit maximization model are constructed based on the dynamic pricing mechanism, from the government’s and platform’s standpoint, respectively. Through numerical experiments, this paper analyzes the income distribution of drivers under different settings and the influence of different factors (average travel time, psychologically expected price of drivers and passengers, and probability of driver leaving the system) on the proportion of income distribution. The results show that the drivers’ income distribution proportion is higher in the pursuit of social welfare maximization than that in the pursuit of platform profit maximization, and in different benefit pursuit models, various factors have a certain influence on the driver’s income distribution proportion. The proposed method and conclusion in this study can be considered as references for online ride-hailing market supervision and policy-making.

scholarly journals Game-Theory Modeling for Social Welfare Maximization in Smart Grids

Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 2315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Hwang ◽  
Issac Sim ◽  
Young Sun ◽  
Heung-Jae Lee ◽  
Jin Kim
Keyword(s):  
Power Generation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Smart Grids ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Additional Parameter ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Energy Strategies

In this paper, we study the Stackelberg game-based evolutionary game with two players, generators and energy users (EUs), for monetary profit maximization in real-time price (RTP) demand response (DR) systems. We propose two energy strategies, generator’s best-pricing and power-generation strategy and demand’s best electricity-usage strategy, which maximize the profit of generators and EUs, respectively, rather than maximizing the conventional unified profit of the generator and EUs. As a win–win strategy to reach the social-welfare maximization, the generators acquire the optimal power consumption calculated by the EUs, and the EUs obtain the optimal electricity price calculated by the generators to update their own energy parameters to achieve profit maximization over time, whenever the generators and the EUs execute their energy strategy in the proposed Stackelberg game structure. In the problem formulation, we newly formulate a generator profit function containing the additional parameter of the electricity usage of EUs to reflect the influence by the parameter. The simulation results show that the proposed energy strategies can effectively improve the profit of the generators to 45% compared to the beseline scheme, and reduce the electricity charge of the EUs by 15.6% on average. Furthermore, we confirmed the proposed algorithm can contribute to stabilization of power generation and peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction, which is one of the goals of DR.

Benefits Analysis of Energy Tax Reform

2014 ◽  
Vol 986-987 ◽  
pp. 251-254
Author(s):  
Jian Ma ◽  
Yang Song ◽  
Liu He Ji
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Sustainable Use ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Energy Taxes ◽  
Energy Tax ◽  
Sustainable Economic Growth ◽  
Energy Strategies ◽  
Current Energy

Sustainable economic growth of a country needs support from energy industry. The limitation and environmental problems caused by energy makes the governments to re-examine their energy strategies. As an important tool for national macro-control, tax policy has an irreplaceable role on the promotion of conventional energy conservation, sustainable use and introduction of new energy sources. More and more theories and practices have proved that the energy tax is beneficial to conservation and utilization of energy. At present, China has yet to levy a special energy tax. There are many problems in energy taxes, so we have to reform our current energy taxes. Evaluation of the effect of the reforms can be judged in many ways. In this article, we will analyze it from a social welfare perspective, trying to build an optimization of the energy tax system in order to achieve social welfare maximization.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document