Part 2 Jurisdiction, Admissibility, and Applicable Law: Compétence, Recevabilité, Et Droit Applicable, Art.7 Crimes against humanity/Crimes contre l’humanité

Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 7 defines crimes against humanity, one of four categories of offence within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The classic definitions of crimes against humanity, in such instruments as the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, are vague and open-ended, leaving courts to interpret the scope of such expressions as ‘persecution’ and ‘inhumane acts’. Out of concern with the uncertain parameters of the crime, the drafters of the Rome Statute included extra language designed to restrain efforts at generous or liberal interpretation. The five distinct ‘contextual elements’ of crimes against humanity are: (i) an attack directed against any civilian population; (ii) a State or organizational policy; (iii) an attack of a widespread or systematic nature; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and the attack; and (v) knowledge of the attack.

Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 8bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 8bis defines the crime of aggression, one of four categories of offence within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The provision is part of a package of amendments adopted at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010. It entered into force in accordance with article 121(5) one year after ratification of the amendments by the first State Party. Liechtenstein was the first State Party to ratify the amendments, on May 8, 2012. Consequently, the amendment entered into force on May 8, 2013. On that date, the amendment was registered by the depository, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. However, exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over article 8bis is subject to article 15bis and article 15ter.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 8 defines war crimes, one of four categories of offence within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Much more than a codification of earlier law and practice, the Rome Statute's provisions on war crimes provide a relatively comprehensive codification of war crimes committed in non-international armed conflict. They also recognize new crimes, such as the recruitment of child soldiers and attacks on peacekeepers. However, they also fall short in some important respects, failing to provide adequate criminalization of prohibited weapons, the result of a nuclear impasse.


Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

Chapter 9 interprets the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), the Statute’s Elements of Crimes, and the Court’s jurisprudence to identify the characteristics non-state entities behind crimes against humanity (CAH) need. It argues that the term ‘organizational policy’ under article 7(2)(1) ICC Statute is best understood in accordance with the ICC’s Elements of Crimes. In line with international jurisprudence, a collective entity’s policy can relate to the criminal acts underlying CAH in three ways: the entity might tolerate and thereby motivate the crimes; it might instigate the crimes; or commit the crimes through its own forces. Going beyond how the ICC has interpreted the ICC Statute hitherto, this chapter argues that the degree of organization of armed groups behind CAH depends on how the entity relates to the crimes in question. Concretely, it needs different capacities to tolerate, instigate, or commit crimes against humanity.


Author(s):  
Michala Chadimova

Crimes committed by the members of Boko Haram in Nigeria are not only the subject of national trials but also of preliminary examination at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This article focuses on the sexual slavery perpetrated by Boko Haram, describes how the crimes are viewed within the national Nigerian criminal process and addresses the possibility of prosecution of the crimes at the ICC.<br/> This article analyses the legal terminology used to describe the crimes connected to Boko Haram – enslavement, sexual slavery, human trafficking and terrorism – and their interaction. While providing an overview of the ICC's current preliminary examination into the situation in Nigeria, this article discusses how the principle of complementarity is potentially holding the OTP back from the formal investigation.<br/> Furthermore, an overview of cases at the ICC that have involved charges of sexual slavery or enslavement will be provided. By analysing the Court's findings in relation to elements of sexual slavery, this article provides an insightful view into the Court's rhetoric on this crime. Similarly, this article discusses modes of liability that have been employed in the Katanga/Chui and Ntaganda cases and provides a learning opportunity for future cases of sexual slavery as both a crime against humanity (Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute) and a war crime (Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute; 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute).


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
Angela Mudukuti

In 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepped into uncharted waters as it issued its first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state, then President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir. Following the UN Security Council's referral of the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC, Al-Bashir was charged by the Court with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and in 2010, he was also charged with genocide. As a consequence, all of the states parties to the Rome Statute had a duty to arrest Al-Bashir. Several states have nonetheless failed to arrest him during country visits, allowing Al-Bashir to evade the ICC. This has given rise to a number of cases before the ICC Chambers, including this Appeals Chamber judgment regarding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-123
Author(s):  
Ahmed Samir Hassanein

While the complementary regime of the International Criminal Court (icc) has been the subject of extensive examination in the literature, this article offers a new reading of the inability scenario that establishes a clear distinction between two different forms of inability under Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute. An in-depth analysis of this article as this review suggests, would show that the reason behind the inability of a national judicial system is attributed to one of two factors or even the two together; first, physical factors, in the case of ‘total or substantial collapse’, and second, legal factors, in the case of ‘unavailability of national judicial system’. Significantly, the aforementioned distinction is not limited to theoretical debate, but it has pivotal legal ramifications as the emerging practice of the icc shows, or rather does not show, as it seems that the icc confuses the two forms of inability.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 107 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 107 governs the transfer of the person following completion of the sentence. When a released prisoner is not a national of the State of enforcement, and is not authorized to remain there, two possible scenarios arise: transfer to a State ‘which is obliged to receive him or her’ and transfer to a State ‘which agrees to receive him or her’. Transfer of a released person to a third State upon completion of sentence will invariably require agreement. Absent such agreement, the individual will remain in the State of enforcement. In deciding upon transfer, the wishes of the released prisoner are to be taken into account.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 101 sets out the principle of speciality, which is part of the customary law governing extradition between States. The rationale for the principle of speciality ‘is to protect State sovereignty’. For this reason, the rule is limited to the scenarios in which the person is arrested and is surrendered as a result of a request submitted by the Court to the State. It is inapplicable if the suspect has appeared voluntarily. The State that surrenders the individual to the Court may be asked to waive the rule of speciality if the Court seeks to proceed with respect to crimes that were not part of the original request for surrender.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 24 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Preceded by two provisions that entrench two Latin maxims described collectively as the principle of legality, article 24 completes the treatment of the subject in Part 3 of the Rome Statute. Article 24 promises the accused that if there is a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgment, ‘the law more favourable shall apply’. However, this rule giving the defendant the benefit of the ‘more favourable’ provision is not without difficulties. It is not always a simple manner to determine which rule is in fact more favourable. Moreover, there may be an important element of subjectivity, in that individuals may differ in their assessment.


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