scholarly journals Efficiency and Equilibrium in Network Games: An Experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
Edoardo Gallo ◽  
Chang Yan
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Network Game ◽  
Asymmetric Networks ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium

Abstract The tension between efficiency and equilibrium is a central feature of economic systems. We examine this trade-off in a network game with a unique Nash equilibrium in which agents can achieve a higher payoff by following a “collaborative norm”. Subjects establish and maintain a collaborative norm in the circle, but the norm weakens with the introduction of one hub connected to everyone in the wheel. In complex and asymmetric networks of 15 and 21 nodes, the norm disappears and subjects’ play converges to Nash. We provide evidence that subjects base their decisions on their degree, rather than the overall network structure.

scholarly journals Economic Analysis of Accident Law: A New Liability Rule that Induces Socially Optimal Behaviour in Case of Limited Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Astha Srivastava ◽  
Ankur Srivastava
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Standard Of Care ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Liability Rules ◽  
Levels Of Care ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Behaviour

AbstractIn accident law, we seek a liability rule that will induce both the parties to adopt socially optimal levels of precaution. Economic analysis, however, shows that none of the commonly used liability rules induce both parties to adopt optimal levels, if courts have access only to ‘Limited Information’ on. In such a case, it has also been established (K. (2006). Efficiency of liability rules: a reconsideration. J. Int. Trade Econ. Dev. 15: 359–373) that no liability rule based on cost justified untaken precaution as a standard of care can be efficient. In this paper, we describe a two-step liability rule: the rule of negligence with the defence of relative negligence. We prove that this rule has a unique Nash equilibrium at socially optimal levels of care for the non-cooperative game, and therefore induces both parties to adopt socially optimal behaviour even in case of limited information.

scholarly journals Multiple Activities in Networks

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying-Ju Chen ◽  
Yves Zenou, ◽  
Junjie Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Network Model ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Network Density ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
The One

We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular, that quadratic games with linear best-reply functions aggregate nicely to multiple activities because equilibrium efforts obey similar formulas to that of the one-activity case. We then derive some comparative-statics results showing how own productivity affects equilibrium efforts and how network density impacts equilibrium outcomes. (JEL C72, D11, D85, Z13)

Applications to Economics

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Common Effort ◽  
The Cost ◽  
All Pay Auction ◽  
Individual Effort ◽  
Applications To Economics

This chapter explores whether the equilibrium effects of noisy behavior can cause large deviations from standard predictions in economically relevant situations. It considers a simple price-competition game, which is also partly motivated by the possibility of changing a payoff parameter that has no effect on the unique Nash equilibrium, but which may be expected to affect quantal response equilibrium. In the minimum-effort coordination game studied, any common effort in the range of feasible effort levels is a Nash equilibrium, but one would expect that an increase in the cost of individual effort or an increase in the number of players who are trying to coordinate would reduce the effort levels observed in an experiment. The chapter presents an analysis of the logit equilibrium and rent dissipation for a rent-seeking contest that is modeled as an “all-pay auction.” The final two applications in this chapter deal with auctions with private information.

scholarly journals Identifying the Salient Genes in Microarray Data: A Novel Game Theoretic Model for the Co-Expression Network

Diagnostics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 586
Author(s):  
Papori Neog Bora ◽  
Vishwa Jyoti Baruah ◽  
Surajit Borkotokey ◽  
Loyimee Gogoi ◽  
Priyakshi Mahanta ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Gene Expression ◽  
Genetic Diseases ◽  
System Level ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cancer Dataset ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Diagnosis And Prognosis ◽  
Network Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Relevance Index

Microarray techniques are used to generate a large amount of information on gene expression. This information can be statistically processed and analyzed to identify the genes useful for the diagnosis and prognosis of genetic diseases. Game theoretic tools are applied to analyze the gene expression data. Gene co-expression networks are increasingly used to explore the system-level functionality of genes, where the roles of the genes in building networks in addition to their independent activities are also considered. In this paper, we develop a novel microarray network game by constructing a gene co-expression network and defining a game on this network. The notion of the Link Relevance Index (LRI) for this network game is introduced and characterized. The LRI successfully identifies the relevant cancer biomarkers. It also enables identifying salient genes in the colon cancer dataset. Network games can more accurately describe the interactions among genes as their basic premises are to consider the interactions among players prescribed by a network structure. LRI presents a tool to identify the underlying salient genes involved in cancer or other metabolic syndromes.

scholarly journals Cultural selection shapes network structure

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (8) ◽  
pp. eaaw0609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Smolla ◽  
Erol Akçay
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Skill Sets ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Dense Networks ◽  
The Social

Cultural evolution relies on the social transmission of cultural traits along a population’s social network. Research indicates that network structure affects information spread and thus the capacity for cumulative culture. However, how network structure itself is driven by population-culture co-evolution remains largely unclear. We use a simple model to investigate how populations negotiate the trade-off between acquiring new skills and getting better at existing skills and how this trade-off shapes social networks. We find unexpected eco-evolutionary feedbacks from culture onto social networks and vice versa. We show that selecting for skill generalists results in sparse networks with diverse skill sets, whereas selecting for skill specialists results in dense networks and a population that specializes on the same few skills on which everyone is an expert. Our model advances our understanding of the complex feedbacks in cultural evolution and demonstrates how individual-level behavior can lead to the emergence of population-level structure.

scholarly journals Strategic equilibrium versus global optimum for a pair of competing servers

2006 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 1165-1172
Author(s):  
Benjamin Avi-Itzhak ◽  
Boaz Golany ◽  
Uriel G. Rothblum
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Queueing System ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Global Optimum ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Service Rates ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Person Game ◽  
The Given ◽  
Linear Penalties

Christ and Avi-Itzhak (2002) analyzed a queueing system with two competing servers who determine their service rates so as to optimize their individual utilities. The system is formulated as a two-person game; Christ and Avi-Itzhak proved the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium which is symmetric. In this paper, we explore globally optimal solutions. We prove that the unique Nash equilibrium is generally strictly inferior to a globally optimal solution and that optimal solutions are symmetric and require the servers to adopt service rates that are smaller than those occurring in equilibrium. Furthermore, given a symmetric globally optimal solution, we show how to impose linear penalties on the service rates so that the given optimal solution becomes a unique Nash equilibrium. When service rates are not observable, we show how the same effect is achieved by imposing linear penalties on a corresponding signal.

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