Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Iain Johnston

“Rising nationalism” has been a major meme in commentary on the development of China's material power since the early 1990s. Analysts often claim that rising nationalism, especially among China's youth, is an important force compelling the Chinese leadership to take a tougher stand on a range of foreign policy issues, particularly maritime disputes in East Asia. The rising nationalism meme is one element in the “newly assertive China” narrative that generalizes from China's coercive diplomacy in these disputes to claim that a dissatisfied China is challenging a U.S.-dominated liberal international order writ large. But is this meme accurate? Generally, research on Chinese nationalism has lacked a baseline against which to measure changing levels of nationalism across time. The data from the Beijing Area Study survey of Beijing residents from 1998 to 2015 suggest that the rising popular nationalism meme is empirically inaccurate. This finding implies that there are other factors that may be more important in explaining China's coercive diplomacy on maritime issues, such as elite opinion, the personal preferences of top leaders, security dilemma dynamics, organizational interests, or some combination thereof.

1995 ◽  
Vol 142 ◽  
pp. 295-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen S. Whiting

As the Deng era approaches its end, concern abroad, particularly in East Asia, focuses on how the People's Republic of China (PRC) will cope with territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and India, and the continued quest for Taiwan. Meanwhile Chinese military modernization steadily increases the People's Liberation Army (PLA) air and sea power projection. The question arises: might a beleaguered post-Deng leadership seek to strengthen its legitimacy through exploitation of Chinese nationalism and if so, how would this manifest itself in foreign relations?


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 1085-1104
Author(s):  
Mustafa Kutlay ◽  
Ziya Öniş

Abstract Turkish foreign policy has dramatically transformed over the last two decades. In the first decade of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rule, the ‘logic of interdependence’ constituted the driving motive of Turkish foreign policy. In the second decade, however, the ‘logic of interdependence’ and the soft power-driven ‘mediator–integrator’ role were gradually replaced with a quest for ‘strategic autonomy’, accompanied by interventionism, unilateralism and coercive diplomacy. This article explores the causes of this dramatic shift. We argue that ‘strategic autonomy’, which goes beyond a moderate level of status-seeking compatible with Turkey's material power credentials, has a double connotation in the Turkish context. First, it constitutes a framework for the Turkish ruling elite to align with the non-western great powers and balance the US-led hierarchical order. Second, and more importantly, it serves as a legitimating foreign policy discourse for the government to mobilize its electoral base at home, fragment opposition and accrue popular support. We conclude that the search for autonomy from its western allies and the move towards the Russia–China axis has led to Turkey's isolation and permitted the emergence of new forms of dependence.


Asian Survey ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 625-639
Author(s):  
Douglas H. Mendel, Jr.
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jennifer Pan ◽  
Zijie Shao ◽  
Yiqing Xu

Abstract Research shows that government-controlled media is an effective tool for authoritarian regimes to shape public opinion. Does government-controlled media remain effective when it is required to support changes in positions that autocrats take on issues? Existing theories do not provide a clear answer to this question, but we often observe authoritarian governments using government media to frame policies in new ways when significant changes in policy positions are required. By conducting an experiment that exposes respondents to government-controlled media—in the form of TV news segments—on issues where the regime substantially changed its policy positions, we find that by framing the same issue differently, government-controlled media moves respondents to adopt policy positions closer to the ones espoused by the regime regardless of individual predisposition. This result holds for domestic and foreign policy issues, for direct and composite measures of attitudes, and persists up to 48 hours after exposure.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 271-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE CUMINGS

At the inception of the twenty-first century—not to mention the next millennium—books on ‘the American Century’ proliferate monthly, if not daily. We now have The American Century Dictionary, The American Century Thesaurus, and even The American Century Cookbook; perhaps the American Century baseball cap or cologne is not far behind. With one or two exceptions, the authors celebrate the unipolar pre-eminence and comprehensive economic advantage that the United States now enjoys. Surveys of public opinion show that most people agree: the American wave appears to be surging just as the year 2000 beckons. Unemployment and inflation are both at twenty-year lows, sending economists (who say you can't get lows for both at the same time) back to the drawing board. The stock market roars past the magic 10,000 mark, and the monster federal budget deficit of a decade ago miraculously metamorphoses into a surplus that may soon reach upwards of $1 trillion. Meanwhile President William Jefferson Clinton, not long after a humiliating impeachment, is rated in 1999 as the best of all postwar presidents in conducting foreign policy (a dizzying ascent from eighth place in 1994), according to a nationwide poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This surprising result might also, of course, bespeak inattention: when asked to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the US, fully 21 per cent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered ‘don't know’), and a mere seven per cent thought foreign policy issues were important to the nation. But who cares, when all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds?


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