Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Law Approach to International Criminal Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 695-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peg Birmingham

My argument in this article is that Hannah Arendt has a coherent and well-developed, although not systematic, philosophy of law which she brings to the Eichmann trial specifically and to international criminal law generally. In Part One of the article, I lay out Arendt’s philosophy of law, focusing on her account of the difference between the Greek and Roman conceptions of the law, the status of the consensus iuris, and the status of legal principles. Part Two offers a comparison of Arendt’s and Dworkin’s legal and political principles that animate the law. Part Three takes up Arendt’s approach to international criminal law through an analysis of her report of the Eichmann trial, specifically her account of the unprecedented nature of crimes against humanity, the new type of criminal who commits administrative massacres, and the difference between the criminal and the political trial at the international level.

2001 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 87-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Nemitz

‘Sentencing is an art and not a science’. This statement of Lord Lane expresses, with all due respect, what sentencing should not be. Although it cannot be denied that the process of determining a sentence is far from being a mathematical exercise, the result of which can be verified or falsified by reference to some unquestionable law of nature, both the legislator and the judiciary must strive for the development of a law of sentencing which is based on a comprehensive set of statutory provisions. The very term ‘lawof sentencing’ indicates that the meting out of a sentence is more than the exercise of a skill that only judges are vested with. The use of the term ‘art’, conversely, to describe sentencing gives the impression that the act of sentencing is beyond objective understanding and control. When we speak of art, we acknowledge that while views on the outcome can be manifold, objective criteria for a ‘correct’ assessment are few: there's no accounting for taste. This is unacceptable when looking at the significance of the law of sentencing for the pursuit of various sentencing purposes. To base the determination of the sentence on legal grounds enhances the review possibilities with regard to sentencing judgments. This contributes to an even sentencing practice, which in turn leads to just and comprehensible sentencing judgments. Such a practice is necessary in order to achieve public acceptance of the criminal justice system in general and of sentencing verdicts in particular. Such acceptance is imperative for the achievement of several sentencing purposes, especially that of affirmative (or positive) general prevention.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 823-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wibke Kristin Timmermann

AbstractThe author critically analyses in this article the status of incitement in international criminal law. After a discussion of the relevant judgments by the Nuremberg Tribunal and related courts, including German de-Nazification courts, the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention and the case-law of the International Criminal Tribunals, the international approach is criticized, particularly its practice of regarding only direct and public incitement to genocide as inchoate, whilst instigation generally is treated as not inchoate. The author recommends the adoption of an approach modelled on German and Swiss domestic law and argues that instigation per se should also be regarded as an inchoate crime.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Theofanis

AbstractRes judicata is well-settled as a general principle of international law. But the rules of res judicata in international criminal procedure are undeveloped. Recent cases from the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have added to the understanding of res judicata in international law - demonstrating the risk that new rules of res judicata will implicitly incorporate either a common-law or civil-law definition of what the "law" is. Analysis of issues considered in recent Tribunal jurisprudence - particularly the questions of review and reconsideration - locates potential hazards in the development of the law and provides guidance for the application of the ICC statute.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 231-246
Author(s):  
Emily Crawford

In this article, Emily Crawford explores one set of key institutional and legal responses to, and consequences of, the Rwanda genocide – the ictr and the revival of icl that the ictr and the icty heralded. Tracing the development of the concept and institutions of icl, Crawford observes how the case law of the [ad hoc] tribunals, and the ictr in particular, were pivotal in progressively developing the international law of genocide, and the law of non-international armed conflict’.


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