One-Dimensional Man, One-Dimensional History: Re-reading Herbert Marcuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 340-360
Author(s):  
Ethan Kleinberg

Abstract In this article I revisit Herbert Marcuse’s 1964 work One-Dimensional Man with the goal of reactivating Marcuse’s critique of one-dimensional society but in regard to the current practice and discipline of history. On my reading, it is in the field of history that the dangers of one-dimensionality are felt most acutely today. Especially in the ways that historians and philosophers of history continue to render history as a mausoleum to warehouse an entombed and inactive past. In what follows, I offer a willful and intentional reading of the role and place of philosophy of history in One-Dimensional Man in order to demonstrate the ways that history and historians have now become key proponents of one-dimensionality. I then marshal Marcuse’s analysis, though shorn of the speculative teleology that characterizes the two-dimensional history of Marcuse’s dialectic, in order to reactivate history as a multi-dimensional force to enact change in the future.

2020 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-114
Author(s):  
Adrian Blau

AbstractThis paper proposes a new framework for categorizing approaches to the history of political thought. Previous categorizations exclude much research; political theory, if included, is often caricatured. And previous categorizations are one-dimensional, presenting different approaches as alternatives. My framework is two-dimensional, distinguishing six kinds of end (two empirical, four theoretical) and six kinds of means. Importantly, these choices are not alternatives: studies may have more than one end and typically use several means. Studies with different ends often use some of the same means. And all studies straddle the supposed empirical/theoretical “divide.” Quentin Skinner himself expertly combines empirical and theoretical analysis—yet the latter is often overlooked, not least because of Skinner's own methodological pronouncements. This highlights a curious disjuncture in methodological writings, between what they say we do, and what we should do. What we should do is much broader than existing categorizations imply.


2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-24
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann

Abstract The essay – an elaborated version of my academic farewell speech [Abschiedsvorlesung] – discusses three theses: 1. Histories and history as well as history of philosophy and philosophy of history can only be staged as narratives. “True” stories enact the past and deliver schemes for anticipating the future; insofar history and future constitute the semantics of the present. 2. “Systematic” philosophy analyses the temporal narratives which store the historical experiences and eliminates their temporality in a process of transforming narratives into arguments. The most important step in this transformation consists in isolating the key notions of the narratives and in arranging these key notions in a “timeless” systematic order. 3. History of philosophy and philosophy of history restage, however, the temporal narrative, which systematic philosophy wants to eliminate from philosophy. This operation produces an unsolvable paradox where the claim of timeless truth and that of unescapable temporality are both valid. It throws up questions such as: how can it be possible for philosophical truths to lose their credit? Do timeless truths exist, and if so what do they mean? Do these paradoxes lead to schadenfreude on the part of the historian of philosophy, who knew it all along, or should one see these unsolvable complexities as a chance to enjoy the richness of possibilities which history unfolds? The essay chooses the second alternative.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Friedrich Koch

AbstractB-time, i. e. the temporal scale of the B-series of events, is one and the same for all times, while A-times (the temporal scales of A-series) are as many as there are moments of time. This means that A-theorists will have to consider one-dimensional time two-dimensionally: as changing within itself at every moment. The two-dimensional view is here put to service for a meta-compatibilist theory of freedom, a theory, that is, which reconciles freedom, determinism and their first order incompatibility at the second order. Kant’s position is interpreted as meta-compatibilist as well, but as having the drawback of separating time and freedom. In order to appreciate the connection of time and freedom, one has to acknowledge that in free acts the future is determined further according to plan, while at the same time the past is (with nomological necessity) co-determined further in countless unclear and inscrutable ways. A free act thus consumes its own range of freedom by positing retroactively the sufficient causal antecedents for its taking place: It was free before it occurred and is part of nature after.


1966 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 46-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Lecar

“Dynamical mixing”, i.e. relaxation of a stellar phase space distribution through interaction with the mean gravitational field, is numerically investigated for a one-dimensional self-gravitating stellar gas. Qualitative results are presented in the form of a motion picture of the flow of phase points (representing homogeneous slabs of stars) in two-dimensional phase space.


2001 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 172-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence A. Pervin

David Magnusson has been the most articulate spokesperson for a holistic, systems approach to personality. This paper considers three concepts relevant to a dynamic systems approach to personality: dynamics, systems, and levels. Some of the history of a dynamic view is traced, leading to an emphasis on the need for stressing the interplay among goals. Concepts such as multidetermination, equipotentiality, and equifinality are shown to be important aspects of a systems approach. Finally, attention is drawn to the question of levels of description, analysis, and explanation in a theory of personality. The importance of the issue is emphasized in relation to recent advances in our understanding of biological processes. Integrating such advances into a theory of personality while avoiding the danger of reductionism is a challenge for the future.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Katja Corcoran ◽  
Michael Häfner ◽  
Mathias Kauff ◽  
Stefan Stürmer

Abstract. In this article, we reflect on 50 years of the journal Social Psychology. We interviewed colleagues who have witnessed the history of the journal. Based on these interviews, we identified three crucial periods in Social Psychology’s history, that are (a) the early development and further professionalization of the journal, (b) the reunification of East and West Germany, and (c) the internationalization of the journal and its transformation from the Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie to Social Psychology. We end our reflection with a discussion of changes that occurred during these periods and their implication for the future of our field.


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