Health, Disability & Parental Interests: Adopting a Contextual Approach in the Reproductive Torts

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 213-243
Author(s):  
Nicolette Priaulx

AbstractIllustrating the limitations of the notion that caring for a disabled child is harmful and sufficiently distinctive from the (judicially viewed harmless) experience of caring for non-disabled children, this article takes issue with the differential outcomes of the reproductive torts where success pivots upon the presence or absence of disability. Since caring for any child must be seen as bringing about a significant caring responsibility, if there is a difference in the burden that results, this will be a matter of extent, not kind. Also taking a critical view of the House of Lords recent determination of Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital, this article notes that nor can a "common approach" to all claims of wrongful conception and birth offer an equitable alternative. Ignoring context and treating all reproductive outcomes equally for the purposes of compensation is certain to result in manifest unfairness. The thrust of the argument is that it is essential that the law embrace a more contemporary and contextual approach, based on the value of reproductive autonomy.

2009 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. D. FORD

The Articles of Union approved by the parliaments of Scotland and England in 1707 provided for the preservation of the private law of Scotland and for the determination of disputes arising north of the border in Scottish courts. At the same time, however, the Articles not only allowed for the amendment of the law by legislation enacted at Westminster but also left open the possibility of appeals being made to the British parliament against decisions delivered in Scottish courts. The Articles did not allow explicitly for appeals, but nor did they prohibit them, and dissatisfied litigants, by exercising the privilege asserted in the Claim of Right to protest for remeid of law against decisions of the lords of council and session, enabled the upper house of the new parliament to substitute its decisions for those delivered by the supreme civil court in Scotland. This much has long been understood by historians of Scots law, as has the significant impact the opinions expressed by English judges in the House of Lords came to have on the development of the modern law. Yet what has never been properly understood is the nature of the protestations for remeid of law from which appeals to the British parliament emerged. Detailed study of these protestations in the years before and immediately following the union reveals that they were conceived of in several different ways and that their nature was never clearly defined. Nevertheless, it also tends to confirm that there is some basis for the common suspicion that appeals were not intended to be made to the House of Lords in the way that they have been.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-202
Author(s):  
Hamid Pongoliu
Keyword(s):  
The Will ◽  

Gorontalo has a customary principle derived from sharia law, and the sharia law is sourced from the Qur'an, hadith, ijmak and qiyas (adati-hula'a to syara'a, syara'a hula'a to Kitabi), which should reflect the existence of the implementation of the distribution of inheritance in Islam in the Gorontalo community. This customary principle can be a source of law if it is a rational act, not immorality, done always repeatedly, does not bring harm and does not conflict with the law of sharak. But in reality there is the implementation of inheritance that violates Islamic law, namely the distribution by way of deliberation, the determination of the amount of heirs equally, the delay in the distribution of inheritance, wills with houses given to girls, wills not to distribute inheritance, distribution of assets it depends on the will of the heir and the delay in the distribution of inheritance on the grounds that one of the parents is still alive. The distribution by deliberation and determination of the amount of the portion for each heir are equally acceptable as long as they follow the guidelines of the Compilation of Islamic Law article 183 and the concept of takharruj which was previously preceded by the Shari'a division. After the heirs know the size of the portion, then they may agree to share it in their own way or leave the inheritance according to Shari'a and agree to give to each other with other heirs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Anmari Meerkotter

The Constitutional Court (CC) judgment of Lee v Minister of Correction Services 2013 2SA 144 (CC) is a recent contribution to transformative constitutional jurisprudence in the field of the law of delict. This matter turned on the issue of factual causation in the context of wrongful and negligent systemic omissions by the state. In this case note, I explore the law relating to this element of delictual liability with specific regard to the traditional test for factual causation – the conditio sine qua non (‘but-for’) test. In particular, I note the problems occasioned by formalistic adherence to this test in the context of systemic state omissions as evidenced by the SCA judgment in the same matter. I also consider the manner in which English courts have addressed this problem. Thereafter, I analyse the CC’s broader approach to the determination of factual causation as one based on common sense and justice. I argue that this approach endorses a break from a formalistic application of the test and constitutes a step towards an approach which resonates with the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. Furthermore, it presents an appropriate solution to the problems associated with factual causation where systemic omissions are concerned. I then consider the transformative impact of the Lee judgment. In particular, I argue that the broader enquiry favoured by the CC facilitates the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed state accountability, and amounts to an extension of the existing norm of accountability jurisprudence. Hence, I contend that the judgment presents a further effort by the Constitutional Court to effect wholesale the constitutionalisation of the law of delict, as well as a vindicatory tool to be used by litigants who have been adversely affected by systemic state omissions.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter analyses the practical application of the law of belligerent occupation in internationalized armed conflicts in its temporal, geographical, and personal dimensions. Firstly, from a temporal perspective, the law is shown to apply once one of the conflict parties consolidates its control over the enemy territory and substitutes its own authority for that of the displaced enemy. Secondly, the chapter assesses the geographical scope of the applicable law and draws specific guidelines for the determination of the territory subject to the law of occupation in various types of internationalized armed conflicts. Thirdly, the chapter endorses the allegiance-based approach to the designation of protected persons under the law of occupation and applies it to the reality of internationalized armed conflict. Overall, the chapter presents a workable toolkit for the application of the law of occupation to internationalized armed conflicts.


Author(s):  
Zehra Çalışkan ◽  
Derya Evgin ◽  
Nuray Caner ◽  
Bahriye Kaplan ◽  
Gonca Özyurt

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Jakub Mácha

Abstract Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play.


1910 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 491
Author(s):  
F. M. B. ◽  
Thomas Beven
Keyword(s):  

Legal Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-322
Author(s):  
Mitchell C. Davies

The objectives of the Criminal Law Revision Committee when drafting the radical reforms proposed by the 1966 Theft Bill were described by a contemporary commentator2 as being: ‘. . . to do away with the more embarrassing and restrictive technicalities of the existing law . . .’In the same place it was observed that the Committee faced a choice between creating a specific definition of the various theft offences and their elements, or one whose generality would allow it to evolve to meet the challenges presented by ever more complex and sophisticated dishonest dealing.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.


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