scholarly journals Inter-Basin Water Transfer Green Supply Chain Equilibrium and Coordination under Social Welfare Maximization

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhisong Chen ◽  
Lingling Pei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Water Transfer ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Basin Water

scholarly journals Inter-basin water transfer green supply chain coordination with partial backlogging under random precipitation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhisong Chen ◽  
Huimin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Water Transfer ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Operational Performance ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Partial Backlogging ◽  
Basin Water

Abstract Water demand backlogging and delivery loss have important impacts on the operational decisions and efficiency of the inter-basin water transfer (IBWT) green supply chain. This paper formulates, analyzes, and compares three IBWT green supply chain coordination decision models considering water delivery loss with lost sales, fully backlogging and partial backlogging under random precipitation, conducts the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses, and summarizes the corresponding managerial insights and policy implications. The research results show that: first, a two-part tariff contract can effectively coordinate the IBWT green supply chain and improve operational performance; second, the fully/partial backlogging strategy can effectively improve the operational performance of the IBWT green supply chain; third, fully backlogging is the first-best strategy and partial backlogging is the second-best strategy for the IBWT green supply chain.

Water-saving service supply chain cooperation under social welfare maximization

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 703-721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhisong Chen ◽  
Huimin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Operational Performance ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Consumption Reduction ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Internal Incentive

Abstract The water-saving service (WSS) supply chain equilibrium and cooperative decision models under the scenario without/with the social welfare maximization (SWM) goal are developed, analyzed, and compared, respectively, the numerical and sensitivity analyses for all models are conducted and compared, and the corresponding management insights and policy implications are summarized in this paper. The research results indicate that: (1) the cooperation strategy outperforms the equilibrium strategy regarding the water-consumption reduction, operational performance of WSS supply chain, the corresponding social welfare, consumer surplus, and positive externalities, regardless of whether the SWM is considered or not; (2) a subsidy threshold policy under which the government only subsidizes the WSS supply chain adopting the cooperation strategy is recommended to be designed to maximize social welfare with higher positive externalities; (3) subsidizing the WSS to pursue the SWM contributes to enhancing the water-consumption reduction, improving the operational performance of WSS supply chain and its members, the corresponding social welfare, consumer surplus, and positive externalities; (4) the WSS provider would have an internal incentive to provide WSS without government subsidy when the fixed cost of WSS is low, otherwise, the WSS provider would not have an internal incentive to provide WSS unless with a government subsidy.

scholarly journals Inter-Basin Water Transfer Supply Chain Coordination with Ramsey Pricing

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (19) ◽  
pp. 3651
Author(s):  
Chen ◽  
Cheung ◽  
Tan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Water Transfer ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Ramsey Pricing ◽  
Pricing Scheme ◽  
Basin Water ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tariff Structure

Often enough, social welfare and private benefit do not align for quasi-public goods/services. The inter-basin water transfer (IBWT) project provides a vivid example of this. In this paper, following the game-theoretical approach, we derive an optimal Ramsey pricing scheme to resolve these conflicts. We try to compare traditional supply chain management models with an optimal Ramsey pricing scheme, with an enforcement of coordination among firms. Using simulation techniques, we compute numerical estimates under three regimes: a standard equilibrium decision framework, a coordination decision model and a coordinated Ramsey pricing scheme. Our results show the relative welfare impact of different settings, revealing that the optimal pricing scheme based on the two-part tariff structure cannot only improve social welfare, but also ensure a target profit for participating firms. Lastly, our findings have strong policy implications for the government with profit regulation and the control of water resources.

scholarly journals Game-Theory Modeling for Social Welfare Maximization in Smart Grids

Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 2315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Hwang ◽  
Issac Sim ◽  
Young Sun ◽  
Heung-Jae Lee ◽  
Jin Kim
Keyword(s):  
Power Generation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Smart Grids ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Additional Parameter ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Energy Strategies

In this paper, we study the Stackelberg game-based evolutionary game with two players, generators and energy users (EUs), for monetary profit maximization in real-time price (RTP) demand response (DR) systems. We propose two energy strategies, generator’s best-pricing and power-generation strategy and demand’s best electricity-usage strategy, which maximize the profit of generators and EUs, respectively, rather than maximizing the conventional unified profit of the generator and EUs. As a win–win strategy to reach the social-welfare maximization, the generators acquire the optimal power consumption calculated by the EUs, and the EUs obtain the optimal electricity price calculated by the generators to update their own energy parameters to achieve profit maximization over time, whenever the generators and the EUs execute their energy strategy in the proposed Stackelberg game structure. In the problem formulation, we newly formulate a generator profit function containing the additional parameter of the electricity usage of EUs to reflect the influence by the parameter. The simulation results show that the proposed energy strategies can effectively improve the profit of the generators to 45% compared to the beseline scheme, and reduce the electricity charge of the EUs by 15.6% on average. Furthermore, we confirmed the proposed algorithm can contribute to stabilization of power generation and peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction, which is one of the goals of DR.

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