A Brand New Definition for the Crime of Aggression: The Kampala Outcome

2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Mancini

At the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was held in Kampala in 2010, the negotiations on the crime of aggression resulted in a complex package, at the core of which are the definition of the crime and the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over it. This article examines the definition of the crime of aggression, as enshrined in the new Article 8 bis, considering the various parts of that package as well as the existing practice and case law. On the basis of this analysis, it evaluates the relevance of the Kampala definition to the evolution of customary international law.

Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gwilym David Blunt

Pogge has repeatedly compared the causes of global poverty with historical crimes against humanity. This claim, however, has been treated as mere rhetoric. This article argues that there are good reasons to take it seriously. It does this by comparing Pogge’s thesis on the causes of global poverty with the baseline definition of crimes against humanity found in international law, especially the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It argues that the causes of global poverty are comparable with the crimes of slavery and apartheid. This has important consequences for cosmopolitan thought, as it makes the need for practical solutions to global poverty more urgent and raises questions about the global poor’s right to resist the international system by violent means.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 98 emerged in the context of the debate on grounds to refuse surrender and assistance. The Rome Statute has the potential to conflict with other obligations of States under international law, whether pursuant to customary international law or treaty. In particular, they are required to respect the immunities of diplomats and international officials. States that allow military activity by foreign troops on their territory often have agreements, known as ‘status of forces agreements’ (SOFAs). Article 98 governs these conflicts by, in effect, making obligations of arrest and surrender under the Statute subordinate to other legal norms.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 80 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 80 deals with the application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law. The provision was introduced in the final draft, submitted to the Conference early in the day on 17 July 1998, as part of a compromise aimed at calming the objections of a relatively small number of States that had unsuccessfully campaigned to include capital punishment within the range of available penalties in the Rome Statue. Some of these States were concerned that the exclusion of the death penalty would be interpreted as evidence of a growing abolitionist trend internationally and possibly of an emerging norm of customary international law.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 182-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fausto Pocar

Article 21 of the Rome Statute, in defining the applicable sources of law for the International Criminal Court (ICC), breaks with the practice of the ad hoc tribunals by treating customary international law as only a secondary authority. Nonetheless, customary international law still has an acknowledged role in ICC jurisprudence in filling lacunae in the Rome Statute and aiding in its interpretation. One can also predict other instances in which the application of customary international law will be required. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ICC's use of customary law will lead to that law's further fragmentation or whether that use will instead modify customary law to reflect the ICC Statute.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 266-297
Author(s):  
Emma Charlene Lubaale

Abstract Not many states have effective national laws on prosecution of international crimes. Presently, of the 124 states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), less than half have specific national legislation incorporating international crimes. Some faith has been placed in the ordinary-crimes approach; the assumption being that states without effective laws on international crimes can prosecute on the basis of ordinary crimes. This article assesses the practicality of this approach with regard to the crime of rape in Uganda. Based on this assessment, the author draws a number of conclusions. First, that there are glaring gaps in the Ugandan definition of rape, making it impossible for it to be relied on. Secondly, although national courts have the option to interpret national laws with a view to aligning them with international law, the gaps salient in the definition of ordinary rape are too glaring; they cannot be remedied by way of interpretation without undermining the principle of legality. Thirdly, prosecuting the international crime of rape as an ordinary crime suggests that approaches applicable to the prosecution of ordinary rape will be invoked. Because these approaches were never intended to capture the reality of the international crime of rape, the ordinary-crimes approach remains illusory.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 10 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 10 is a rare provision in that it has no title to suggest its content. It is not directed at the application and interpretation of the Rome Statute. Rather, it is intended to guide those who invoke the Rome Statute as an authoritative statement of customary international law, or of general international law. It insulates both the conventional and customary legal obligations of States from claims that these are in some way altered by adoption of the Rome Statute. Article 80 of the Statute has a similar purpose, although it is targeted specifically at capital punishment.


Author(s):  
YVES HAMULI KABUMBA

AbstractTo be characterized as a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the acts listed must have been committed as part of a systematic or widespread attack in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. Both variants of the attack, that is to say its “systematic” or “generalized” nature are alternative requirements. However, some of the legal literature since the preparatory work to draft the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 considers that the requirement of a policy makes both variants cumulative, hence creating a conflict between Article 7(1) and Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute. The controversy over the content and the legal scope of the concept of policy is worsened by the absence of definitions of the notions of policy and systematic attack in the core legal texts of the ICC. What definition have Chambers of the ICC given to the notion of policy? What sources have Chambers relied on? Does ICC case law provide tools to avoid possible conflict between Article 7(1) and Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute? These are the issues this study attempts to examine.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ramsden ◽  
Isaac Yeung

The scope and effect of the Head of State immunity doctrine before the International Criminal Court has prompted much discussion following the 2011 decision of the first Pre-Trial Chamber concerning the immunity of serving Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir. The ptcI held that, as a matter of customary international law, there existed an exception to Head of State immunity where such official is sought by an international court with jurisdiction, here the icc. In an apparent retreat, a differently constituted ptc in 2014 based the inapplicability of such immunity on the terms of Security Council Resolution 1593. Using the 2011 and 2014 ptc decisions as a critical lens, and drawing upon recent material, this article assesses the proper application of Head of State immunity under Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute.


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