scholarly journals Is global poverty a crime against humanity?

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gwilym David Blunt

Pogge has repeatedly compared the causes of global poverty with historical crimes against humanity. This claim, however, has been treated as mere rhetoric. This article argues that there are good reasons to take it seriously. It does this by comparing Pogge’s thesis on the causes of global poverty with the baseline definition of crimes against humanity found in international law, especially the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It argues that the causes of global poverty are comparable with the crimes of slavery and apartheid. This has important consequences for cosmopolitan thought, as it makes the need for practical solutions to global poverty more urgent and raises questions about the global poor’s right to resist the international system by violent means.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 266-297
Author(s):  
Emma Charlene Lubaale

Abstract Not many states have effective national laws on prosecution of international crimes. Presently, of the 124 states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), less than half have specific national legislation incorporating international crimes. Some faith has been placed in the ordinary-crimes approach; the assumption being that states without effective laws on international crimes can prosecute on the basis of ordinary crimes. This article assesses the practicality of this approach with regard to the crime of rape in Uganda. Based on this assessment, the author draws a number of conclusions. First, that there are glaring gaps in the Ugandan definition of rape, making it impossible for it to be relied on. Secondly, although national courts have the option to interpret national laws with a view to aligning them with international law, the gaps salient in the definition of ordinary rape are too glaring; they cannot be remedied by way of interpretation without undermining the principle of legality. Thirdly, prosecuting the international crime of rape as an ordinary crime suggests that approaches applicable to the prosecution of ordinary rape will be invoked. Because these approaches were never intended to capture the reality of the international crime of rape, the ordinary-crimes approach remains illusory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Mancini

At the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was held in Kampala in 2010, the negotiations on the crime of aggression resulted in a complex package, at the core of which are the definition of the crime and the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over it. This article examines the definition of the crime of aggression, as enshrined in the new Article 8 bis, considering the various parts of that package as well as the existing practice and case law. On the basis of this analysis, it evaluates the relevance of the Kampala definition to the evolution of customary international law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
EAMON ALOYO

AbstractScholars have proposed a number of different ways to improve global accountability, but none has adequately addressed how individuals who commit widespread or systematic nonviolent wrongs can be held to account. I argue that for moral reasons individuals should be held accountable for nonviolent crimes against humanity and that an existing legal institution, the International Criminal Court (ICC), has the authority to prosecute such crimes. The ICC’s prosecutor should start exercising this legal authority because widespread or systematic nonviolent harms can be just as morally wrong as violent ones. What matters on my account is the gravity of a wrong, not whether it was committed violently or nonviolently. I situate these arguments in contemporary discussions of accountability, and provide evidence that individuals can cause widespread or systematic nonviolent harms that meet the legal definition of a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute, the ICC’s foundational document.


Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
Angela Mudukuti

In 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepped into uncharted waters as it issued its first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state, then President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir. Following the UN Security Council's referral of the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC, Al-Bashir was charged by the Court with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and in 2010, he was also charged with genocide. As a consequence, all of the states parties to the Rome Statute had a duty to arrest Al-Bashir. Several states have nonetheless failed to arrest him during country visits, allowing Al-Bashir to evade the ICC. This has given rise to a number of cases before the ICC Chambers, including this Appeals Chamber judgment regarding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie O'BRIEN

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute crimes that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”. Maritime piracy has a long history as a threat to international security and was in fact the first international crime. Yet piracy was excluded from the Rome Statute. In the years since the drafting of the Rome Statute, piracy has increased dramatically to become more like the threat it was in the “Golden Age of Piracy”. Criminal accountability for piracy has been minimal, due to logistical and jurisdictional difficulties. This paper offers an analysis of the potential of the ICC for prosecuting pirates: why it should be considered as a potential forum for ensuring criminal accountability for piracy, how piracy fits within the ICC's jurisdiction, and whether or not piracy should be added to the Rome Statute as a stand-alone crime or under the rubric of crimes against humanity.


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