scholarly journals China-Taiwan Threats of Force and the Paradox of the ‘Nuclear Weapons Principle’

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-426
Author(s):  
Sondre Torp Helmersen

Abstract The People’s Republic of China (‘China’) has adopted legislation threatening to invade the Republic of China (‘Taiwan’) if the latter declares independence. Threats of force are prohibited by the UN Charter Article 2(4) and equivalent customary international law. This article proceeds along two apparently contradictory strands. On the one hand, the prohibition probably does not apply to non-State entities such as the Republic of China. One the other hand, the ICJ stated in the Nuclear Weapons opinion that ‘if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal […] the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal’. If the Republic of China declares independence it will become a State, making a PRC invasion illegal. Therefore, the PRC’s current threats should also be illegal. The best way to resolve this apparent paradox is to say that the ICJ’s ‘Nuclear Weapons principle’ must be nuanced.

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-271
Author(s):  
Madoka Fukuda

AbstractThis article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
Johanis Leatemia

Orderly international community and international law are determined by a national court. Essentially, the national court must be competent to maintain the balance between the national interest which based on the national sovereignty as well as the provisions of international law within the framework of peaceful coexistence. This article reviews the role of national courts in creating and developing the customary international law. As it turns out in practice, however, it has certain weaknesses, particularly in view of the accountability and legitimacy aspects of its establishment. This purpose could be achieved if national courts were able to maintain a balance between the national interest based on the sovereignty of State on the one hand and the provisions of international law on the other. The function of the national court was to maintain a balance between international law and national law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shirley Ayangbah

<p>International Investment in recent times is seen as one of the fastest-developing areas of international law. In the past decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties and other agreements with investment related provisions that grant foreign investors important substantive and procedural rights, including, most importantly, the right to sue individuals, organizations and even the state hosting their investment for violations of customary international law and treaty obligations. Dispute becomes an inevitable phenomenon as individuals, organizations and countries continue to engage in foreign investment and as such there is the need for dispute solving mechanism to resolve such disputes as and when they arises. Even though there are several dispute solving mechanisms, arbitration seems to be a well-established and widely used mechanism to end dispute probably due to the efficiency and flexibility nature of it. The laws governing arbitration differ from one country to the other and it is for this reason that investors need to be abreast with the different arbitration laws  so as to enable them make inform decisions as to whether to resort to arbitration  or not. This paper analyses the arbitration laws of The Republic of Ghana and Peoples Republic of China in a comparative manner by drawing on the similarities and difference with respect to arbitration laws and procedure in these two countries. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part of this paper gives a brief background as well as the characteristics of the concept of arbitration. The second part looks as the similarities and difference of arbitration between the selected countries, and the final part looks at the arbitration phase and post arbitration phase of the two countries.</p>


Author(s):  
Ward Thomas

International law and armed conflict have a rather contentious history together. One the one hand, armed conflict implies and absence of law, and yet, on the other, international law plays an important role in codifying the use of force. The UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, drafted in the waning days of a second cataclysmic world war, were intended to radically transform the centuries-old ideology of raison d’état, which viewed war as a sovereign prerogative. More precisely, Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids not just war but force of any kind, or even the threat of it. On its face, the Charter system is a model of simplicity, consisting of a clear prohibition and two exceptions to that prohibition. The apparent simplicity is misleading, however. Article 2(4) is violated so often that experts disagree about whether it should even be considered good law. The Chapter VII enforcement exception is rarely used, and the meaning of self-defense under Article 51 is the subject of contentious disagreement. Moreover, even some UN bodies have supported creating another exception (humanitarian intervention) that coexists uneasily with the organization’s foundational principles. In addition, there is yet another exception (the use of force by national liberation movements) that may be as significant as the others, yet is little discussed by contemporary commentators.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Brunstetter ◽  
Megan Braun

In the preface of the 2006 edition ofJust and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer makes an important distinction between, on the one hand, “measures short of war,” such as imposing no-fly zones, pinpoint air/missile strikes, and CIA operations, and on the other, “actual warfare,” typified by a ground invasion or a large-scale bombing campaign. Even if the former are, technically speaking, acts of war according to international law, he proffers that “it is common sense to recognize that they are very different from war.” While they all involve “the use of force,” Walzer distinguishes between the level of force used: the former, being more limited in scope, lack the “unpredictable and often catastrophic consequences” of a “full-scale attack.” Walzer calls the ethical framework governing these measuresjus ad vim(the just use of force), and he applies it to state-sponsored uses of force against both state and nonstate actors outside a state's territory that fall short of the quantum and duration associated with traditional warfare. Compared to acts of war,jus ad vimactions present diminished risk to one's own troops, have a destructive outcome that is more predictable and smaller in scale, severely curtail the risk of civilian casualties, and entail a lower economic and military burden. These factors makejus ad vimactions nominally easier for statesmen to justify compared to conventional warfare, though this does not necessarily mean these actions are morally legitimate or that they do not have potentially nefarious consequences.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 767-786 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. D. M. Nelson

The question of reservations was one of the ‘controversial issues’ facing the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in drawing up the final clauses of the Convention. On the one hand it was argued that the integrity of the Convention must be safeguarded and that the ‘package deal’ must be protected from possible disintegration by the making of reservations. On the other hand the view was held that ‘allowance for the possibility of reservations is aimed at accommodating the views of the delegations who have maintained that they cannot become parties to the Convention unless the Convention permits them to exercise a right to enter reservations, in accordance with customary international law and as envisaged under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.’ In short the need to preserve the integrity of the Convention was pitted against the need to secure universal participation in the Convention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-84
Author(s):  
Andrew D. Morris

People’s Liberation Army Air Force Squadron Commander Fan Yuanyan flew his MiG-19 from Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China (prc) to the Republic of China (roc) on Taiwan on 7 July 1977. The timing of this defection, which came as u.s. President Jimmy Carter was moving decisively towards normalisation of relations with the prc, made Fan an anticommunist star. Fan spoke for years afterwards on behalf of the ‘800 million mainland compatriots’ who he felt wanted the roc to retake the mainland, even as he also became more critical of the excesses of capitalism and liberalism in Taiwan. Much of the Kuomintang’s propaganda use of Fan was related to ways in which Nationalist and Communist ideologies about authoritarian and antibourgeois values overlapped. Fan thus represents the ways in which Nationalist and Communist ideologies and societies were mutually constitutive and constructed with the other clearly in mind during the Cold War.


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