scholarly journals The Effect of Fairness Concern on Carbon Emission Reduction and Revenue Distribution in Construction Supply Chain: Power Structure Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Linqing Pu ◽  
Ting Huang ◽  
Li Yuan ◽  
Lu Gan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Nash Model ◽  
General Contractor ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Reduction Effect ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Centralized Model

This paper invested a two-echelon construction supply chain that consists of a general contractor and a subcontractor. This paper constructs the centralized model and the decentralized models, respectively, and studies the emission reduction and revenue distribution strategies of construction supply chain considering fairness concern and cap-and-trade. Numerical analysis is carried out to analyze the influence of cap-and-trade and fairness concern on the optimal decision and the maximum profit of construction supply chain. This paper shows that, under cap-and-trade policy, the centralized model has the best emission reduction effect and the highest supply chain profit without fairness concern, while the general contractor’s Stackelberg model has the best emission reduction effect and the highest supply chain profit with fairness concern. In the two scenarios, the Vertical Nash model is the most unfavorable to emission reduction, and it will also seriously damage the interests of enterprises. In practice, supply chain should choose the general contractor’s Stackelberg model and avoid the Vertical Nash model. Because fairness concern of the subcontractor will damage the supply chain profits and emission reduction performance, the general contractor shall try to select the subcontractor with lower fairness concern to avoid the loss of profit. Besides, enterprises should actively take measures to reduce fairness concern, such as enterprises signing the contract price confidentiality clause, which aims to reduce fairness concern of the subcontractor. The results of this paper can not only enrich the research content of construction supply chain management, but also provide references for the government to formulate emission reduction policies.

scholarly journals Strategies for Capital Constrained Timber and Carbon Sink Supply Chain under the Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Costs

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Wenfei Lu ◽  
Qianwen Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
General Contractor ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Pure Competition

Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

scholarly journals Green Manufacturing Strategy Considering Retailers’ Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhang ◽  
Zhang ◽  
Pu ◽  
Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Green Manufacturing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Manufacturing Strategy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level

This paper addresses the problem of green manufacturing decision making for a green dual-channel supply chain (SC). In the investigated SC, the manufacturer will decide whether to adopt green manufacturing under the influence of the retailer’s fairness concern-based dual-channel. Thus, we discuss two decision scenarios: the no green manufacturing strategy with retailer fairness (NM model), and green manufacturing with retailer fairness (GM model). Our study has several findings: Firstly, adopting a green manufacturing strategy is not always beneficial to supply-chain members when a retailer has fairness. In particular, when fairness is at a relatively high level, the manufacturer will not adopt green manufacturing. Secondly, under green manufacturing, the product’s green degree and subsidies have a positive impact on the price and demand and the members’ profit and utility. Besides, the subsidies and retailer fairness have a counter effect on the optimal decision. Thirdly, comparing the two scenarios (NM & GM), we found that the channel price of the GM model is lower than the NM model. Finally, from the perspective of the supply chain system, the system tends toward the manufacturer adopting green manufacturing and maintaining retailer fairness concerns at a lower level.

scholarly journals Joint emission reduction dynamic optimization and coordination in the supply chain considering fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the context of low-carbon economy, in order to explore the impact of the fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect on supply chain members' balanced emission reduction decisions and profits, supply chain joint emission reduction dynamic optimization models under four different scenarios are built, in which the manufacturer's optimal emission reduction strategy, the retailer's optimal low-carbon promotion strategy and other equilibrium solutions are solved by differential game theory. On the basis of analysis, a contract is designed to achieve the coordination of the supply chain when members are fairness concern. Some findings are as follows. First, when consumers' purchasing behavior is significantly affected by the reference low-carbon effect, and they have higher expectations for the product's emission reduction level, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions, and do harm to the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Second, the fairness concern behavior of both parties will aggravate the adverse effects of reference low-carbon effect, bring a detrimental effect on the performance of the supply chain, aggravate the double marginal effect of the supply chain, and cause continuous negative social influence. Third, the bilateral cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment, the retailer to increase low-carbon promotion investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties' profits and utilities. In addition, the two cost-sharing ratios are only proportional to the marginal revenue and fairness concern intensity of both parties. Finally, when the two cost-sharing ratios and the revenue-sharing coefficient meet a certain relationship and are within a reasonable range, the bilateral cost sharing-revenue sharing hybrid contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.</p>

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing, Ordering, and Coordination for Prefabricated Building Supply Chain with Power Structure and Flexible Cap-and-Trade

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (19) ◽  
pp. 2426
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Menglin Liu ◽  
Lu Gan ◽  
Chong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Under the increasing pressure of global emission reduction, prefabricated buildings are becoming more and more popular. As prefabricated building manufacturers and assemblers are emerging in the market, how do they make decisions of pricing, ordering, and emission reduction? In this paper, game theory is used to make the decisions for the prefabricated building supply chain with flexible cap-and-trade and different power structures, i.e., using prefabricated building manufacturers as the leader, using the vertical Nash equilibrium, and using prefabricated building assemblers as the leader. The two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and to improve the supply chain performance. Moreover, we discuss the influence of different power structures and the two-part tariff contract on the optimal decisions and profits. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusions. This indicates that the supply chain leaders will gain a higher profit and that the power structure has a significant influence on the two-part tariff contract, which will result in an unfair distribution of profit. High carbon trading prices benefit carbon emission reduction. Consumer low-carbon awareness has a positive effect on carbon emission reduction and supply chain performance.

Pricing and Service Quality Guarantee Decisions in Logistics Service Supply Chain with Fairness Concern

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (05) ◽  
pp. 1850036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ni Du ◽  
Qinglan Han
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Service Market ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Basic Model ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Quality Guarantee

Although existing contributions that explore service quality guarantee problem of a logistic service supply chain (LSSC) consider fairness concern behavior of one member, little attention is paid to considering the combination of members’ fairness concern and the joint decision of pricing and service quality guarantee in LSSC. Therefore, it is necessary to research how different fairness concern affects the joint decision of pricing and service quality guarantee in an LSSC. First considering a price and quality-sensitive logistics service market, a basic model without fairness concern of a customized LSSC is established. Then, a new model with fairness concern of a decentralized LSSC is constructed based on the basic model. The optimal decision of the LSSC with fairness concern is investigated in three cases. In each case, we analyze the effect of fairness concern on the optimal decision, and the expected profits and utilities. Finally, some numerical studies are shown to verify our theoretical analyses and some managerial insights are given.

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