Self-Help in the 1990s: The Management of the Self in the Clinton Era

<p>In the 1990s, there was a presumption that the election of Bill Clinton marked a new kind of politics, one marked in part by the heightened visibility of therapeutic language and concepts in political discourse. This thesis questions that presumption by placing trends in the mainstream of self-help (as articulated directly in books and television talk-shows and indirectly in Hollywood cinema) alongside the policy agenda of successive administrations. A comparison of the Clinton era and the preceding Reagan-Bush era does indeed reveal parallels between the dominant strains of therapeutic culture and the dominant politics of each era. Some have sought to explain these parallels by arguing that therapeutic culture displaces traditional forms of legitimisation in the political system. Such an argument suggests that the therapeutic ethos succeeds where “traditional” institutions of all kinds (mainstream religion, the family, the law) are in a post-1960s state of decline. Others find that the influence works in the other direction: that the ethos of personal responsibility within contemporary self-help reflects the growing strength of neoliberalism as practiced by the state since the late 1970s. Neoliberalism here appears not just as an economic agenda but as a wholesale displacement of the social as an organising principle within people's lives - explaining away structural inequalities as the result of individual success and failure. In this argument, neoliberal policies under Clinton may differ in inflection but are essentially continuous with those under Reagan and Bush Snr. By contrast, this thesis argues that the prominence of therapeutic culture in the 1990s represents neither the decline of the social nor the rise of individualism. Following Nikolas Rose and the Foucauldian model of governmentality he uses, I argue that, on the contrary, there was, in the Clinton era, a deep concern both for the therapeutic healing of the self and for the reparation of the social fabric in the midst of a supposed “culture war.” However, the subject and object of that reconciliation differ in kind from that of the Reagan era. While Reagan-era neoliberalism associates freedom with the creation of markets in which rational, choice-making individuals can succeed on their own terms, the centrist politics of the Third Way under Clinton presupposes a world in which partnership not competition is the basis for a new ethical citizen-subject. A close reading of both eighties’ Recovery literature and nineties’ New Age literature shows that while the opposing themes of freedom and responsibility are foregrounded in both eras, the context, rationale and ultimately the meaning of these themes is distinct because they address two different kinds of subjectivity. Similarly, while the actual policies of the Clinton era may resemble those of the Reagan era, the rhetorical terrain of government had shifted: from the market unleashed to the community empowered. I argue that an analysis which seeks not to separate but align the personal and political provides the basis for more nuanced cultural history of both therapeutic culture and contemporary American politics.</p>

Self-Help in the 1990s: The Management of the Self in the Clinton Era

<p>In the 1990s, there was a presumption that the election of Bill Clinton marked a new kind of politics, one marked in part by the heightened visibility of therapeutic language and concepts in political discourse. This thesis questions that presumption by placing trends in the mainstream of self-help (as articulated directly in books and television talk-shows and indirectly in Hollywood cinema) alongside the policy agenda of successive administrations. A comparison of the Clinton era and the preceding Reagan-Bush era does indeed reveal parallels between the dominant strains of therapeutic culture and the dominant politics of each era. Some have sought to explain these parallels by arguing that therapeutic culture displaces traditional forms of legitimisation in the political system. Such an argument suggests that the therapeutic ethos succeeds where “traditional” institutions of all kinds (mainstream religion, the family, the law) are in a post-1960s state of decline. Others find that the influence works in the other direction: that the ethos of personal responsibility within contemporary self-help reflects the growing strength of neoliberalism as practiced by the state since the late 1970s. Neoliberalism here appears not just as an economic agenda but as a wholesale displacement of the social as an organising principle within people's lives - explaining away structural inequalities as the result of individual success and failure. In this argument, neoliberal policies under Clinton may differ in inflection but are essentially continuous with those under Reagan and Bush Snr. By contrast, this thesis argues that the prominence of therapeutic culture in the 1990s represents neither the decline of the social nor the rise of individualism. Following Nikolas Rose and the Foucauldian model of governmentality he uses, I argue that, on the contrary, there was, in the Clinton era, a deep concern both for the therapeutic healing of the self and for the reparation of the social fabric in the midst of a supposed “culture war.” However, the subject and object of that reconciliation differ in kind from that of the Reagan era. While Reagan-era neoliberalism associates freedom with the creation of markets in which rational, choice-making individuals can succeed on their own terms, the centrist politics of the Third Way under Clinton presupposes a world in which partnership not competition is the basis for a new ethical citizen-subject. A close reading of both eighties’ Recovery literature and nineties’ New Age literature shows that while the opposing themes of freedom and responsibility are foregrounded in both eras, the context, rationale and ultimately the meaning of these themes is distinct because they address two different kinds of subjectivity. Similarly, while the actual policies of the Clinton era may resemble those of the Reagan era, the rhetorical terrain of government had shifted: from the market unleashed to the community empowered. I argue that an analysis which seeks not to separate but align the personal and political provides the basis for more nuanced cultural history of both therapeutic culture and contemporary American politics.</p>

A Tale of Two Americas: The American Dream in Cobra Kai

Which different conceptions of the so-called “American Dream” are still alive or gaining ground in the increasingly polarized social climate of the United States during the Trump era? I intend to shed light on this question by analyzing the different types of success ethics presented in the highly popular Netflix series Cobra Kai (2018 - present). This will include an investigation into notions of merit and masculinity and how they are intertwined in the principal conflict between the two main characters: the blue-collar Johnny Lawrence and the affluent Daniel LaRusso – both of whom operate their own respective karate schools. I will embed this conflict within a theoretical framework undergirded by Michael Sandel’s observations on contemporary definitions of “meritocracy” and the associated “rhetoric of rising.” In addition, I will lean on George Lakoff’s linguistic concepts of the “strict vs nurturant parent,” and Lauren Berlant’s notion of “cruel optimism.” In doing so, I hope to illuminate the deep-seated workings of competing philosophies on what “it takes to get ahead” in today’s United States. One of my main findings is that Lawrence’s brand of hard-bodied, Reagan-era masculinity is mutually reinforced with LaRusso’s incremental and cosmopolitan approach, thereby perpetuating polarization and antagonism. The fact that both karate teachers are keen to impart their vision on a younger generation is also indicative of how this enmity represents a battle for the “soul of America.” Given ongoing trends toward increasing social, economic, and cultural divides within the U.S., it is of great importance to examine how these developments are negotiated in popular culture. Cobra Kai offers fertile ground for addressing this question.

From capes to Tuffskin jeans: Stephen King’s vampires and 1980s angst

The central premise of this article is that Stephen King’s use of the vampire as a figure of horror transforms across three texts: ‘Salem’s Lot, ‘The night flier’ and ‘Popsy’. Drawing upon Reagan-era anxieties, King brings us to the conclusion in ‘Popsy’ that the prototypical vampire is not necessarily the one people need to fear since it is the human monster who preys on the vulnerable.

Fashioning masculine anxieties: Clothes and style in The Bonfire of the Vanities

This article is a broad-spectrum exploration of the reconciliations between fashion choices and masculine anxieties in Tom Wolfe’s The Bonfire of the Vanities. It traces the complex processes where the socially stratified worlds of the male characters are configured, especially through the tropes of clothes and lifestyle. The American 1980s, in times of Reaganomics, are understood as a period of excess, social mores and ‘bigness’. This is reflected in the operatic style of Bonfire, which offers a social critique of New York City in the 1980s. Wolfe’s dispassionate gaze takes in the excesses of the Reagan era, all the time exploring the relationship between men’s clothing and New York City. The central premise of the article pivots on performing masculinity through the 1980s menswear, where garments and lifestyle choices acquire specific meanings as indexes of class, vanity, individuality, identity and social mobility. The focus is on the three masculine protagonists at the forefront, but there are also glancing references to other secondary characters. Fashion, within the scope of this article, is based on the explorations of dress, clothes and style, rather than catwalk.

Youngstown

Over a long career, New Jersey’s Bruce Springsteen became the poet of the working poor, just as Indiana’s John Mellencamp became the voice of embattled farm families and Bob Seger the rock ‘n’ roll bard of the Midwest. Springsteen’s stature became such that, against his own intentions, his appeal was invoked by Republican conservatives during the transformative Reagan era. The success of these artists, singing about the hopes and fears of ordinary citizens whose communities and livelihoods were besieged by globalization, was directly tied to the sweeping shifts of labor and governance that affected the industrialized world in the 1980s.

Claiming Martin Luther King, Jr. for the right: The Martin Luther King Day holiday in the Reagan era

The article traces how American conservatives laid claim to the memory of Martin Luther King, Jr. We focus on a key moment in that process, when Republicans in the early 1980s battled other Republicans to establish King’s birthday as a federal holiday and thereby distinguish a conservative position on racial inequality from that associated with southern opposition to civil rights. The victory was consequential, aiding the New Right’s efforts to roll back gains on affirmative action and other race-conscious policies. We use the case to explore the conditions in which political actors are able to lay claim to venerated historical figures who actually had very different beliefs and commitments. The prior popularization of the figure makes it politically advantageous to identify with his or her legacy but also makes it possible to do so credibly. As they are popularized, the figure’s beliefs are made general, abstract, and often vague in a way that lends them to appropriation by those on the other side of partisan lines. Such appropriation is further aided by access to a communicative infrastructure of foundations, think tanks, and media outlets that allows political actors to secure an audience for their reinterpretation of the past.