Pursuing European Strategic Autonomy: Up-to-date Results

2016–2020 witnessed significant structural changes in the foreign and security policy of the European Union. External factors encouraged the need to strengthen the EU strategic autonomy not only in the form of particular practical moves related to the establishment and development of new institutions, but also as part of an attempt to formulate a new common discourse. The article examines these processes through the security communities theory, traditionally applied to analyze transatlantic dynamics. This helps to both systemically address the recent changes and identify miscalculations and missing elements in framing the European security community. Since the 2020 PESCO Strategic Review to a certain extent summed up the initial phase of development of the central initiative of the whole process, the article analyzes the so far achieved results in setting up the new agenda for the EU and the prospects of translating it into joint practices. The main assumption posits that the key obstacle for enhancing strategic autonomy is the need to use a collective identity - both a tool for developing institutions and a goal of this process. As a result, neither a new collective identity, nor a functional network of institutions have been built, leaving the EU unprepared to bring the idea of strategic autonomy further.

EUROPEAN UNION’S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND BIDEN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Over the last decade the EU has faced challenges on numerous fronts: economic crisis and slow recovery, refugee crisis, terrorism, Brexit, lack of effectiveness of its foreign and security policy. In recent years, the EU has put new effort to define its purpose and standing in international relations, and it seeks to become strategically autonomous actor. That means an actor with the ability to set priorities and make decisions. As the role of the United States is still pre-eminent in the security of Europe, the EU-US relations have a special bearing on that EU’s ambition. In this paper we provide an overview of the relations between these two actors with the focus on the first year of Joseph Biden presidency, and we argue that through a complex interaction the EU will seek to define its policies independently of the United States, wishing to expand its space for maneuver and action.

European Strategic Autonomy: The Test Case of Iran

The ideal of the European Union (EU) as a global peace and security actor is increasingly clashing with the reality of a multipolar world defined by militarised conflict, and a loosening of the formerly close trans-Atlantic relationship with the United States. European policy-makers have identified strategic autonomy as a possible remedy in the face of a growing number of internal and external security threats. This paper adds to the conceptualisation of strategic autonomy by contextualising its current usage and political genealogy. Empirically, European strategic autonomy is examined concerning the efforts to preserve the Iranian nuclear deal after the Trump administration had ceased US participation in May 2018. In particular, the paper assesses the European response to counter the re-imposed unilateral United States (US) sanctions against European individuals and entities by updating the so-called blocking regulation, and setting up a special purpose vehicle (spv) for facilitating trade with Iran. The results show that the European struggle toward achieving strategic autonomy has largely failed, but that it holds valuable lessons to approximate this ideal in the future.

Política europea de seguridad y defensa y sus efectos en la industria de defensa

Defence has traditionally not been a priority within Community policies. However, in recent years it had become aware of the need to promote it, with special attention to the development of the industrial base. The most significant milestone for change comes in December 2013 when the Council discusses the future of security and defence. Until then, the Council took precedence over national optics and the Commission acted in the face of industry as a regulator to promote the implementation of single market rules in the defence market. The Libyan crisis of 2011 highlighted the need for strategic autonomy. This abstract concept implies the capability to act. It highlights the need for greater autonomy in industrial matters to support military capabilities without external dependencies. The crisis also occurs at a time of widespread decline in defence budgets that makes it difficult for nations to tackle large programs individually. The need for a competitive industrial base to support autonomous operations is of value. It is in this context that the EU Global Strategy in 2016 is enacted, resulting in the implementation in defence of the CFSP initiative aimed at streamlining demand, and the European Defence Plan, which includes the creation of a specific fund, the EDF, aimed at incentivising industrial cooperation to act on the supply side. The initiatives launched over the past four years to promote security and defence cooperation, with particular attention to the industrial component, are underway and will be difficult to go back even if European countries are in the dilemma between protectionism and cooperation. The COVID 19 crisis has diverted that attention. The future presents a scenario of greater strategic instability, which is faced with different national perspectives, greater competition between great powers in which Europe does not present a single voice, and a European society that seems far from its defence. Under these conditions, Europe faces the need to decide between having military and industrial capabilities appropriate to its political objectives or maintaining formulas for cooperation with third parties following current models. If the strategic objective is to have sufficient autonomy to address actions independently, the development of an industrial defence policy will be a basic element and will be conditioned by member states' visions, budgetary effort, and level of coordination of operational demand and industrial supply.

French EU presidency will focus on strategic autonomy

Significance Macron's priorities will include strengthening EU autonomy in areas such as defence and digital security, promoting the role of nuclear energy as ‘sustainable’ and advancing progress towards an EU minimum wage. Impacts Domestic politics and energy goals will render France less confrontational than other western members towards Hungary and Poland. The French presidency will focus on strengthening European coordination and cooperation regarding strategy in the Indo-Pacific. France is unlikely to use its presidency to intensify efforts to ratify the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.

Geopolitics, Digital Sovereignty…What’s in a Word?

An overlay of digital networks and services often operated by global players encircles and “shrinks” the planet. At the same time, the geopolitical dynamics have entered a cycle of feud for leadership between trade blocs who compete for economic and industrial leadership but also on ethics, values, and political outlook. In this context, governments and lawmakers are struggling to combine the need for global cooperation in digital matters with the imperative to protect their jurisdiction from undue influence and provide economic agents with the means to compete on a global scale. The concept of “digital sovereignty” was carved to address this. Words matter a lot especially when they are meant to translate political goals. We argue that “digital sovereignty” lacks meaning and teeth, while the concept of “strategic autonomy” is more operative, contains in itself the elements of strategic planning, and should lead EU to aim at genuine “digital non-alignment.”

Global Horizons of the Atlantic Alliance: the Biden “Vaccine”

The article examines the conceptual issues of the transatlantic relations under the American administration in 2021 and the renewal of the NATO strategy. The NATO summit in Brussels on June 14, 2021, which was attended by US President Joe Biden, was initially seen as a US “coming back” to Europe after a turbulent “trumpism” period in transatlantic relations. The summit communiqué defines the main lines of the alliance transformation in response to the growing challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, considering the main ones incoming from Russia and China, while also imposed by international terrorism. The analysis of the Summit decisions and the follow-up of Joe Biden's European meetings proves the alliance globalization trend, both in geopolitical and functional terms. The summit, while having adopted the NATO 2030 Agenda, decided to adopt a new strategic concept at the next meeting in Spain in 2022. The author argues that the unresolved transatlantic problems and the allies’ disagreements internally challenge the alliance “global” strategy. The “trusted leadership” the Biden administration sets against the “Trump Doctrine” undermines the allies’ ability to step up the European strategic autonomy project, including in relations with Russia and China, as well as in after-Brexit Euro-Atlantic rebalancing.