scholarly journals A game-theoretical model of multisubject industrial policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 01019
Author(s):  
Victoria Akberdina ◽  
Grigoriy Korovin ◽  
Aleksandra Ponomareva
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Quantitative Assessment ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
The State ◽  
Scientific Justification

The vector of industrial policy developmen aimed at the transition from the domination of the state to the involvement in its development of all stakeholders is relevant in developed countries. Such an approach requires an additional scientific justification, confirming its feasibility. The purpose and objectives of the paper is the development within the framework of game theory a model of relationships of subjects interested in the industrial policy based on their interests, strategies, areas of conflict and areas of consensus. The study used a multi-subject approach, which implies the existence of a number of independent stakeholders with their own goals and strategies. The methodology of evolutionary game theory (EGT) was used to analyze the interests of the stakeholders of their coincidences and conflicts. The process of formation of industrial policy identified three possible points of equilibrium. The interaction between the state and enterprises is formalized as a game in a normal form, the functions of utility of the players and the equation of replication dynamics are presented. To formalize the problem and finding the equations of the replicative dynamics, we have considered the problem in a general form for the continuous asymmetric games. In terms of content, the results and decisions can be used as a characteristic of the space for the creation of multiple mutually acceptable agreements between real and potential participants in the process of industrial policy formation. It is possible to further analyze the model to obtain a quantitative assessment of the factors that have the greatest impact on the motivation of the interaction participants.

scholarly journals Production-Use Water Pricing and Corporate Water Use in China: An Evolutionary Game Theory Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yao Xiao ◽  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Wanting Xu ◽  
Hongye Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Water Supply ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Water Conservation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Water Pricing

Decisions related to pricing production-use water are a critical issue that local governments in China are facing. Its significance has increased in recent years, as a serious corporate water-supply shortage has surfaced with rapid economic development and urbanization. Different from developed countries, the pricing of production-use water is a complex issue in China that involves the distribution of benefits among local governments, water-supply companies, and water-consuming companies, where the overall balance is affected by every slight adjustment. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model involving water-supply companies and water-consuming companies with a systematic analysis of the interaction process between the policy formulation related to water pricing by water-supply companies and the decision making related to water consumption by water-consuming companies. The research finds that the difficulty of balancing corporate financial benefits and public water conservation benefits has led to the complexity of water pricing. Moreover, raising water prices will not necessarily cause companies to save water, but it will increase the production cost of the entire economy. This is the direct cause of low water prices, implemented by water-supply companies, in many regions of China.

EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF HUE, A HUE STRUCTURE, AND COLOR CATEGORIZATION IN NOVICE AND STABLE LEARNERS

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 1150018 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAGNAR STEINGRIMSSON
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Human Learning ◽  
Fixed Number ◽  
Finite Partition ◽  
Color Categories ◽  
Color Categorization ◽  
Categorization System

Evolutionary game theory is used to form a finite partition of a continuous hue circle in which perceptually similar hues are each represented by an icon chip and the circle by a finite but game dynamically determined number of icon chips. On the basis of such icon chip structures, a color categorization for both an individual learner and a population of learners is then evolved. These results remove limitations of some particular previous color categorization simulation work which assumed a fixed number of color stimuli and a maximal number of predefined color categories. These simulations are extended to demonstrate that learners need neither to share the same icon chip structures, nor do these structures have to be fully developed for a population of learners to produce a stable color categorization system. Additionally, when a naïve learner is introduced into a population with a stable color categorization, the game dynamics result in the learner's adopting the existing categorization. All results are shown to hold while the underlying icon chip structures evolve continuously in response to novel stimuli. The usefulness of the approach as well as some of the potential implications of the results for human learning of color categories are discussed.

Evolutionary game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning

2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARL TUYLS ◽  
ANN NOWÉ
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The State ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Mathematical Connection

In this paper we survey the basics of reinforcement learning and (evolutionary) game theory, applied to the field of multi-agent systems. This paper contains three parts. We start with an overview on the fundamentals of reinforcement learning. Next we summarize the most important aspects of evolutionary game theory. Finally, we discuss the state-of-the-art of multi-agent reinforcement learning and the mathematical connection with evolutionary game theory.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

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