Part 10 Enforcement: Exécution, Art.111 Escape/Évasion

Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 111 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 111 sets out measures in the event of escape of a convicted person. The Rome Statute combines ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ approaches to State cooperation, allowing either the State of enforcement or the Court itself to intervene, depending on the circumstances. The Court may choose to return the escaped prisoner to the original State of enforcement, or to change the State of enforcement. Given the Court's authority to oversee and review enforcement in a general sense, even if this provision were not included in the Statute the consequences of escape would probably be the same.

Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 108 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 108 prohibits the prosecution, punishment, or extradition of a sentenced person to a third State for conduct engaged in prior to the person's delivery to the State of enforcement. However, the Court is allowed to dispense with this requirement if it is so requested by the State of enforcement. When the State of enforcement wishes to prosecute or enforce a sentence against a sentenced person for any conduct engaged in prior to that person's transfer, it shall notify its intention to the Presidency and transmit the relevant documents. In the event of a request for extradition made by another State, the State of enforcement shall transmit the entire request to the Presidency with a protocol containing the views of the sentenced person obtained after informing the person sufficiently about the extradition request.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 107 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 107 governs the transfer of the person following completion of the sentence. When a released prisoner is not a national of the State of enforcement, and is not authorized to remain there, two possible scenarios arise: transfer to a State ‘which is obliged to receive him or her’ and transfer to a State ‘which agrees to receive him or her’. Transfer of a released person to a third State upon completion of sentence will invariably require agreement. Absent such agreement, the individual will remain in the State of enforcement. In deciding upon transfer, the wishes of the released prisoner are to be taken into account.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 103 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 103 deals with State enforcement of sentences. The enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court is premised on three broad principles: sentences are served in the prison facilities of States and are subject to their laws; enforcement of the sentence is subject to the supervision of the Court; and the sentence imposed by the Court is binding upon the State of enforcement. The provisions of the Statute governing enforcement are quite succinct, and much of the detail on the issue appears in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 101 sets out the principle of speciality, which is part of the customary law governing extradition between States. The rationale for the principle of speciality ‘is to protect State sovereignty’. For this reason, the rule is limited to the scenarios in which the person is arrested and is surrendered as a result of a request submitted by the Court to the State. It is inapplicable if the suspect has appeared voluntarily. The State that surrenders the individual to the Court may be asked to waive the rule of speciality if the Court seeks to proceed with respect to crimes that were not part of the original request for surrender.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 127 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 127 addresses the withdrawal of a State Party from this Statute. A State may withdraw from the Rome Statute by providing a written notification to the depositary, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The withdrawal takes effect one year after receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General, unless a later date is specified. There have been no notifications of withdrawal from the Rome Statute. The Statute does not indicate whether a notice of withdrawal can itself be withdrawn, thereby returning the State to ordinary status as a Party. Withdrawal does not affect the continuation of the Statute with respect to other States Parties, even if the number of them falls below the threshold of sixty.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 92 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 92 grants the Court authority, ‘[i]n urgent cases’, to request the provisional arrest of the person sought, pending presentation of the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in article 91. When a request is made to a State in accordance with article 92, the Registrar ‘invites’ the State to inform him or her of the arrest, and ‘to provide, inter alia’, personal details and other information concerning the arrest, including a confirmation of ‘the information given to the arrested person in respect of his or her rights’.


2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-359
Author(s):  
Ariel Zemach

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court completely divests the Court of the power to compel a state to disclose evidence in its possession if the state opposes such disclosure on grounds of national security. If a state refuses to disclose information essential to the adjudication of a case on national security grounds, the ICC may settle fair trial concerns either by drawing factual inferences favourable to the defendant or by staying the proceedings. I argue, however, that in practice such judicial powers do not provide a sufficient guarantee of a fair trial. I propose to allay fair trial concerns arising from the refusal of states to allow the ICC access to evidence in their possession by introducing a reform in the exercise of the ICC's prosecutorial discretion. According to my proposal, the requirement of a fair trial, which entails the disclosure of material essential for the defence, would be incorporated into the criteria that guide the ICC Prosecutor in the selection of cases for prosecution. Although the present article focuses on the issue of national security evidence, the reach of the proposed reform extends to all cases of state refusal to allow the ICC access to evidence, regardless of the grounds for refusal.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 106 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 106 strikes a balance between the general carceral system applicable in the State of enforcement that applies to the Court's prisoner, and the requirement of generally accepted international standards drawn from human rights instruments. This ‘national treatment’ clause was originally introduced to ensure that prisoners of the Court would not receive treatment that was worse than that of ordinary prisoners. The primary function of the provision is protecting the fundamental rights of the prisoner. The article also declares that Communications between a sentenced person and the Court shall be unimpeded and confidential.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-93
Author(s):  
Patrick Kimani

The development of international criminal law in the last seven decades has seen a gradual erosion of the integrity of immunities for heads of states. The journey from Nuremberg to The Hague has resulted in a permanent international criminal court. Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute) disregards immunities as an effective bar to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Heads of states have been stripped of their ‘invisibility cloak’ from international criminal prosecutions. The Rome Statute places its reliance on the situation state’s authorities to cooperate with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes. A special tension is noticeable in circumstances where an incumbent head of state is accused at ICC while his or her state is placed under the general cooperation obligation. This tension is clearly manifest in the two criminal processes against Uhuru Kenyatta and Al Bashir. Bearing in mind the significant political muscle a sitting head of state wields in their state, it is quite likely that their state’s authorities will be very reluctant to discharge their cooperation obligations. The prosecution of sitting heads of states remains a challenge. Is it time to rethink the structure of the ICC or the implementation of the Statute?


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