Witnesses before the International Criminal Court

Author(s):  
Sylvia Ntube Ngane

AbstractIt is an established rule of international law that all witnesses shall testify at the seat of the court. The witness scheme of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a complex one which provides for direct and indirect judicial authority over witnesses. This article grabbles with the complexities of the ICC procedural rules with regard to witnesses, concentrating on three components in the ICC witness scheme: testimony, cooperation and protection. Part I of this article examines the general rule of witness testimony before the Court and different alternatives for the giving of testimonial evidence when a witness cannot be present before the Court. The ICC's powers to compel witnesses are extremely limited and it is forced to rely on traditional legal assistance such as depositions. Part II discusses the exercise of indirect judicial authority by the Court through the assistance of States in relation to witnesses. It analyses provisions on State cooperation with witnesses, national implementing legislation with regard to witnesses and assesses the effectiveness of this legislation. The subsequent practice of State Parties as reflected by their implementing legislation on witnesses proves that a consistent practice does not exist. This section also examines the cooperation between the ICC and international organisations as regards witnesses. Part III examines the ICC Witness Protection Scheme; it looks at the ways in which witnesses are protected and it cites the practice of other tribunals. It then looks at the ICC's Victims and Witness Unit vis-à-vis the policies and mechanisms in place.

2003 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spyros Economides

AbstractThe International Criminal Court (ICC) came into effect on 1 July 2002. This article gives an account of the historical background to the ICC and an overview of the Court's Statute, remit and powers. It is argued that the ICC is a highly politicized legal institution which will only be effective through inter-state cooperation. Despite its lengthy historical antecedents and legal precedents, prudence suggests that — due to the nature of international politics — the establishment of the ICC should be viewed as the beginning of a cumulative process of reforming the politics of international justice rather than the end of a process of transformation in international law.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 32 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 32 addresses defences of mistake of fact or mistake of law. The drafters of the Statute did not want to leave the determination of defences to the discretion of judges, an approach used in all of the earlier models including the final draft Code of Crimes adopted by the International Law Commission in 1996. In general, the purpose of codifying defences in the Rome Statute is not to authorize them but rather to confine them. Thus, article 32 admits defences of mistake of fact and law but under certain conditions. If article 32 were not in the Statute, the general rule on mens rea set out in article 30 would apply without restriction, possibly subject to limitation by the Elements of Crimes.


Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


Author(s):  
Andrew Wolman

Abstract The International Criminal Court (ICC) can exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states parties. However, it has never been clear whether the Court will automatically recognize a nationality that has been conferred by a state party under its domestic law, nor what criteria it would use to evaluate that nationality should it not be automatically accepted. In December 2019, the Office of the Prosecutor made its first formal pronouncement on the question, finding that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over North Koreans, despite their being South Korean nationals under South Korean law, because North Koreans are not able to exercise their rights as South Koreans until accepted as such by application, and on occasion their applications might be refused. In this article, I reject the Prosecutor’s analysis as misguided. I also reject the other main approaches to nationality recognition suggested by scholars, namely a ‘genuine link’ requirement, a deferral to municipal law, and a deferral to municipal law except where a conferral of nationality violates international law. Instead, I propose a functional approach that would respect municipal conferral of nationality unless that conferral unreasonably interferes with the sovereign interests of a non-state party.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 672-690
Author(s):  
Kyle Rapp

AbstractWhat is the role of rhetoric and argumentation in international relations? Some argue that it is little more than ‘cheap talk’, while others say that it may play a role in persuasion or coordination. However, why states deploy certain arguments, and why these arguments succeed or fail, is less well understood. I argue that, in international negotiations, certain types of legal frames are particularly useful for creating winning arguments. When a state bases its arguments on constitutive legal claims, opponents are more likely to become trapped by the law: unable to develop sustainable rebuttals or advance their preferred policy. To evaluate this theory, I apply qualitative discourse analysis to the US arguments on the crime of aggression at the Kampala Review Conference of the International Criminal Court – where the US advanced numerous arguments intended to reshape the crime to align with US interests. The analysis supports the theoretical propositions – arguments framed on codified legal grounds had greater success, while arguments framed on more political grounds were less sustainable, failing to achieve the desired outcomes. These findings further develop our understanding of the use of international law in rhetoric, argumentation, and negotiation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.


2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-132
Author(s):  
Shane Darcy

AbstractInternational law has not traditionally recognised individuals as victims of the crime of aggression. Recent developments may precipitate a departure from this approach. The activation of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the crime of aggression opens the way for the future application of the Court's regime of victim participation and reparation in the context of prosecutions for this crime. The determination by the United Nations Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 36 that any deprivation of life resulting from an act of aggression violates Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights serves to recognise a previously overlooked class of victims. This article explores these recent developments, by discussing their background, meaning and implications for international law and the rights of victims.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Daria A. Sedova

In the entire history of mankind, a large number of acts of violence and aggression have been committed. Over the past 50 years alone, there have been more than 400 interstate and intrastate conflicts that have claimed the lives of millions of people. Increasingly, there has been an urgent need to protect the violated rights of individuals. The idea of creating a single international body for the protection of human rights has been discussed more than once. For the first time, the idea of creating an international judicial body was expressed in 1948 by the UN General Assembly after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials at the end of World War II, which issue has been discussed at the United Nations ever since. However, efforts to create such a mechanism have not been successful, despite the need for a permanent criminal court to prosecute and punish those who commit the most serious crimes. In 1998, this idea was realized. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has sought ways to establish a world order with a fair resolution of conflicts. It has long been recognized, the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal noted, that international law imposes duties and obligations on specific individuals as well as on the state. [] Crimes against international law are committed by people, not by abstract categories, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be respected. To date, the ICC is successfully coping with the task of punishing those persons or groups of persons who have committed the international crimes listed in the Rome Statute. It would seem that the balance between good and evil has been found. The crime has been committed and the criminal punished. But it is important to note that the procedural issues have not been resolved as well as that of punishing criminals. An urgent matter today is the status of defenders of the accused in international criminal proceedings. This question requires not only a doctrinal, but also a practical understanding.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Fazlollah Foroughi ◽  
Zahra Dastan

Due to quantitative expansion and evolution in committing the crime at the international level, the scope of criminal proceedings has been widened significantly. Tolerance and forgiveness towards crimes that happen at international level not only is a double oppression on the victims, but also provide a fertile context for others to commit crimes more daringly. Thus, it is essential that international criminals are held accountable to the law and competent institution, and the realization of this issue leads to the victim satisfaction in international law. Not only in international law, but also in domestic law, show respect and protection of human rights is effective only when there is an effective justice system to guarantee the rights. Although some international crimes practically occur by the government or at least high-ranking government officials, the Statute of the International Criminal Court has reiterated this point that they only have jurisdiction over the crimes committed by natural persons rather than legal entities, which one good example is governments, and although the real victims of these crimes have been human beings, in the case of action and referring the case to the competent international courts, these are the states (rather than the victims) that actually have the right of access to the authorities and not beneficiaries .Thus, at the first step, we should see whether the Court has jurisdiction over the crime committed by the government and whether people can file an action independently in the International Criminal Court or not? When people, rather than governments, are beneficiaries in some international crimes, why only the government and not the people is the plaintiff? And what is the right of the victim in such category of crimes? Accordingly, the current research seeks to examine these rights and restrictions, and relevant limitations.


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