J.W.F. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996. XVI + 270 p.

Author(s):  
2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Zines

This article originally was published as a Law and Policy Paper. The Law and Policy Papers series was established in 1994 by the Centre for International and Public Law in the Faculty of Law, the Australian National University. The series publishes papers contributing to understanding and discussion on matters relating to law and public policy, especially those that are the subject of contemporary debate. In 1999 the papers were published jointly by the Centre for International and Public Law and The Federation Press. This article is reproduced in the Federal Law Review with the permission of the original publishers.


1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-564
Author(s):  
Dawn Oliver

First, I want to express my gratitude and sense of honour in being invited to deliver the Lionel Cohen lecture for 1995. The relationship between the Israeli and the British legal systems is a close and mutually beneficial one, and we in Britain in particular owe large debts to the legal community in Israel. This is especially the case in my field, public law, where distinguished academics have enriched our academic literature, notably Justice Zamir, whose work on the declaratory judgment has been so influential. Israeli courts, too, have made major contributions to the development of the common law generally and judicial review very notably.In this lecture I want to discuss the process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom, and to explore some of the difficulties that lie in the way of reform. Some quite radical reforms to our system of government — the introduction of executive agencies in the British civil service, for instance—have been introduced without resort to legislation. There has been a spate of reform to local government and the National Health Service.


2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-569
Author(s):  
Tom Cornford

AbstractIn this article I address the question of whether the omissions principle – the principle that the common law does not impose liability for omissions – applies with the same force in negligence cases involving public authority defendants as in cases involving private defendants. My argument is that the answer depends upon the answer to a prior question: can a duty of care be based upon the public law powers and duties of a public authority? In making my argument, I refute the views both of those who insist that a claim in negligence against a public authority can be rejected purely because it relates to an omission not falling within one of the standard exceptions to the omissions principle and of those who insist that such a claim can succeed while at the same denying that a duty of care can be based on a public authority's public law powers and duties.


Author(s):  
Daniel Visser

Unjustified enrichment confronted both civil and common lawyers with thinking which was often completely outside the paradigm to which they had become accustomed. The recognition of unjustified enrichment as a cause of action in its own right in English law created a new arena of uncertainty between the systems. This article argues that comparative lawyers can make an important contribution to the future of the fractured and fractious world of unjustified enrichment. It may help to uncover the enormous wealth of learning of which both the common law and the civil law are the repositories, and so bring the same level of understanding to the law of unjustified enrichment which has, over the years, been achieved between the systems in regard to contract and tort.


Author(s):  
Thomas W. Bennett

For the first time in the history of South African law, a typically African concept – Ubuntu – has been adopted into the common law of the land (which is a mixture of English and Roman-Dutch law). Ever since colonial conquest, the indigenous normative orders of Africa have been treated as inferior. While South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation had the effect of elevating customary law to the same status as that of the common law, the traffic of ideas between the two systems continued to favour the latter as the superior system. The reception of ubuntu into the common law reversed this process. This paper examines the function of ubuntu in its new environment. Most of the discussion about the concept has concentrated on its meaning, a question that has been concentrated on finding a suitable English translation. The most obvious have been the calques, ‘humanity’, ‘personhood’ or ‘humaneness’, but none have been especially helpful, for they cannot hope to convey the full range of functions now performed by ubuntu. It is argued in this paper that searches for a priori meanings are unhelpful: words are continually being exploited by users to serve their own particular ends. In this regard, it must be appreciated that ubuntu is a loanword, and thus especially susceptible to manipulation. The paper shows that the courts have used ubuntu to supply a peculiarly African form of equity that has been used to solve hard cases and conflicts between rules, notably in the area of public law.


1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
P.P. Craig

The capacity of the common law to develop and evolve is well recognised within both private and public law. This is indeed one of its enduring qualities. The objective of the present article is not, however, to contribute to the jurisprudential debate concerning the nature of the adjudicative process at common law. My object is more modest. It is to consider and place in perspective some of the recent developments which have occurred at common law in relation to the duty of public authorities to provide reasons. It is a well known and oft repeated proposition that there is no general common law duty to furnish the reasons for a decision. It is equally well known that this proposition has been the target of regular attack by those who argue that such a general duty should exist. A reconsideration of both of these propositions is timely in the light of case law developments culminating in the House of Lords' judgment in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Doody.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 47-77
Author(s):  
Hanna Kuczyńska

In this article the position of the accused as a source of personal evidence in three different European legal systems: Poland, Germany, and England, will be presented. This analysis will be oriented to understand the way of functioning of the two different models of giving statements of fact by the accused at a criminal trial. The main difference is that in the common law model of criminal trial the accused may only present evidence by testifying as a witness speaking about what happened, whereas in the continental model the accused gives a specific personal type of evidence (that in the Anglo-Saxon literature is rather described as “oral evidence”) that is known as explanations. From this differentiation several consequences arise: among others, the possibility of presenting untruthful explanations and presenting many versions of events in the continental model which have to be assessed by the judges. At the same time, the same right of the accused to silence and not to give incriminating evidence applies in both models of criminal trial – however, in two different shapes and with different types of limitations.


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