Substantial Convergence or Parallel Paths? Similarities and Differences in the Economic Analysis of Horizontal Mergers in U.S. and EU Competition Law

2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 101-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Coppi ◽  
Mike Walker
EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1072-1125
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit.


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1034-1086
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Yi Man Li ◽  
Herru Ching Yu Li ◽  
Cho Kei Mak ◽  
Po Kei Chan

AbstractIn recent years, many of the Asian countries follow suit to implement competition law. Are there any differences with regards to the intention to implement competition law? Are they driven by similar lines of reasoning? Many of the previous research shed light on one or two Asia countries reasons for implementing competition law. Others focus on the US antitrust law or EU competition law only. This paper compares and contrasts the similarities and differences with regards to the major motives in implementing competition laws/antitrust laws. We first used content analysis to categorize the reasons for implementation of competition law. After that, data visualization method is used to study the the reasons mentioned by official websites and academic journals which lead to the implementation of competition laws in different countries.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102.


2005 ◽  
pp. 100-116
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
A. Shastitko

The article is devoted to the analysis of the draft law "On Protection of Competition", which must substitute the laws "On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Commodity Markets" and "On Protection of Competition on the Financial Services Market". The innovations enhancing the quality of Russian competition law and new norms providing at least ambiguous effects on antimonopoly regulation are considered. The first group of positive measures includes unification of competition norms for commodity and financial markets, changes of criteria and the scale of control of economic concentrations, specification of conditions, where norms are applied "per se" and according to the "rule of reason", introduction of rules that can prevent the restriction of competition by the executive power. The interpretation of the "collective dominance" concept and certain rules devoted to antimonopoly control of state aid are in the second group of questionable steps.


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