Evolutionary theories and the philosophy of science

Philosophical theories proceeding from the history of physical-mathematical sciences are hardly applicable to the analysis of biosciences and evolutionary theory, in particular. This article briefly reconstructs the history of evolutionary theory beginning with its roots in the 19th century and up to the ultracontemporary concepts. Our objective is to outline the dynamics of Darwinism and anti-Darwinism from the perspective of the philosophy of science. We begin with the arguments of E. Mayr against the applicability of T. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions to the history of biology. Mayr emphasized that Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 caused a genuine scientific revolution in biology, but it was not a Kuhnian revolution. Darwin coined several theories comprising a complex theoretical system. Mayr defined five most crucial of these theories: evolution as such, common descent of all organisms including man, gradualism, the multiplication of species explaining organic diversity, and, finally, the theory of natural selection. Distinguishing these theories is of great significance because their destiny in the history of biology substantially differed. The acceptance of one theory by the majority of the scientific community does not necessarily mean the acceptance of others. Another argument by Mayr proved that Darwin caused two scientific revolutions in biology, which Mayr referred to as the First and Second Darwinian Revolutions. The Second Darwinian Revolution happened already in the 20th century and Mayr himself was its active participant. Both revolutions followed Darwin’s concept of natural selection. The period between these two revolutions can be in no way described as “normal science” in Kuhnian terms. Our reconstruction of the history of evolutionary theory support Mayr’s anti-Kuhnian arguments. Furthermore, we claim that the “evolution of evolutionary theory” can be interpreted in terms of the modified research programmes theory by Imre Lakatos, though not in their “purity”, but rather modified and combined with certain aspects of Marxian-Hegelian dialectics.

Darwin’s Impact on the Medical Sciences

In early nineteenth century medicine, the concepts of organic evolution and natural selection emerged in different contexts, partly anticipating Darwinian revolution. In particular, the anatomical concept of disease favored the perception that men and animals were very similar from a morphological, physiological and pathological point of view, and that this could indicate a certain degree of kinship between them. The debate around human races and human pathological heredity saw first formulations of the principle of natural selection, even if without a full appraisal of its evolutionary implications. Charles Darwin took many inspirations from these medical theories. The impact of the theory of evolution formulated by him in 1859 was only apparently slight in medicine. It is even possible to support that evolutionary concepts contributed in a significant way to the most important medical issues, debates and new discipline in the period between 1880 and 1940.

The biology of mental disorders: What are we talking about?

After the Darwinian revolution, biology is not only the study of the operation of structural elements (functional biology), but also the study of adaption and phylogenetic history (evolutionary biology). From an evolutionary perspective, the biology of mental disorders is not just “neurobiology and genetic constitution” but also adaptive reactions to adverse situations. Evolutionary explanations of mental disorders are biological and non-reductionist.

Pragmatist Portraits of Experimental Intelligence by Peirce, James, Dewey, and Others

Pragmatist accounts of experimental intelligence are, at once, a continuation of the historical debate about the nature, scope, and function of reason and a significant departure from this dispute. They also reveal the efforts of philosophers to come to terms with the Darwinian revolution in the life sciences. Arguably, American pragmatism was the first self-consciously Darwinian movement in Western philosophy. The reconceptions of reason or intelligence formulated by Peirce, James, Dewey, and other pragmatists were central to their reconstruction of philosophy. In conjunction with this, Peirce and Dewey redefined logic as a theory of inquiry. But virtually all of the pragmatists linked intelligence to action. They envisioned human ingenuity to be without inherent limits but its historical forms often to be pathological distortions. They were sensitive to the tragic failures of experimental intelligence to make a difference, to inform and guide action in a liberating and illuminating manner.