Adapt to Translate

The article presents the advantages and limitations of adaptive clinical trials for assessing the effectiveness of medical interventions and specifies the conditions that contributed to their development and implementation in clinical practice. I advance two arguments by discussing different cases of adaptive trials. The normative argument is that responsible adaptation should be taken seriously as a new way of doing clinical research insofar as a valid justification, sufficient understanding, and adequate operational conditions are provided. The second argument is historical. The development of adaptive trials can be related to lessons learned from research in cases of urgency and to the decades-long efforts to end the productivity crisis of pharmaceutical research, which led to the emergence of translational, personalized, and, recently, precision medicine movements.

Filozofia polityczna a racja stanu. Część 2

Reason of state understood as the reason for its existence and expressed by a synthesis of the normative as well as the political, including its normative and empirical, universal and particular, abstract and concrete dimensions requires a justification by political philosophy. Yet, in the output of the main body of Western political philosophy, including the Aristotelian, Marxist, and liberal traditions, the reason of state lacks any validation. In those traditions, there is no distinction between the elements to be found in all states and those present only in some of them. In fact, both in Aristotle and Marx, the normative in the conduct of all states sets the limits of the empirical which expresses their real behavior. The normative of general principles outlines the political of concrete states. The normative supervises the political and the political is to confirm the normative. Thus, in Aristotle and Marx, the political is to indicate the necessity of the normative, its power of influence and complex character. In turn, the modern as well as contemporary liberals, especially contractarians, completely deprive their normative argument of any empirical confirmation. Thus, they consciously and purposefully give it exclusively a normative dimension. Accordingly, the normative fully replaces the empirical which leads to the elimination of the political. In his concept of public reason, Rawls goes even further and considers the empirical identical with the normative, and consequently the political with the normative. For some of his followers, the irrevocable character of the connection between the normative and the empirical in the notion of public reason is to be guaranteed by elimination of the political. This is to be achieved by the abolition of the state itself and thus the deprivation of the idea of reason of state of any conceptual foundation. However, both in Montesquieu and Burke, there is a strong distinction between what characterizes all states and what distinguishes each of them. Such a distinction results from the difference between what is common to their subjects or citizens and the societies they create, and what distinguishes them from themselves and their societies. At the same time, Montesquieu’s liberalism and Burke’s conservatism offer an equilibrium of the normative and the political which in turn constitutes a doctrinal support for the concept of reason of state beyond the main traditions of western political philosophy.

Intersectionality and the Struggle for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights: An Analysis of UN Discursive Patterns

<p>This thesis makes the normative argument that intersectionality should be taken seriously by the United Nations in their efforts to address Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR). This work suggests that, in spite of widespread recognition of the value of intersectionality for approaching issues of SRHR, the UN has insufficiently adopted the theory into its policy and practice. At the international policy level, intersectionality is nearly absent as a paradigm, yet its central components are dominant within mainstream development discourse. These components include discourses of women's empowerment, human rights, and men's involvement. Drawing on critical feminist and race theory, I argue that a narrow gender vision of SRHR is not sufficient and that intersectionality should be recognized both in discourse and practice by UN agencies. This argument is examined along the parallel tracks of the population movement within the UN system and the evolution of the global women's movement (GWM). This study shows that the UN system has traditionally adopted the approaches and discourses of the global women's movement, as analysed over four decades of UN population movement discourse. However, a shift occurring at the new millennium, as well as significant political barriers barring a discussion of race and racism, have led to a break in this relationship, damaging the take-up of GWM discourse. The conclusion drawn from this argument is that SRHR is an intersectional issue and the new and emerging intersectional paradigm must be adopted by the UN in order to effectively address SRHR on a local and global scale.</p>

Intersectionality and the Struggle for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights: An Analysis of UN Discursive Patterns

<p>This thesis makes the normative argument that intersectionality should be taken seriously by the United Nations in their efforts to address Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR). This work suggests that, in spite of widespread recognition of the value of intersectionality for approaching issues of SRHR, the UN has insufficiently adopted the theory into its policy and practice. At the international policy level, intersectionality is nearly absent as a paradigm, yet its central components are dominant within mainstream development discourse. These components include discourses of women's empowerment, human rights, and men's involvement. Drawing on critical feminist and race theory, I argue that a narrow gender vision of SRHR is not sufficient and that intersectionality should be recognized both in discourse and practice by UN agencies. This argument is examined along the parallel tracks of the population movement within the UN system and the evolution of the global women's movement (GWM). This study shows that the UN system has traditionally adopted the approaches and discourses of the global women's movement, as analysed over four decades of UN population movement discourse. However, a shift occurring at the new millennium, as well as significant political barriers barring a discussion of race and racism, have led to a break in this relationship, damaging the take-up of GWM discourse. The conclusion drawn from this argument is that SRHR is an intersectional issue and the new and emerging intersectional paradigm must be adopted by the UN in order to effectively address SRHR on a local and global scale.</p>

Rocking the Boat:The Participation Rhetoric Exposed: Why Should People Living in Poverty Have a Voice and Space at the United Nations?

<p>Poverty is one of the most serious issues of our time, and the major seat of the poverty eradication discourse is at the United Nations. The term participation has increasingly featured in the high level poverty discourse in recent years, as well as in development practice. However, in contrast to other identity groups, such as women, indigenous people and people with disabilities, the participation of people living in poverty in high level UN processes is not given priority. They are not seen as an identity group in their own right, rather they are subsumed into others. Furthermore, any participation is assumed to be acceptably realised at the local level, with little priority placed on the facilitation of participation in transnational or global institutions such as the UN. NGOs are assumed to be able to represent the poor, a situation which is problematic and serves to further marginalise people living in poverty. As NGOs translate and represent, they effectively silence people living in poverty. In the absence of the poor, perceptions held by the general public and by decision makers about the poor continue to hamper the debate and restrict possible solutions. Furthermore, the exclusionary statistics-dominated language of UN debate and procedural restrictions present barriers to people living in poverty being meaningfully involved in the poverty discourse. Additionally, the overuse of statistics in these debates serves to abstract and dehumanise the poor. This thesis makes the normative argument that people living in poverty should have a place and space at the United Nations, as do other identity groups. Their participation represents an opportunity to force the debate beyond statistics, and expose the harsh realities of ongoing suffering resulting from the world's failure to act. Their testimony and input could provide an effective catalyst for mobilising political will. Drawing on critical theory, I argue that regular participation and testimony of the poor has the potential to pierce the political facade within which the powerful at the UN make decisions, with scant realisation of the often devastating consequences for the currently invisible poor. The conclusion drawn from this argument is that the poor must be allowed to be leaders of their own liberation and to reclaim their dignity.</p>

Rocking the Boat:The Participation Rhetoric Exposed: Why Should People Living in Poverty Have a Voice and Space at the United Nations?

<p>Poverty is one of the most serious issues of our time, and the major seat of the poverty eradication discourse is at the United Nations. The term participation has increasingly featured in the high level poverty discourse in recent years, as well as in development practice. However, in contrast to other identity groups, such as women, indigenous people and people with disabilities, the participation of people living in poverty in high level UN processes is not given priority. They are not seen as an identity group in their own right, rather they are subsumed into others. Furthermore, any participation is assumed to be acceptably realised at the local level, with little priority placed on the facilitation of participation in transnational or global institutions such as the UN. NGOs are assumed to be able to represent the poor, a situation which is problematic and serves to further marginalise people living in poverty. As NGOs translate and represent, they effectively silence people living in poverty. In the absence of the poor, perceptions held by the general public and by decision makers about the poor continue to hamper the debate and restrict possible solutions. Furthermore, the exclusionary statistics-dominated language of UN debate and procedural restrictions present barriers to people living in poverty being meaningfully involved in the poverty discourse. Additionally, the overuse of statistics in these debates serves to abstract and dehumanise the poor. This thesis makes the normative argument that people living in poverty should have a place and space at the United Nations, as do other identity groups. Their participation represents an opportunity to force the debate beyond statistics, and expose the harsh realities of ongoing suffering resulting from the world's failure to act. Their testimony and input could provide an effective catalyst for mobilising political will. Drawing on critical theory, I argue that regular participation and testimony of the poor has the potential to pierce the political facade within which the powerful at the UN make decisions, with scant realisation of the often devastating consequences for the currently invisible poor. The conclusion drawn from this argument is that the poor must be allowed to be leaders of their own liberation and to reclaim their dignity.</p>

Learning from Scientific Disagreement

The article addresses the question of how should scientific peers revise their beliefs (if at all) upon recognized disagreement. After presenting the basics of peer disagreement in sections 1 and 2, we focus, in section 3, on a concrete case of scientific disagreement, to wit, the dispute over the evidential status of randomized control trials in medical practice. The examination of this case motivates the idea that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. In section 4, we support this conclusion by providing a normative argument in the same direction; if we are correct, typical reasons for conciliation are absent in this kind of scientific disagreements.

Comments on Ernest Weinrib’s ideas of “correlativity and personality”

This article aims to explain some of the core concepts that tort law philosopher Ernest Weinrib has expounded in his latest book “Corrective Justice” (2012). The article concentrates on the first chapter of the book, “Correlativity and Personality”, in which Weinrib lays down the core of his conceptual and normative argument about corrective justice. Understanding this core concepts may be of interest for any scholar delving into Weinrib’s ouvre for the first time, and might bring a renewed interested for those in the tort law field already familiar with his contentions about the relationship between tort law and corrective justice.

Constructive Versus Destructive Conflict: Taking Stock of the Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence in the EU

This article argues that constitutional pluralism is not a theory merely for times of equanimity, but crucially, in times of constitutional conflict. Given that it rests on the premise of regarding law as a dynamic, incrementally developing creature, constitutional conflict is no exceptional event, and represents an important element of the system's functioning. However, this does not mean that every point of conflict necessarily means progress for the pluralist system as a whole: it is possible to distinguish constructive from destructive conflict. In this respect, this piece will put forward a normative argument concerning the limits to which the auto-correct function of constitutional pluralism can stretch. In so doing, this piece will look at the recent jurisprudence of constitutional conflict at the EU and national level to demonstrate the limits of constructive conflict, as well as show how the example of Poland falls into the category of destructive conflict.