El Criterio del Placer en las Leyes V 733a-734e

Méthexis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-101
Author(s):  
José Antonio Giménez
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Virtuous Life ◽  
Better Than

Abstract In Book v of Plato’s Laws, he defends that a virtuous life is better than a vicious one, based on the idea that the former involves more pleasure than the latter (733a-734e). The use of this kind of argumentation seems to contradict other passages of the Laws, in which it will be objected that pleasure can work as a criterion of election. This essay aims to show that this recourse does not presuppose any kind of hedonism. In order to prove this, I hold that in the Laws (i) education tries to integrate our natural tendencies in the good life; (ii) this integration is possible because some pleasures can be pursued for their own sake because they are harmless. Based on these principles, I argue that (iii) the argument of Book v appeals to the possibility of choosing pleasure if they are not involved in other criteria of election.

It Ain’t Necessarily So

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomy Arpaly
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Virtuous Life ◽  
Main Thing ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Rule Out

According to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, the virtuous life constitutes or is the main thing required for flourishing or the good life. This chapter argues that while it might be plausible that, as Rosalind Hursthouse claims, moral virtue is a better bet than moral vice for the person who wants to flourish, the neo-Aristotelian fails to rule out the possibility that a morally mediocre life could be better than either.

Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life

Phronesis ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Detailed Examination ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Instrumental Value ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Positive Evaluation

Abstract In the Philebus, Socrates maintains two theses about the relationship between pleasure and the good life: (1) the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is better than the unmixed life of intelligence, and: (2) the unmixed life of intelligence is the most divine. Taken together, these two claims lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the best human life is better than the life of a god. A popular strategy for avoiding this conclusion is to distinguish human from divine goods; on such a reading, pleasure has merely instrumental value, and it benefits human beings only as a result of their imperfect nature. I argue that certain ‘pure’ pleasures are full-fledged, intrinsic goods in the Philebus, which are even worthy of the gods (thus Socrates ultimately rejects thesis 2). This positive evaluation of pure pleasure results from a detailed examination of pleasure, which reveals that different types of pleasures have fundamentally different natures.

A Liberal Theory of the Good?

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Neal
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
To Come ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Made In ◽  
Do So

One argument often made in support of liberal political morality is that liberalism, both as a theory and as a practice, is neutral in regard to the question of the good life. In this essay, I shall criticize and reject this argument. Now this conclusion is anything but novel; one would have almost as much difficulty finding a critic, of whatever perspective, granting that liberalism is indeed neutral with regard to the good as one would have finding a liberal denying it. It is this phenomenon that I find especially interesting, and which serves to set the context of my discussion. If, as I aim to show, it is a relatively straightforward path of argument which leads to the conclusion that liberalism is not neutral with regard to the question of the good life, then why do so many liberals remain convinced that it is? Why, when liberals and their critics debate the issue of neutrality, do they so often seem to talk beyond one another? It seems to me that instances of these debates ought to come off better than they do, and so I shall attempt here to describe how they might.

Tensions Between the Good Life, the Good Profession, and the Good Society

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 667-668
Author(s):  
Isaac Prilleltensky
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Good Society

Is the Good Life the Easy Life?

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie K. Napa ◽  
Laura A. King
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life

AESTHETICS AND THE GOOD LIFE

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-155
Author(s):  
Esmee Cromie Bellalta
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life
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