Chapter Three. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice: Advisory jurisdiction

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1


1985 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 182-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

En s'efforçant, au lendemain de la guerre [1914 – 1918], de poser les bases d'une société de peuples régie par le droit, les fondateurs de cette communauté internationale nouvelle se rendaient pleinement compte qu'il ne saurait y avoir une société organisée sans un pouvoir judiciaire chargé de veiller, en dehors de toute préoccupation de politique et de force, à la stricte observation du droit. C'est dans cette conviction qu'ils ont prévu, dès l'origine, la création de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.Feinberg in 1931Reviewing the history of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International Court of Justice from 1922—the World Court, a convenient but possibly misleading expression which embraces both the Permanent Court from 1922 to 1945 and the present International Court of Justice established as an integral part of the United Nations since—four clearly separated periods can be discerned. They run from 1922 to 1931, 1932 to 1940, 1946 to 1966, and from 1967 onwards.The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court after a cataclysmic war in Europe and the awe-inspiring Russian Revolution released a wave of euphoria upon the exhausted and war-weary peoples of what is now known as Western Europe, and they placed great hopes in the new League and Court.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanimir A. Alexandrov

States can accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to all or certain categories of legal disputes by means of unilateral declarations. This article examines the reservations to the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction that states include in such declarations. It reviews the practice of states and traces the trends in drafting and adopting reservations. It also analyzes the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice in relation to the interpretation of various reservations, particularly in recent cases, illustrating the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of different types of reservations.


Author(s):  
Matthieu Aldjima Namountougou

SummaryAccording to the International Court of Justice, any person through whom an international organization acts is an agent of that organization. However, this definition is too broad. Any participation in the fulfilment of the mission of an international organization does not necessarily make the person an agent of the international organization. After detailing the particularities of the status of international agents, this article considers the issue of accountability for wrongs attributable to them. It recommends in this respect the development of a system of accountability that combines national and international justice responses with priority to the former based on the location of the offence.


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 880-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Egon Schwelb

The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice did not contain a clause regulating the procedure for its amendment. This was considered to be a “gap,” an “unfortunate lacuna.” This “gap” may or may not have been deliberate. It was certainly not a “genuine” gap. In spite of the absence of a provision on amendments, the law provided a clear though inconvenient answer to the question of how the Statute could be amended, namely, by unanimous consent of all parties to it. In 1928 proceedings for the introduction of some amendments were initiated. They were incorporated in a Protocol of Amendment in 1929. The difficulties which were encountered before the Protocol of Amendment entered into force in 1936 are now history and need not be dealt with here, the less so as they have been described in considerable detail in a recent book. The Protocol of Amendment did not remedy this defect of the original Statute. As Hudson has explained, this was due to the fact that the adhesion of the United States was proposed on condition that the Statute “shall not be amended without the consent of the United States.” Such a position could hardly be accorded to the United States unless it were also maintained for the other states which were parties.


Author(s):  
Andrew Yu. Klyuchnikov

The rules on the competence of international courts determine the nature of the cases they resolve and the conditions for their admission to proceedings. The possibility composition of the court considers each case individually following the principle of jurisdiction to decide the jurisdiction due to the lack of a clear regulatory framework. Each international court of justice, relying on the international law, is solely competent to resolve doubts as to its own jurisdiction. This study aims to identify the approach of courts to solving jurisdictional problems in practice. The material for the study includes the cases of international courts, doctrinal comments, and legal positions of prominent researchers of international justice. The author describes the basic interpretative framework procedure, restraint, activism in the justification, and the lack of personal jurisdiction. Thus, if the international court of justice has no confidence in the existence of competence on the subject of the dispute, it will not take measures to justify it. The brevity of the position on the issue will be due to interpretative restraint. Activism arises when the international court of justice seeks to achieve a procedural result, substantiate the rationality of the result of interpretation or the impossibility of achieving it. Science has not resolved the issue of factors that may affect the limits of interpretation by international courts of their own competence.


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