scholarly journals Analyzing the Dynamic Data Sponsoring in the Case of Competing Internet Service Providers and Content Providers

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Brahim Minaoui
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Internet Service Providers ◽  
Internet Service ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Telecommunications Market ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Best Response Dynamic

With a sponsored content plan on the Internet market, a content provider (CP) negotiates with the Internet service providers (ISPs) on behalf of the end-users to remove the network subscription fees. In this work, we have studied the impact of data sponsoring plans on the decision-making strategies of the ISPs and the CPs in the telecommunications market. We develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers (CPs and ISPs), where the CPs sponsor content. We formulate the interactions between the ISPs and between the CPs as a noncooperative game. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning the Nash equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of the sponsoring content on providers’ policies.

A Customer Confusion Environment in Telecommunication Networks: Analysis and Policy Impact

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (02) ◽  
pp. 1930002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Mohamed Fakir
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Telecommunication Networks ◽  
Internet Service ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Consumer Confusion ◽  
Telecommunications Market ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Best Response Dynamic ◽  
Over Time

In this paper, we have studied the impact of customer confusion on the decision-making strategies of Internet service providers (ISP) in the network and telecommunications market. This confusion may come from several factors, e.g. incomplete information on the offer, non-transparent advertising, the ability of the analysis, etc.; but that sure varies over time since yesterday’s customer is no longer today’s. In this work, we have developed a simple oligopolistic model, using non-cooperative game theory, to formalize the interactions between service providers and end-users by considering that the rationality of customers varies over time. We assessed the impact of the dynamics of consumer confusion on the competition and profitability of service providers who are considered rational and competitive with one another to maximize their respective gains in the face of a confused fraction of consumers while others are not confused. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning Nash equilibrium. On the one hand, we have shown that when the number of confused customers is large, the ISP is interested in that and they offer moderately high prices with low quality of service. On the other hand, over time, rationality increases, forcing the ISPs to change their strategies by offering better services so that their demand increases. We also add that when customer behavior changes quickly, the ISPs follow clearer strategies with customer satisfactory services.

scholarly journals The Effect of Caching on CP and ISP Policies in Information-Centric Networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Mostafa Jourhmane
Keyword(s):  
Network Performance ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Internet Traffic ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Internet Service Providers ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Internet Service ◽  
Content Provider

Internet traffic volume is increasing, and this causes scalability issues in content delivery. Information-centric network has been introduced to support this increase in Internet traffic through caching. While collaborative caching in information-centric network is a crucial feature to improve network performance and reduce delivery costs in content distribution, the current pricing strategies on the Internet are not incentive compatible with information-centric network interconnection. In this paper, we focus on the economic incentive interactions in caching deployment between several types of information-centric network providers (content provider and Internet service provider). In particular, we develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers in an information-centric network model where the providers are motivated to cache and share content. We use a generalized Zipf distribution to model content popularity. We formulate the interactions between the Internet service providers and between the content providers as a noncooperative game. We use a Stackelberg game model to capture the interactions between the content provider and Internet service providers. Through mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point. The numerical simulations illustrate that our proposed game models result in a win-win solution.

Analyzing the Customers' Dynamic Confusion in Telecommunication Networks Share Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Mohamed Fakir
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Telecommunication Networks ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Consumer Confusion ◽  
Response Dynamic ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Best Response Dynamic ◽  
Over Time

In this article, the authors have developed a simple oligopolistic model to formalize the interactions between service providers and end-users by considering that the rationality of customers varies over time. This article assessed the impact of the dynamics of consumer confusion on the competition and profitability of service providers who are considered rational and competitive with one another to maximize their respective gains in the face of a confused fraction of consumers while others are not confused. This article shows the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. The authors used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning Nash equilibrium. We have shown that when the number of confused customers is large, the ISP interest this and they offer moderately high prices with low quality of service. On the other hand, over time, rationality increases, forcing the ISPs to change their strategies by offering better services so that their demand increases. We also add that when customer behavior changes quickly, the ISPs follow clearer strategies with customer satisfactory services.

Cyberpolitik

ADALAH ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Munadhil Abdul Muqsith
Keyword(s):  
Political Communication ◽  
Total Population ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Mailing List ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Internet Service Providers ◽  
Internet Service ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
Internet Media ◽  
First Time

Abstract:The internet developed for the first time in Indonesia in the early 1990s. Starting from the pagayuban network, it is now expanding without boundaries anywhere. A survey conducted by the Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII) said that the number of internet users in Indonesia in 2012 reached 63 million people or 24.23 percent of the country's total population. Next year, that figure is predicted to increase by close to 30 percent to 82 million users and continue to grow to 107 million in 2014 and 139 million or 50 percent of the total population in 2015. million people. This matter also results in political communication with the internet media, or is often said to be cyber politics. Cyber politics in Indonesia has faced growth in recent years. There are many facilities that support the growth of cyber politics, such as Facebook, Twitter, mailing list, YouTube, and others.Keywords: Cyberpolitik, Internet  Abstrak:Internet berkembang pertama kali di Indonesia pada awal tahun 1990-an. Diawali dari pagayuban network kini berkembang luas tanpa batas dimanapun juga. Suatu survei yang diselenggarakan Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia (APJII) mengatakan kalau jumlah pengguna internet di Indonesia tahun 2012 menggapai 63 juta orang ataupun 24,23 persen dari total populasi negeri ini. Tahun depan, angka itu diprediksi naik dekat 30 persen jadi 82 juta pengguna serta terus berkembang jadi 107 juta pada 2014 serta 139 juta ataupun 50 persen total populasi pada 2015. juta orang. Perihal ini pula berakibat pada komunikasi politik dengan media internet, ataupun kerap diucap dengan cyber politic. Cyber politic di Indonesia hadapi pertumbuhan sebagian tahun terakhir. Banyaknya fasilitas yang menunjang pertumbuhan cyber politic semacam terdapatnya facebook, Twitter, mailing list, youtobe, serta lain-lain.Kata Kunci: Cyberpolitik, Internet 

STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF PROVIDERS FOR DIFFERENTIATED INTERNET SERVICES

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 102-113
Author(s):  
Alexey Gaivoronski ◽  
◽  
Vasily Gorbachuk ◽  
Maxim Dunaievskiy ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Network Capacity ◽  
Global Network ◽  
High Price ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Internet Services ◽  
Net Neutrality ◽  
Internet Service Providers ◽  
Video Content ◽  
Internet Service

As computing and Internet connections become general-purpose technologies and services aimed at broad global markets, questions arise about the effectiveness of such markets in terms of public welfare, the participation of differentiated service providers and end-users. Motorola’s Iridium Global Communications project was completed in the 1990s due to similar issues, reaching the goal of technological connectivity for the first time. As Internet services are characterized by high innovation, differentiation and dynamism, they can use well-known models of differentiated products. However, the demand functions in such models are hyperbolic rather than linear. In addition, such models are stochastic and include providers with different ways of competing. In the Internet ecosystem, the links between Internet service providers (ISPs) as telecommunications operators and content service providers are important, especially high-bandwidth video content providers. As increasing bandwidth requires new investments in network capacity, both video content providers and ISPs need to be motivated to do so. In order to analyze the relationships between Internet service providers and content providers in the Internet ecosystem, computable models, based on the construction of payoff functions for all the participants in the ecosystem, are suggested. The introduction of paid content browsing will motivate Internet service providers to invest in increasing the capacity of the global network, which has a trend of exponential growth. At the same time, such a browsing will violate the principles of net neutrality, which provides grounds for the development of new tasks to minimize the violations of net neutrality and maximize the social welfare of the Internet ecosystem. The models point to the importance of the efficiency of Internet service providers, the predictability of demand and the high price elasticity of innovative services.

Controlling Electronic Intrusion by Unsolicited Unwanted Bulk Spam

2009 ◽  
pp. 136-147
Author(s):  
Phaedon John Kozyris
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Present Review ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Internet Service Providers ◽  
Internet Service ◽  
Monetary Cost ◽  
Know How ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Basic Approaches

The ordinary and uncomplicated Spam menace is made possible by technological advances which enable the sender to dispatch millions if not billions of commercial messages without significant monetary cost and without wasting time. The present review will focus on fundamentals, exploring what has already been done and suggesting avenues of improvement. The chapter promotes basic approaches of handling Spam depending on the actions and choices of the receiver. The anti-Spam campaign needs effective enforcement powers and should be able to use all available technological know-how. As the vagaries of enforcement are presented, the role of the Internet Service Providers and advertisers is envisaged.

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