scholarly journals Production-Use Water Pricing and Corporate Water Use in China: An Evolutionary Game Theory Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yao Xiao ◽  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Wanting Xu ◽  
Hongye Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Water Supply ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Water Conservation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Water Pricing

Decisions related to pricing production-use water are a critical issue that local governments in China are facing. Its significance has increased in recent years, as a serious corporate water-supply shortage has surfaced with rapid economic development and urbanization. Different from developed countries, the pricing of production-use water is a complex issue in China that involves the distribution of benefits among local governments, water-supply companies, and water-consuming companies, where the overall balance is affected by every slight adjustment. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model involving water-supply companies and water-consuming companies with a systematic analysis of the interaction process between the policy formulation related to water pricing by water-supply companies and the decision making related to water consumption by water-consuming companies. The research finds that the difficulty of balancing corporate financial benefits and public water conservation benefits has led to the complexity of water pricing. Moreover, raising water prices will not necessarily cause companies to save water, but it will increase the production cost of the entire economy. This is the direct cause of low water prices, implemented by water-supply companies, in many regions of China.

scholarly journals A game-theoretical model of multisubject industrial policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 01019
Author(s):  
Victoria Akberdina ◽  
Grigoriy Korovin ◽  
Aleksandra Ponomareva
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Quantitative Assessment ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
The State ◽  
Scientific Justification

The vector of industrial policy developmen aimed at the transition from the domination of the state to the involvement in its development of all stakeholders is relevant in developed countries. Such an approach requires an additional scientific justification, confirming its feasibility. The purpose and objectives of the paper is the development within the framework of game theory a model of relationships of subjects interested in the industrial policy based on their interests, strategies, areas of conflict and areas of consensus. The study used a multi-subject approach, which implies the existence of a number of independent stakeholders with their own goals and strategies. The methodology of evolutionary game theory (EGT) was used to analyze the interests of the stakeholders of their coincidences and conflicts. The process of formation of industrial policy identified three possible points of equilibrium. The interaction between the state and enterprises is formalized as a game in a normal form, the functions of utility of the players and the equation of replication dynamics are presented. To formalize the problem and finding the equations of the replicative dynamics, we have considered the problem in a general form for the continuous asymmetric games. In terms of content, the results and decisions can be used as a characteristic of the space for the creation of multiple mutually acceptable agreements between real and potential participants in the process of industrial policy formation. It is possible to further analyze the model to obtain a quantitative assessment of the factors that have the greatest impact on the motivation of the interaction participants.

Research on Opportunistic Behavior in Energy Security Cooperation of China and Japan

2011 ◽  
Vol 71-78 ◽  
pp. 2085-2088
Author(s):  
Chun Chu ◽  
De Shan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Energy Security ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Security Cooperation ◽  
Energy Cooperation ◽  
China And Japan

Analyze the opportunistic behavior between China and Japan in energy security cooperation with game theory. There are two types countries in the process of the cooperation, they are opportunistic and cooperating countries. To use of evolutionary game theory model of cooperation and energy cooperation between China and Japan in the opportunistic behavior analysis, the results show that under certain conditions, cooperation can be avoided the incidence of opportunistic behavior, if not satisfy the relevant constraints, the co-operation will inevitably.

scholarly journals The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles H. Anderton
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Geographic Space ◽  
Policy Interventions ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Holocaust ◽  
Moore Neighborhood

A standard evolutionary game theory model is used to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a population that make it vulnerable to accepting the genocidal aims of political leaders. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, genocide architects can engineer the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people-group into one that supports, or does not resist, the architects’ atrocity goals. The model reveals policy interventions that prevent the social evolution of genocide among the population. The model is then extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in a Moore neighborhood. Key concepts of the analyses are applied to the onset and spread of genocide during the Holocaust (1938-1945) and to the prevention of genocide in Côte d'Ivoire (2011). [JEL codes: C73, D74]

scholarly journals Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market

EconomiA ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Azevedo Araujo ◽  
Helmar Nunes Moreira
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Labour Market ◽  
Lyapunov Stability ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theory Model
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document