Alienation, Human Nature, Human Good

Keyword(s):  
1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-208
Author(s):  
Frank I. Michelman

Prescriptive political and moral theories contain ideas about what human beings are like and about what, correspondingly, is good for them. Conceptions of human “nature” and corresponding human good enter into normative argument by way of support and justification. Of course, it is logically open for the ratiocinative traffic to run the other way. Strongly held convictions about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of certain social institutions or practices may help condition and shape one's responses to one or another set of propositions about what people are like and what, in consequence, they have reason to value.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Damiano Simoncelli

These days, the Thomistic account of natural law is the object of renewed interest and criticisms. A number of objections are usually lodged against the idea of a human nature and a shared human good, in that it might seem that these ideas are unquestionably culturally related and that cultural boundaries cannot be crossed. At the same time, the concepts of ‘human nature’ and ‘natural law’ are often misunderstood to be related to human biology only. To overcome these issues, this paper aims to reinterpret the Thomistic doctrine of natural law as a form of the golden rule (‘Do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you’; ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’).


Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Wall

The term perfectionism in philosophy, unlike its more common usage in popular psychology, denotes a range of theoretical positions. There are perfectionist accounts of ethics, perfectionist accounts of well-being, and perfectionist accounts of politics. These positions are often mutually supportive, but one can accept some of them while rejecting others. Perfectionist views purport to be objective in that they characterize states of affairs, character traits, activities, and/or relationships as good in themselves and not good in virtue of the fact that they are desired or enjoyed by human beings. In the history of philosophy, perfectionism has a long and impressive pedigree. It is often associated with ethical theories that characterize the human good in terms of the development and exercise of capacities that are taken to be central to human nature. Aristotle is the foundational figure in this tradition, but perfectionist arguments of this kind can be found in writers as diverse as Aquinas, Kant, (arguably) Mill, Marx, Nietzsche, G. E. Moore, and T. H. Green, among others. Perfectionism also has been associated with ethical theories that, while not tying the human good specifically to the development of human nature, accept some alternative objective account of the human good. Typically, such views have a teleological structure, holding that we have duties to promote the good. More recently, perfectionism has been used to refer to political theories that reject the liberal principle of state neutrality and hold that it is permissible for states to favor, actively and intentionally, objectively valuable conceptions of the good over base ones. Perfectionism, in both moral and political philosophy, has often been charged with being anti-egalitarian and hostile to individual liberty. This charge is encouraged and sustained by a selective focus on the elitist ideas of certain influential perfectionist writers, such as Nietzsche. For these writers, what matters is the excellence of the few, not the mediocrity of the many. It is a mistake, however, to identify perfectionism with any specific articulation of it. Contemporary defenses of perfectionism have attempted to show how its central ideas are compatible with, and indeed supportive of, human equality and individual autonomy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 598-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Harcourt

Psychoanalytic writing rarely features on university ethics curricula, so the idea that psychoanalysis has a place in the history of ethics may be a surprise. The aim of the paper is to show that it should not be. The strategy is to sketch in outline an enduring line of inquiry in the history of ethics, namely the Platonic-Aristotelian investigation of the relationship between human nature, human excellence and the human good, and to suggest that psychoanalysis exemplifies it too. But since the suggestion, once made, seems not only true but obviously true, the paper spends some time exploring why the place of psychoanalysis in the history of ethics has so often been overlooked, before developing the outline more fully and offering detailed reasons as to why psychoanalysis fits it. One consequence is that Freudian and (in a sense explained) ‘relational’ variants of psychoanalysis continue the Platonic-Aristotelian line of inquiry in interestingly different ways.


2022 ◽  
pp. 097168582110587
Author(s):  
Abhijeet Bardapurkar

This work is a study of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book I, II and III) to characterize the good: the good that features in education and good life. Nicomachean Ethics teaches us that human good is neither in thought/theory, nor in action/practice alone, it is neither an exclusively individual prerogative, nor an outright social preserve. And, human good is impossible without education. The practice of education can neither be isolated nor conceptualized apart from the demands of human life. If education is for human well-being—for human good—the good then is not in action alone, but action in accordance with the excellence (or virtue) 1 of the actor. What unifies reason and action, knowing and doing is learning to be an excellent (or virtuous) person—a person who is well-disposed in her affections and action, whose judgements are true, and decisions correct; and whose intellect and character are in harmony with the human nature.


Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

This book is a selective discussion of the tradition in moral philosophy that runs from Socrates to the present. The main themes: (1) Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics take different positions in debates the relation between morality (including right action and the character of virtuous agents) and the human good. Aquinas’ version of an Aristotelian view identifies the human good with the fulfilment of human nature and capacities in a just society. These facts about the human good can be discovered by rational reflexion on human nature and human needs. (2) These views both about the content of ethics and about the sources of ethical knowledge are questioned by Scotus and later writers on natural law. Voluntarists take the principles of natural law and moral right to be the products of will; naturalists take them to be discovered by reason. (3) The dispute about will and reason is the source of the long dispute between sentimentalists (Hutcheson, Hume) and rationalists (Butler, Price, Reid) about whether moral judgment has a non-rational or a rational basis. Kant tries to resolve this dispute. (4) These arguments lead to further discussion about what makes morally right actions right. Sentimentalists, followed by Mill and Sidgwick and by later utilitarians, argue that actions are right in so far as they maximize pleasure. Others, including the rationalists, Kant, Ross, and Rawls, argue that moral principles are not subordinate to utility.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 127-149
Author(s):  
John Hacker-Wright

AbstractThe central idea of Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness is that moral judgments belong to the same logical kind of judgments as those that attribute natural goodness and defect to plants and animals. But moral judgments focus on a subset of human powers that play a special role in our lives as rational animals, namely, reason, will, and desire. These powers play a central role in properly human actions: those actions in which we go for something that we see and understand as good. Many readers of Foot resolutely ignore what she says about the human good being sui generis and obstinately continue to read her as advocating a version of naturalism grounded in empirical study of human nature. One might wonder how else it could count as a naturalistic view unless we could square the view with nature as studied by the empirical sciences. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical response to this question: help can come from turning to recent defenses of Aristotelian essentialism. Foot’s naturalism can square with nature as interpreted through the lens of Aristotelian essentialism. On such a view, the virtues are perfections of human powers including reason, will, and desire.


2006 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf Reber
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