The American Narrative: Is There One & What Is It?

Daedalus ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 141 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Chafe

Nearly four centuries of American history have witnessed the evolving conflict between two competing sets of values: a belief that acting on behalf of the common good should guide social and political behavior, and a belief that unfettered individual freedom should dominate political and social life. Tracing this conflict from Puritanism through the American Revolution, the Civil War, the rise of industrialism, the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the Great Society, and the conservative revival of the Nixon/Reagan era, the essay reveals this clash of values as pivotal to understanding the narrative of American history, with contemporary political battles crystallizing just how basic this conflict has been.

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 266-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Zuckert

One new form of liberalism is a doctrine that might be called Constitutional Welfare Liberalism. It stands in some continuity with the varieties of welfare and equality oriented liberalism that emerged in the Nineteenth Century and which found expression in the U.S. in political movements like the New Deal of F.D.R. and the Great Society of L.B.J. Constitutional Welfare Liberalism differs somewhat from earlier versions of Welfare Liberalism in that it claims to be solidly grounded in the fundamentals of the liberal tradition and of the American Constitution. Advocates of Constitutional Welfare Liberalism would replace what they call the “negative-liberties model” of the Constitutional order with a “benefits model.” They rest their case on an analysis of rights that denies the meaningfulness of the common distinction between negative and positive rights. Some advocates of Constitutional Welfare Liberalism also base their claims on the positive empowerments and ends of government as expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution. It is shown here via an analysis of the negative/positive rights distinction that the distinction is indeed meaningful when understood more accurately than Constitutional Welfare Liberalism theorists do. Likewise it is shown that neither the general character of the Constitution as an empowerment of government, nor the particular goals stated in the Preamble imply the benefits model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (58) ◽  
pp. 410
Author(s):  
Janaína Machado STURZA ◽  
Karinne Emanoela Goettems dos SANTOS

RESUMO Objetivo: Este estudo tem como objetivo fomentar a reflexão sobre o atual cenário de conflitos sociais, no qual se encontra a sociedade contemporânea, destacando a importância do acesso à Justiça por meio de um processo civil constitucionalmente adequado, na perspectiva do bem comum. Metodologia: A pesquisa converge para a importância da adaptação dos procedimentos judiciais à realidade social, por meio de um estudo bibliográfico norteado pelo método hipotético dedutivo, apresentando a hermenêutica filosófica gadameriana e as perspectivas de Mauro Cappelletti como principais referenciais teóricos. Resultados: Entender a sociedade a partir de um contexto conflituoso implica assumir uma nova postura diante da complexidade social e da efetivação do necessário processo de transformação na perspectiva de bem comum e, essencialmente, de acesso à Justiça como compromisso. Na órbita do processo civil, esse compromisso torna-se ainda mais evidente com a superveniência do novo Código de Processo. Contribuições: A demonstração de que a efetividade dos direitos fundamentais e a consagração da cidadania perpassam necessariamente por um processo civil constitucionalmente adequado, o qual deve e é capaz de adaptar-se às complexidades da vida social contemporânea.Palavras-chave: bem comum; cidadania; acesso à Justiça; processo constitucionalmente adequado.  ABSTRACT Objective: To encourage reflection on the current scenario of social conflicts in which contemporary society is situated, highlighting the importance of access to Justice by way of a constitutionally adequate civil process in the perspective of the common good. Methodology: The research converges to the importance of adapting judicial procedures to social reality by way of a bibliographic study guided by the hypothetical deductive method, presenting Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics and the perspectives of Mauro Cappelletti as main theoretical references. Results: To understand the society from a conflictual context implies taking a new stance before social complexity and the implementation of the necessary transformation process in the perspective of the common good and, essentially, access to Justice as a commitment. In the orbit of civil proceedings this commitment becomes even more evident upon the supervenience of the new Code of Procedure.Contributions: The demonstration that the effectiveness of fundamental rights and the implementation of citizenship necessarily pass through a constitutionally adequate civil process, which must and is capable of adapting to the complexities of contemporary social life. Keywords: Common good; citizenship; access to Justice; appropriate constitutional process.


Author(s):  
Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo

Migration is a shared condition of all humanity. We have all been strangers in a strange land. All humanity lives today as a result of migration, by themselves or their ancestors. Migration is a matter sometimes of choice, often of need, and always an inalienable right. All helpless people deserve to be helped. Offering such help is a commandment and a blessing shared among all religions. Accordingly, as Pope Francis reminds us, our duties to migrants include “to welcome”, “to protect”, “to promote”, and “to integrate.” National borders are not a result of primary natural law, as aren’t private property and clothes, “because nature did not give [humans] clothes, but art invented them”. National borders depend on social, political and geographical factors. Therefore, faced with current waves of mass migration, in order to establish practices that respond to the common good we need to be guided by three levels of responsibility. The first principle being that “in case of need all things are common”, because “every man is my brother”. This principle is relative to existence or subsistence and conditions other related issues (such as accommodation, food, housing, security, etc.). Secondly, as part of the fundamental rights of people, legal guarantees of primary rights that foster an “organic participation” in the economic and social life of the nation. Access to these economic and social goods, including education and employment, will allow people to develop their own abilities. Thirdly, a deeper sense of integration, reflecting responsibilities related to protecting, examining and developing the values that underpin the deep, stable, unity of a society— and, more fundamentally, create a horizon of public peace, understood as St. Augustine’s "tranquility in order". In particular, with regards to the aforementioned context, policies on migration should be guided by prudence, but prudence must never mean exclusion. On the contrary, governments should evaluate, “with wisdom and foresight, the extent to which their country is in a position, without prejudice to the common good of citizens, to offer a decent life to migrants, especially those truly in need of protection. Strangely enough, the response of most governments in the face of this phenomenon only seems to value the third principle, completely disregarding the first two.


1982 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
David R. Colburn ◽  
Philip H. Burch

Author(s):  
Lash Kurt T

This chapter begins with a fairly exhaustive account of the use of the Ninth Amendment in state and federal courts prior to the New Deal. There is nothing new here in terms of theory: one finds the same analysis of the Ninth Amendment already developed in prior chapters repeated over and over again in state and federal courts throughout the Progressive era. There is a purpose, however, to including this history. One of the most durable myths about the Ninth Amendment is that it attracted little attention prior to the modern Supreme Court's discovery of the Ninth in Griswold v. Connecticut. The present discussion puts this myth permanently to rest. The second half of the chapter helps explain how the myth arose in the first place.


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