In quest of a single European Union voice in the United Nations General Assembly: The politics of Resolution 65/276

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spyros Blavoukos ◽  
Dimitris Bourantonis ◽  
Ioannis Galariotis

In May 2011, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 65/276 that enhances the European Union (EU) institutional mode of representation in the UNGA and other multilateral fora operating under its auspices. This followed an earlier, failed attempt that caused much embarrassment and political turmoil in the EU. The article examines the politics of this resolution, tracing its background logic, its origins and the political interactions in the UN that eventually led to its almost consensual embracement. It accounts for the failure in the first stage of the negotiations and how the EU responded to it, adjusting its bargaining strategy accordingly. This case study contributes to the better understanding of the links between intra-EU coherence and EU effectiveness as an international actor. We posit that there is one additional dimension of EU coherence not fully captured in the relevant literature. We distinguish between genuine coherence and generated coherence. The former entails homogeneity, or at least a significant degree of a priori convergence among EU member-states. The latter refers to EU positions that have emerged after hard and protracted intra-EU negotiations. The two types differ in the degree of flexibility bestowed on the EU in international negotiations.

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 652-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Burmester ◽  
Michael Jankowski

Existing research suggests that European Union member states are increasingly able to act in concert in the United Nations General Assembly. Based on several hundred co-ordination meetings per year, the European Union ‘speaks with one voice’ on most of the resolutions voted upon in the United Nations General Assembly. However, little is known about instances where the European Union member states do not vote coherently. Three questions remain unanswered. First, what factors determine deviating voting behaviour of European Union member states? Second, who are the most frequent defectors from the European Union’s majority position? Third, which voting blocs within the European Union can be identified? The article answers these questions in a quantitative design by controlling for domestic factors, issues of resolutions and the position of the United States. The results suggest that domestic factors determine deviating voting behaviour far less than agenda-related issues and the position of the United States.


English Today ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Tomoyuki Kawashima

How do people choose a language when they are proficient in more than one language? This research sheds light on language choice, English use in particular, in diplomacy where an individual speaks primarily for negotiation on behalf of an organization or a community. Nick (2001: 39) argued that ‘language is not a simple tool … but very often the very essence of the diplomatic vocation’. Despite its importance, little has been investigated about language choice in diplomatic meetings (Finsen, 2016). Wodak, Krzyzanowski and Forchtner (2012), one of the few studies, illustrated that 45% of the overall percentage of languages in the European Parliament (EP) meetings was English. To accumulate more data of English use in diplomacy, this research investigated addresses made by the heads of state at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA). The EP is the law-making institution of the European Union (EN) (European Union, 2019), and the UN and the EU have contrasting language policies. Under the EU's non-restrictive language policy, national languages of all 23 members are included in the official languages (Finsen, 2016). On the other hand, the UN restricts the number of official languages to six, namely Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. This makes a difference in the payment for interpretation services. If representatives would like to speak in Portuguese, the EU provides interpretation. However, the UN does not. The speakers need to provide interpretation into one of the six official languages on their own. These contrasting language policies between the EU and the UN can influence language choice at the UN meetings. Moreover, the UN has a larger number of member states than the EU, and many of them belong to other language or regional organizations. Therefore, this study focuses on the prevalence of English use by the heads of state at the UN GA meetings according to five language and two regional groups.


Author(s):  
Carla Monteleone

The European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) are expressions of a rules-based global order. The EU has enshrined support to the UN in its security strategies, and its priorities indicate an engagement in a wide range of UN programs and activities to maintain the rules-based order and adapt it to face internal and external challenges. The EU and its member states are the largest contributors to the UN budget. Following the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, the EU has increased its representation at the UN, gaining enhanced observer status in the General Assembly. However, because of the intergovernmental nature of the forum, only its member states have the right to vote. This has led scholars to investigate the actorness of the EU at the UN through the analysis of the voting cohesion of EU member states in the General Assembly. Less attention has been paid to the behavior of EU member states in the Security Council. Existing scholarship has tended to analyze how the EU acts within the UN more than inter-organizational cooperation. However, the contribution of the EU and its member states to UN activities in the area of peace and security maintenance is particularly relevant and is a reminder that inter-organizational cooperation deserve greater attention than the one it has received so far.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199756
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Alex Baturo

When political principals send agents to international organizations, those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet, various types of country representatives appear on the international stage, including permanent representatives as well as more overtly “political” government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric. In addition, career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the United Nations. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents’ rhetoric at the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at international organizations. Points for practitioners Delegations to international organizations do not “speak with one voice.” This article illustrates that permanent representatives to the United Nations display more characteristics of bureaucratic culture than do other delegates from the same country. For practitioners, it is important to realize that the manner in which certain classes of international actors “conduct business” can differ markedly. These differences in tone—even among delegates from the same principal—can impact the process of negotiation and debate.


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