scholarly journals A Distinct Right to Freedom of Thought in South America

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 245-270
Author(s):  
Cláudio de Oliveira Santos Colnago ◽  
Bethany Shiner

Abstract The right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, yet current jurisprudence interprets the right as a mere dimension of freedom of expression, also protected by Article 13. Contemporary neurotechnology research presents the possibility for human thoughts to be tracked, recorded, analysed and predicted. This applies pressure upon the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ current understanding of the right to freedom of thought. Firstly, this paper will examine how Article 13 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at different stages of its jurisprudence. Secondly, by considering both technological advances and the other rights guaranteed by the Convention, this paper argues for an evolution in the interpretation of Article 13 whereby the right to freedom of thought is understood as a distinct right, separate from freedom of expression. Finally, this paper proposes that the positive duty to secure Convention rights requires States to enact preventative legislation and regulations. Existing bioethics principles should be drawn upon to inform human rights-compliant laws and regulations that require the architectural design of technologies to limit the potential to infringe upon freedom of thought.

Author(s):  
Sjors Ligthart

Abstract Since advances in brain-reading technology are changing traditional epistemic boundaries of the mind, yielding information from the brain that enables to draw inferences about particular mental states of individuals, the sustainability of the present framework of European human rights has been called into question. More specifically, it has been argued that in order to provide adequate human rights protection from non-consensual brain-reading, the right to freedom of thought should be revised, making it ‘fit for the future’ again. From the perspective of criminal justice, the present paper examines whether such a revision is necessary within the European legal context. It argues that under its current understanding, the right to freedom of thought would probably not cover the employment of most brain-reading applications in criminal justice. By contrast, the right to freedom of (non-)expression will provide legal protection in this regard and, at the same time, will also allow for certain exceptions. Hence, instead of revising the absolute right to freedom of thought, a legal approach tailored to non-consensual brain-reading could be developed under the already existing right not to convey information, ideas, and opinions as guaranteed under the freedom of (non-)expression. This might need to re-interpret the right to freedom of expression, rather than the right to freedom of thought.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasrullah Ainul Yaqin

This article responds to the issue of human rights (HAM) from the perspective of maqâṣidî’s reasoning (maqâṣid asy-syarî‘ah). Considering that human rights violations have always been being a boomerang in the life of Indonesian society. It could be seen like what happened to the Shia people in Sampang whose right have been lost to enjoy their life in peace and worship their religious rights freely and safely in their homeland. A similar case has been experienced by several Ahmadiyah congregations. In this case, the writer elaborates the maqâṣid concept which has been continued its development along the time. According to ‘Izzuddin bin ‘Abd as-Salâm, the purpose of Islamic law is to create benefit and reject the damage for human being, both in this world and in the hereafter. The highest benefit of Islamic law is to maintain and keep the religion (ḥifẓ ad-dîn), soul (ḥifẓ an-nafs), reason (ḥifẓ al-‘aql), descent (ḥifẓ an-nasl), and property (ḥifẓ al-mâl) . These five things are known as aḍ-ḍarûriyyah al-khamsah (the five primary). Later, some maqâṣidî scholars (such as Ibn ‘Âsyûr, ‘Allâl al-Fâsî, Jamâluddîn ‘Aṭiyyah, and Yusûf al-Qarâḍâwî) developed the scope of maqâṣid asy-syarî‘ah. So that, it is not restricted to the five primary matters only, but also to several other primary matters, such as justice, freedom, equality and human rights. On the other side, Muḥammad az-Zuḥailî views that the concept of aḍ-ḍarûriyyah al-khamsah is the basis of human rights itself. Because, ḥifẓ ad-dîn, ḥifẓ an-nafs, ḥifẓ al-‘aql, ḥifẓ an-nasl, and ḥifẓ al-mâl do not only mean to maintain, but also include the meaning of rights, namely: the right to religion, the right to life, the right to think and freedom of thought, family rights, and property rights.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


Author(s):  
Allan Hepburn

In the 1940s and 1950s, Britain was relatively uniform in terms of race and religion. The majority of Britons adhered to the Church of England, although Anglo-Catholic leanings—the last gasp of the Oxford Movement—prompted some people to convert to Roman Catholicism. Although the secularization thesis has had a tenacious grip on twentieth-century literary studies, it does not account for the flare-up of interest in religion in mid-century Britain. The ecumenical movement, which began in the 1930s in Europe, went into suspension during the war, and returned with vigour after 1945, advocated international collaboration among Christian denominations and consequently overlapped with the promotion of human rights, especially the defence of freedom of worship, the right to privacy, freedom of conscience, and freedom of expression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-169
Author(s):  
Teresa M. Bejan

AbstractThe classical liberal doctrine of free expression asserts the priority of speech as an extension of the freedom of thought. Yet its critics argue that freedom of expression, itself, demands the suppression of the so-called “silencing speech” of racists, sexists, and so on, as a threat to the equal expressive rights of others. This essay argues that the claim to free expression must be distinguished from claims to equal speech. The former asserts an equal right to express one’s thoughts without interference; the latter the right to address others, and to receive a hearing and consideration from them, in turn. I explore the theory of equal speech in light of the ancient Athenian practice of isegoria and argue that the equality demanded is not distributive but relational: an equal speaker’s voice should be counted as “on a par” with others. This ideal better captures critics’ concerns about silencing speech than do their appeals to free expression. Insofar as epistemic and status-harms provide grounds for the suppression and exclusion of some speech and speakers, the ideal of equal speech is more closely connected with the freedom of association than of thought. Noticing this draws attention to the continuing—and potentially problematic—importance of exclusion in constituting effective sites of equal speech today.


2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Gerstenberg

In this paper I want to address, against the background of the ECtHR’s recent attempt to resolve the clash between property rights and the right to freedom of expression in its decision in Appleby v. UK, two questions, both of which I take to be related to the overarching theme of “social democracy”. First, there is the problem of the influence of “higher law”-of human rights norms and constitutional norms-on private law norms; second, the question of the role of adjudication in “constitutionalizing” private law, in other words, the question of the “judicial cognizability” of constitutional norms within private law.


Author(s):  
Patrick O’Callaghan ◽  
Bethany Shiner

Abstract This paper examines the right to freedom of thought in the European Convention on Human Rights against the background of technological developments in neuroscience and algorithmic processes. Article 9 echr provides an absolute right to freedom of thought when the integrity of our inner life or forum internum is at stake. In all other cases, where thoughts have been manifested in some way in the forum externum, the right to freedom of thought is treated as a qualified right. While Article 9 echr is a core focus of this paper, we argue that freedom of thought is further supported by Articles 8, 10 and 11 echr. This complex of rights carves out breathing space for the individual’s personal development and therefore supports the enjoyment of freedom of thought in its fullest sense. Charged with ‘maintaining and promoting the ideals and values of a democratic society’ as well as ensuring that individual human rights are given ‘practical and effective protection’, this paper predicts that the ECtHR will make greater use of the right to freedom of thought in the face of the emerging challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorg Sladič

Legal privilege and professional secrecy of attorneys relate to the right to a fair trial (Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) as well as to the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The reason for protecting the lawyer via fundamental rights is the protection of fundamental rights of the lawyer’s clients. All legal orders apply legal privileges and professional secrecy; however, the contents of such are not identical. Traditionally there is an important difference between common and civil law. The professional secrecy of an attorney in civil law jurisdictions is his right and at the same time his obligation based on his membership of the Bar (that is his legal profession). In common law legal privilege comprises the contents of documents issued by an attorney to the client. Professional secrecy of attorneys in civil law jurisdictions applies solely to independent lawyers; in-house lawyers are usually not allowed to benefit from rules on professional secrecy (exceptions in the Netherlands and Belgium). On the other hand, common law jurisdictions apply legal professional privilege, recognized also to in-house lawyers. Slovenian law follows the traditional civil law concept of professional secrecy and sets a limited privilege to in-house lawyers. The article then discusses Slovenian law of civil procedure and compares the position of professional secrecy in lawsuits before State’s courts and in arbitration.


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