scholarly journals Joint emission reduction dynamic optimization and coordination in the supply chain considering fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the context of low-carbon economy, in order to explore the impact of the fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect on supply chain members' balanced emission reduction decisions and profits, supply chain joint emission reduction dynamic optimization models under four different scenarios are built, in which the manufacturer's optimal emission reduction strategy, the retailer's optimal low-carbon promotion strategy and other equilibrium solutions are solved by differential game theory. On the basis of analysis, a contract is designed to achieve the coordination of the supply chain when members are fairness concern. Some findings are as follows. First, when consumers' purchasing behavior is significantly affected by the reference low-carbon effect, and they have higher expectations for the product's emission reduction level, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions, and do harm to the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Second, the fairness concern behavior of both parties will aggravate the adverse effects of reference low-carbon effect, bring a detrimental effect on the performance of the supply chain, aggravate the double marginal effect of the supply chain, and cause continuous negative social influence. Third, the bilateral cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment, the retailer to increase low-carbon promotion investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties' profits and utilities. In addition, the two cost-sharing ratios are only proportional to the marginal revenue and fairness concern intensity of both parties. Finally, when the two cost-sharing ratios and the revenue-sharing coefficient meet a certain relationship and are within a reasonable range, the bilateral cost sharing-revenue sharing hybrid contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.</p>

scholarly journals Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 539
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Joint Emission Reduction Dynamic Decisions and Coordination in a Supply Chain Considering Altruistic Behavior and Reference Low-Carbon Effect

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
ziyuan zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Intensity Increase ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In the context of low-carbon economy, supply chain members’ joint emission reduction issue has become a research hotspot, while there are few researches which synthetically studies the effect of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and supply chain members’ altruistic behavior on their decisions. To study the impact of supply chain members’ altruistic behavior and consumers’ reference low-carbon effect on their joint emission reduction decisions and profits, we build optimization models under four decision scenarios, in which we solve the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal emission reduction strategies and other equilibrium solutions by differential game theory. We obtain some findings. First, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will harm the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions and retailer's enthusiasm for low-carbon publicity. Second, the altruistic behavior of the manufacturer and the retailer can not only weaken the negative impact of the reference low-carbon effect, but also promote both parties to actively reduce emissions, help achieve Pareto improvement of their own profits and utilities, and obtain additional social welfare. Third, the cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment without affecting the retailer’s low-carbon publicity investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties’ profits and utilities. In addition, the cost-sharing ratio is only proportional to the marginal profits and altruistic intensity of both parties, and is not affected by the reference low-carbon effect. Meanwhile, the cost-sharing ratio will decrease as the manufacturer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase, and will increase as the retailer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase. In particular, when the retailer is completely altruistic, the cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Low carbon joint strategy and coordination for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness

2022 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Jianxin Chen ◽  
Lin Sun ◽  
Tonghua Zhang ◽  
Rui Hou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Fairness Concern

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the paper, fairness concern criterion is utilized to explore the coordination of a dyadic supply chain with a fairness-concerned retailer (acting as a newsvendor), who is committed to low carbon efforts. Two models are developed for stochastic demand disturbances in the forms of multiplicative case and additive case, respectively. Firstly, the optimal joint decision of the retailer and the supply chain are proposed in two scenarios, i.e., decentralized decision and the centralized decision. Secondly, in order to realize channel coordination, the contract of revenue sharing combined with the mechanism of low-carbon cost sharing is designed. Moreover, the influences of the retailer's fairness concern and bargaining power on the joint decision and the contract parameters are also investigated. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and some suggestions to supply chain management are also provided. The results show that the revenue sharing contract can make the supply chain achieved coordination with the cost sharing mechanism of low-carbon efforts. Furthermore, the optimal low-carbon effort level and ordering quantity decrease in terms of fairness-concerned parameter and Nash bargaining power parameter, which increases in unit cost. However, the optimal pricing makes the opposite change.</p>

scholarly journals Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chao-qun Han ◽  
Hua-ying Gu ◽  
Li-hui Sui ◽  
Chang-peng Shao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Impact

Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.

scholarly journals Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Shuying Gong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Source ◽  
The Impact

Considering the impact of dual-source supply and low-carbon manufacturing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, this article constructs a CLSC model with two competitive dominant upstream suppliers and one following a downstream (re-)manufacturer, then coordinates supply chain through cost-sharing contract. Based on the industrial case in the area of power battery, we analyze the optimal strategies under competition, cooperation, and coordination structures separately and then investigate the influences of emission reduction effort and collection efficiency on supply chain performance. The results reveal that collection of used products can positively affect the (re-)manufacturer’s profit but has opposite impact on the new component supplier. Besides, recycling is beneficial to both low-carbon consumers’ utility and social welfare, but hurts the total profit of CLSC because of the high investment cost of collection. Therefore, the paper designs a cost-sharing contract, which is of applicability and efficiency for both economic and environmental development. Furthermore, it can also increase the profit of CLSC up to cooperation case and improve each member’s profit, eliminating double marginal effect and achieving supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Knowledge Stock ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Cost

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

Cost-Sharing Contract in Low Carbonization Supply Chain Based on Improving Demand for Low-Carbon Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 1073-1076 ◽  
pp. 2539-2544
Author(s):  
Yan Ju Zhou ◽  
Yu Qing Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Reduction Cost

For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, we establish Stackelberg models based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. And we analyze the changes of the order quantity, the profits of each member and the whole supply chain before and after the implementation of the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads to a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. Then we derivate the necessary conditions that the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer could both increase.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Investment in Carbon Emission-Reducing Technology Based on Stochasticity and Low-Carbon Preferences

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Shan Yu ◽  
Qiang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Dynamic Perspective ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Due to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emission-reducing measures are urgently needed. Important emission-reduction measures mainly include carbon trading and low-carbon cost subsidies. Comprehensive consideration of these two policies is a research hotspot in the field of low-carbon technology investment. Based on this background, this paper considers the impact of consumer low-carbon preferences on market demand and the impact of uncertainty in carbon emission-reduction behaviour. We construct a stochastic differential game model with upstream and downstream enterprises based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy. From a dynamic perspective, this paper researches the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics of the joint emission-reduction mechanism in a supply chain. This paper discusses the sensitivity of the parameters and uses numerical simulation to verify the impact of each parameter on the emission-reduction decision-making activities of stakeholders after introducing the cost subsidy. The results show that a cost subsidy policy can promote carbon emission-reduction investment and supply chain profit. Thus, it is important to strengthen technical cooperation and exchange among enterprises.

Contracting Emissions Reduction Supply Chain Based on Market Low-Carbon Preference and Carbon Intensity Constraint

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050003
Author(s):  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Ling Liang ◽  
Xu Fang ◽  
Guang Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Carbon Intensity ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Carbon Emissions Reduction ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Impact

Carbon emissions reduction has become a frequently discussed topic in industry and academia. However, how can reduction effects be enhanced with dominant brand and downstream manufacturer? This paper incorporates emissions reduction into a green supply chain which considers consumers’ low-carbon preference behavior and government intensity regulations, in order to discuss the impacts of consumers’ environmental awareness and government constraints on optimal emissions reduction and profit, respectively. The paper first constructs three reduction models on the basis of reality: independent reduction by manufacturer, contractual reduction by brand and collaborative reduction by both. Then it concludes the optimal decisions and compare the models. The results show that both the profits and emissions reduction will be decreased with the strengthened carbon intensity constraint, but the cost-sharing contract can mitigate this negative effect on dominant brand and society. Meanwhile, the acceptable range of cost-sharing ratio will be smaller with a lower cost coefficient of emissions reduction and a higher consumers’ preference. Furthermore, government should design the incentive method or regulate the carbon market to improve the social welfare level. Lastly, a numerical study is conducted, the impact of several key factors on supply chain performance and model selection are presented for management decisions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document