The Definition of Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Endorsing and Furthering or Merely Having Knowledge of the State or Organizational Policy?

2004 ◽  
pp. 163-192
Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

Chapter 9 interprets the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), the Statute’s Elements of Crimes, and the Court’s jurisprudence to identify the characteristics non-state entities behind crimes against humanity (CAH) need. It argues that the term ‘organizational policy’ under article 7(2)(1) ICC Statute is best understood in accordance with the ICC’s Elements of Crimes. In line with international jurisprudence, a collective entity’s policy can relate to the criminal acts underlying CAH in three ways: the entity might tolerate and thereby motivate the crimes; it might instigate the crimes; or commit the crimes through its own forces. Going beyond how the ICC has interpreted the ICC Statute hitherto, this chapter argues that the degree of organization of armed groups behind CAH depends on how the entity relates to the crimes in question. Concretely, it needs different capacities to tolerate, instigate, or commit crimes against humanity.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gwilym David Blunt

Pogge has repeatedly compared the causes of global poverty with historical crimes against humanity. This claim, however, has been treated as mere rhetoric. This article argues that there are good reasons to take it seriously. It does this by comparing Pogge’s thesis on the causes of global poverty with the baseline definition of crimes against humanity found in international law, especially the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It argues that the causes of global poverty are comparable with the crimes of slavery and apartheid. This has important consequences for cosmopolitan thought, as it makes the need for practical solutions to global poverty more urgent and raises questions about the global poor’s right to resist the international system by violent means.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 7 defines crimes against humanity, one of four categories of offence within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The classic definitions of crimes against humanity, in such instruments as the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, are vague and open-ended, leaving courts to interpret the scope of such expressions as ‘persecution’ and ‘inhumane acts’. Out of concern with the uncertain parameters of the crime, the drafters of the Rome Statute included extra language designed to restrain efforts at generous or liberal interpretation. The five distinct ‘contextual elements’ of crimes against humanity are: (i) an attack directed against any civilian population; (ii) a State or organizational policy; (iii) an attack of a widespread or systematic nature; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and the attack; and (v) knowledge of the attack.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
EAMON ALOYO

AbstractScholars have proposed a number of different ways to improve global accountability, but none has adequately addressed how individuals who commit widespread or systematic nonviolent wrongs can be held to account. I argue that for moral reasons individuals should be held accountable for nonviolent crimes against humanity and that an existing legal institution, the International Criminal Court (ICC), has the authority to prosecute such crimes. The ICC’s prosecutor should start exercising this legal authority because widespread or systematic nonviolent harms can be just as morally wrong as violent ones. What matters on my account is the gravity of a wrong, not whether it was committed violently or nonviolently. I situate these arguments in contemporary discussions of accountability, and provide evidence that individuals can cause widespread or systematic nonviolent harms that meet the legal definition of a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute, the ICC’s foundational document.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
Angela Mudukuti

In 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepped into uncharted waters as it issued its first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state, then President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir. Following the UN Security Council's referral of the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC, Al-Bashir was charged by the Court with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and in 2010, he was also charged with genocide. As a consequence, all of the states parties to the Rome Statute had a duty to arrest Al-Bashir. Several states have nonetheless failed to arrest him during country visits, allowing Al-Bashir to evade the ICC. This has given rise to a number of cases before the ICC Chambers, including this Appeals Chamber judgment regarding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 111 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 111 sets out measures in the event of escape of a convicted person. The Rome Statute combines ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ approaches to State cooperation, allowing either the State of enforcement or the Court itself to intervene, depending on the circumstances. The Court may choose to return the escaped prisoner to the original State of enforcement, or to change the State of enforcement. Given the Court's authority to oversee and review enforcement in a general sense, even if this provision were not included in the Statute the consequences of escape would probably be the same.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 108 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 108 prohibits the prosecution, punishment, or extradition of a sentenced person to a third State for conduct engaged in prior to the person's delivery to the State of enforcement. However, the Court is allowed to dispense with this requirement if it is so requested by the State of enforcement. When the State of enforcement wishes to prosecute or enforce a sentence against a sentenced person for any conduct engaged in prior to that person's transfer, it shall notify its intention to the Presidency and transmit the relevant documents. In the event of a request for extradition made by another State, the State of enforcement shall transmit the entire request to the Presidency with a protocol containing the views of the sentenced person obtained after informing the person sufficiently about the extradition request.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 107 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 107 governs the transfer of the person following completion of the sentence. When a released prisoner is not a national of the State of enforcement, and is not authorized to remain there, two possible scenarios arise: transfer to a State ‘which is obliged to receive him or her’ and transfer to a State ‘which agrees to receive him or her’. Transfer of a released person to a third State upon completion of sentence will invariably require agreement. Absent such agreement, the individual will remain in the State of enforcement. In deciding upon transfer, the wishes of the released prisoner are to be taken into account.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 103 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 103 deals with State enforcement of sentences. The enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court is premised on three broad principles: sentences are served in the prison facilities of States and are subject to their laws; enforcement of the sentence is subject to the supervision of the Court; and the sentence imposed by the Court is binding upon the State of enforcement. The provisions of the Statute governing enforcement are quite succinct, and much of the detail on the issue appears in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 101 sets out the principle of speciality, which is part of the customary law governing extradition between States. The rationale for the principle of speciality ‘is to protect State sovereignty’. For this reason, the rule is limited to the scenarios in which the person is arrested and is surrendered as a result of a request submitted by the Court to the State. It is inapplicable if the suspect has appeared voluntarily. The State that surrenders the individual to the Court may be asked to waive the rule of speciality if the Court seeks to proceed with respect to crimes that were not part of the original request for surrender.


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