Michael Ruse—Bare-Knuckle Fighting: EvoDevo versus Natural Selection (Biological Theory 1: 402–403, 2006)

The development of socio-biology science brings changes to the security of humansocial life. The biological theory about evolution made discussion that was identified as Social Darwinism. This thought was based on assumptions that human life through natural selection and always in conflict by competition to fight for life, keep the existence, and also survival of the fittest. Social Darwinism in its history produced ideology like Fascism and has made tragedies in the eras of World Wars I and II. As a thought, Social Darwinism still continues today.The competition between countries in the new Millennium era, both in the arms race and economic competition, are reflection of Darwinist thougt.

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Evolution and (aristotelian) virtue ethics

Human Affairs ◽

10.1515/humaff-2019-0016 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 29 (2) ◽

pp. 199-206

Author(s):

John Mizzoni

Keyword(s):

Natural Selection ◽

Virtue Ethics ◽

Recent Work ◽

Bernard Williams ◽

Evolutionary Perspective ◽

Human Origins ◽

Michael Ruse ◽

Ethical Thought ◽

Jonathan Haidt

Abstract It is well known that virtue ethics has become very popular among moral theorists. Even Aristotelian virtue ethics continues to have defenders. Bernard Williams (1983; 1995, p. xy), though, has claimed that this “neo-Aristotelian enterprise” might “require us tofeign amnesia about natural selection.” This paper looks at some recent work on virtueethics as seen from an evolutionary perspective (Michael Ruse, 1991; William Casebeer, 2003; Donald J. Munro, 2005; John Lemos, 2008; Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph, 2008) and explores whether Williams’ evolutionary challenge can be met. Against Williams’ challenge, I argue that “the first and hardest lesson of Darwinism,” as Williams calls it, has indeed found “its way fully into ethical thought” (Williams, 1983, p. xy). And virtue ethics—in several varieties, not only Aristotelian—fits it rather well with anevolutionary perspective on human origins.

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Popper’s analysis of the theory of evolution

Theoria Beograd ◽

10.2298/theo1702019l ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 60 (2) ◽

pp. 19-35

Author(s):

Nebojsa Lukic

Keyword(s):

Natural Selection ◽

Biological Theory ◽

Research Programme ◽

Logical Truth ◽

Empirical Content ◽

Theory Of Evolution

In this paper I will deal with Popper?s analysis of the theory of evolution. Relying on his methodological teaching, known as falsificationism, Popper sought to determine whether it can be said that this significant biological theory is testable. Two directions of Popper?s critique can be selected: 1) one critique shows that theory of evolution can not formulate scientific law and that, therefore, it can not predict; 2) the second critique shows that the principle (or, in Popper?s own words, theory) of natural selection is a tautology - principle of natural selection is simple logical truth which, according to Popper, implies the lack of empirical content of that principle and, consequently, its impossibility to be tested. Conclusion of his analysis is that we ought to look at the theory of evolution, together with the theory of natural selection, as a productive metaphysical research programme. He changed his view on the theory of natural selection in the paper Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind, where he argued that the theory of natural selection is in certain sense testable, that it is not a tautology, but that it is not universally true and he gave up on characterizing that theory as a metaphysical research programme. The aim of this paper is to select the most relevant moments of Popper?s critique and to place them in the context of his methodological teaching.

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