14. Portfolio Optimization: Institutional Investors and Asset Managers

2016 ◽  
pp. 93-94
Keyword(s):  
Portfolio Optimization ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Asset Managers

scholarly journals The Influence of Large Investment Funds

2021 ◽  
pp. 231-244
Author(s):  
Helen Campbell Pickford
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Natural Capital ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Asset Managers ◽  
Large Investment ◽  
The Way

The adoption of the Economics of Mutuality will depend on institutional investors promoting it through active engaged investing. Chapter 18 describes how some investment funds are taking an active role in managing the companies in which they are invested. It involves them acquiring significant blocks of shares that are held for extended periods of time and managed directly by asset owners themselves instead of by intermediary asset managers. Critical to this is the way in which the performance of their investments is monitored and measured. Alongside measuring financial performance over longer periods of time than is conventionally the case, performance needs to be assessed in relation to other indicators of performance related to human, social, and natural capital.

scholarly journals The Rise of Institutional Investors

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Fichtner
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Equity Funds ◽  
Private Equity Funds ◽  
Important Position ◽  
State Street ◽  
Asset Managers

During the last decades, institutional investors gained an ever more important position as managers of assets and owners of corporations. By demanding (short-term) shareholder value, some of them have driven the financialization of corporations and of the financial sector itself. This chapter first characterizes the specific roles that private equity funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds have played in this development. It then moves on to focus on one group of institutional investors that is rapidly becoming a pivotal factor for corporate control in many countries – the “Big Three” large passive asset managers BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street.

Improving The Mechanism For The Participation Of Banks In The Restructuring Of Joint-Stock Enterprises In The Cis.

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Kotov
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Of Action ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Scale Up ◽  
Investment Bank ◽  
Asset Managers

This article focuses on the participation of commercial banks in the CIS in providing the investment processes of restructuring of joint-stock companies. The features of the investment bank providing various types of modernization of companies, as well as the risks associated with the implementation of their functions as consultants, institutional investors, investment brokers and asset managers, trust companies. The content of the mechanism of action of banks to scale up and improve the quality of the investment programs to ensure the restructuring of joint-stock companies.

Institutional Investor Voting Behaviour

2021 ◽  
pp. 227-262
Author(s):  
Luca Enriques ◽  
Alessandro Romano
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Geographical Proximity ◽  
Voting Behaviour ◽  
Current Policy ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
Asset Managers ◽  
Shed Light

This chapter shows how network theory can improve our understanding of institutional investors’ voting behaviour and, more generally, their role in corporate governance. The standard idea is that institutional investors compete against each other on relative performance and hence might not cast informed votes, due to rational apathy and rational reticence. In other words, institutional investors have incentives to free-ride instead of ‘cooperating’ and casting informed votes. We show that connections of various kinds among institutional investors, whether from formal networks, geographical proximity, or common ownership, and among institutional investors and other agents, such as proxy advisors, contribute to shaping institutional investors’ incentives to vote ‘actively’. They also create intricate competition dynamics: competition takes place not only among institutional investors (and their asset managers) but also at the level of their employees and among ‘cliques’ of institutional investors. Employees, who strive for better jobs, are motivated to obtain more information on portfolio companies than may be strictly justified from their employer institution’s perspective, and to circulate it within their network. Cliques of institutional investors compete against each other. Because there are good reasons to believe that cliques of cooperators outperform cliques of non-cooperators, the network-level competition might increase the incentives of institutional investors to collect information. These dynamics can enhance institutional investors’ engagement in portfolio companies and also shed light on some current policy issues such as the antitrust effects of common ownership and mandatory disclosures of institutional investors’ voting.

Understanding the Use of Long-Term Finance in Developing Countries

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Soledad Martinez Pería ◽  
Sergio L. Schmukler
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Financial Intermediaries ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Short And Long Term ◽  
Asset Managers

This chapter reviews recent evidence on the use of long-term finance in developing countries (relative to developed ones) to try to identify where short- and long-term financing occurs, and what role different financial intermediaries and markets play in extending this type of financing. Although banks are the most important providers of credit, they do not seem to offer long-term financing. In fact, loans in developing countries have significantly shorter maturities than those in developed countries. Capital markets have become increasingly sizable since the 1990s and can provide financing at fairly long terms. But just a few large firms use these markets. Only some institutional investors provide funding at long-term maturities. Incentives for asset managers are tilted toward the short term due to constant monitoring. Instead, asset-liability managers have a longer-term horizon, as foreign investors in developing countries do. Governments might help expand long-term financing, although with limited policy tools.

Private equity in 401(K) plans – a trillion dollar opportunity?

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 85-91
Author(s):  
Robert L. Sichel ◽  
William P. Wade ◽  
Ruth E. Delaney ◽  
Kristina M. Zanotti ◽  
Michael McGrath
Keyword(s):  
Asset Allocation ◽  
Asset Management ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Regulatory Guidance ◽  
Private Market ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Asset Managers

Purpose To explain recent regulatory guidance for different types of stakeholders, including asset managers, fund complexes, and institutional investors. Design/methodology/approach Summary of recent regulatory guidance and explanation for different types of stakeholders, including asset managers, fund complexes, and institutional investors. Findings While the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) letter does not open the door to direct access to Private Market Investments by 401(k) plan participants, it does provide a framework for the expanded use of private equity and, we believe, other types of Private Market Investments in managed asset allocation funds such as target date funds. Originality/value Practical guidance from experienced asset management and investment funds and ERISA lawyers.

scholarly journals Informed Trading in Business Groups

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvaro Pedraza
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Group Affiliation ◽  
Common Ownership ◽  
Timing Ability ◽  
Access Information ◽  
Disclosure Rules ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Asset Managers

Abstract Business groups, which are collections of legally independent companies with a significant amount of common ownership, dominate private sector activity in developing countries. This paper studies information flows within these groups by examining the trading performance of institutional investors in firms that belong to the same group. Using a novel dataset with complete transaction records in Colombia, this paper estimates the difference in returns between trades of asset managers in group-affiliated companies and trades of non-affiliated managers in the same stocks during the same period. The data show that affiliated managers display superior timing ability and that their trades outperform those of non-affiliated managers by 0.85 percent per month. The evidence suggests that institutional investors with group affiliation access information that is only available to members of the group. In order to limit the use of private information, financial authorities might need to expand their disclosure rules to monitor the trades of group-affiliated investors.

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