Alternative Action Organizations During Hard Economic Times: A Comparative European Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
pp. 733-738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Kousis ◽  
Stefania Kalogeraki ◽  
Camilo Cristancho

The aim of this Special Issue is to offer new systematic analyses on European alternative (non)economic solidarity practices since the global financial crisis, that have attracted limited media and scholarly attention. Its seven articles are devoted to multidimensional analyses providing complementary perspectives on alternative action organizations across Europe and rest on Action Organization Analysis, a new hubs-website approach extending Protest Event Analysis. They deal with the emergence and continuity of alternative action organizations in different contexts, while they focus on its multiple tactics and the ways in which they address crisis-related needs under diverse conditions of vulnerability and hardship. Our contributions rely on original data produced in the context of Work Package 6 of the EU-funded FP7 project “Living with Hard Times: How Citizens React to Economic Crises and Their Social and Political Consequences” (LIVEWHAT), conducted across nine European countries.

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoo-Duk Kang ◽  
Kyuntae Kim ◽  
Tae Hyun Oh ◽  
Cheol-Won Lee ◽  
Hyun Jean Lee ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Steven L Schwarcz

Securitisation represents a significant worldwide source of capital market financing. European investors commonly invest in asset-backed securities issued in U.S. securitisation transactions, and vice versa One of the key goals of the European Commission's proposed Capital Markets Union (CMU) is to further facilitate securitisation as a source of capital market financing as a viable alternative to bank-based finance for companies operating in the EU. To that end, this chapter explains securitisation and attempts to put its rise, its decline after the global financial crisis, and its recent CMU-inspired revival into a global perspective. It examines not only securitisation's relationship to the financial crisis but also post-crisis comparative regulatory approaches in the EU and the United States.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 557-591
Author(s):  
Andri Fannar Bergþórsson

In response to the global financial crisis, the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was created in 2010. Supranational bodies were established for different financial sectors to act as supervisors of sorts for national-level supervisors in EU Member States. This article focuses on how the system was adapted to three EFTA States that are not part of the EU but form the internal market along with EU Member States through the EEA Agreement – Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein (EEA EFTA States). The aim is to clarify how ESFS has been incorporated into the EEA agreement and to discuss whether this a workable solution for the EEA EFTA States that have not transferred their sovereignty by name in the same manner as the EU Member States. One issue is whether the adaptation has gone beyond the limits of the two-pillar structure, as all initiative and work stem from the EU supranational bodies and not the EFTA pillar.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig

This chapter traces the development of what is now the EU. It first describes the origins of ideas of European unity. It then discusses the various treaties that paved the way towards broader European integration. These include the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951,the Single European Act 1986, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992, and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. Next, the chapter turns to the impact of the global financial crisis on the EU and considers several theories of integration.


1998 ◽  
Vol 166 ◽  
pp. 44-56
Author(s):  
Nigel Pain ◽  
Florence Hubert ◽  
Dirk te Velde ◽  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Véronique Genre

Economic growth in the EU area rose markedly last year. Output expanded by more than 3 per cent in over half of the member countries, although growth was notably slower in the larger economies. The outlook continued to improve in the first half of this year. Growth in the first quarter was particularly buoyant. Eurostat figures indicate that output in the EU was some 3.3 per cent higher in the first quarter of 1998 than a year earlier. Although output rose by only 0.2 per cent in the second quarter, this was partly due to statistical distortions arising from the different number of working days in the quarter. Italy is the sole economy where growth has proved to be weaker than initially expected. The global financial crisis and slowdown in worldwide demand is expected to dampen EU growth somewhat next year, and we continue to be less optimistic than the European Commission about future prospects. Growth in the EU economies is projected to slow from 2¾ per cent this year to around 2¼ per cent in 1999.


2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (s2) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
György Surányi

Looking back to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, Hungary was among the first countries to be forced to make use of financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. The government, the MNB (the central bank of Hungary) as well as the domestic and foreign analysts cited the high public debt and the volume of unsecured foreign-currency loans as the main reasons for the crises. Though these were real weaknesses, this diagnosis was false as much as the following treatment. First and foremost, it was the inadequate level of foreign exchange reserves that made Hungary to request outside financial assistance. The excessive fiscal tightening urged by the MNB only led to deepening of the crises. In general, the macropolicy – both fiscal and monetary policy – before, during and after the crises turned out to be painfully pro-cyclical. Due to the lack of sufficient reserves, the MNB became virtually powerless to intervene and could only watch from the side-lines as events unfolded. The orthodox mind-set after replenishing the forex reserves prevented it from implementing a broad scale of unconventional measures to ease the crises. The fiscal authority lost its capacity long before to reduce the severity of the crises. Thus, the excessive and incorrect structure of fiscal correction coupled with an unjustified orthodox monetary policy, the contraction of the Hungarian economy went much beyond the inevitable amount.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document