Evolution of an Erosion

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
Cathál MacPartholán

This article critically examines the development of statutory restrictions on the common law right to silence in the UK, providing insight from common law, jurisprudence and historical legal contexts, and considering the broader context of the privilege against self-incrimination, and critically evaluates the development restriction of the right, by ss 34–38 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

2013 ◽  
pp. 21-41
Author(s):  
Gillian S. Howard

The English legal system is based on the common law. The common law system in England and Wales developed from the decisions of judges whose rulings over the centuries have created precedents for other courts to follow and these decisions were based on the ‘custom and practice of the Realm’. The system of binding precedent means that any decision of the Supreme Court—the new name for the former House of Lords (the highest court in the UK)—will bind all the lower courts, unless the lower courts are able to distinguish the facts of the current case and argue that the previous binding decision cannot apply, because of differences in the facts of the two cases. However, since the UK joined the European Union (EU), the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) now supersede any decisions of the domestic courts and require the English national courts to follow its decisions. (Scotland has a system based on Dutch Roman law, and some procedural differences although no fundamental differences in relation to employment law.) The Human Rights Act 1998 became law in England and Wales in 2000 (and in Scotland in 1998) in order to incorporate the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. The two most important Articles applicable to employment law are Article 8(1), the right to respect for privacy, family life, and correspondence, and Article 6, the right to a fair trial.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo

Chapter 5 deals with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. It considers relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. These include sections 34, 36, and 37, which permit adverse inferences to be drawn from certain failures of the defendant at the pre-trial stage. Section 34, in particular, has generated a substantial body of case law. The manner in which the Court of Appeal has resolved the issue of silence on legal advice has been subjected to particular criticism. The operation of section 34 has been held to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights so long as a sufficiently watertight direction is given to the jury. The precise extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination applies to real evidence also remains uncertain and is an issue requiring resolution.


Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

This chapter focuses on confessions and on the defendant’s pre-trial silence. It explains how a defendant may be convicted on the evidence of a confession alone. It analyses the definition of a confession as specified in section 82(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and how a confession proffered by the prosecution or by a co-defendant may be excluded by rule under PACE. The chapter also considers the preservation of the common law discretion to exclude confession evidence as well as the procedure for police interrogation of suspects under PACE. It concludes with an examination of how the jury at trial may draw an inference of guilt under sections 34, 36, and 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.


Evidence ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 456-499
Author(s):  
Roderick Munday

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. A suspect’s silence in response to questioning is liable to arouse suspicion: the normal reaction to an accusation, it is widely believed, is to volunteer a response. This chapter discusses the following: the so-called right to silence; permissible inferences drawn from the defendant’s silence at common law; the failures provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: permissible inferences drawn from the defendant’s failure to mention facts, failure to testify, failure or refusal to account for objects etc, or failure to account for presence; permissible inferences drawn from lies told by the defendant: Lucas directions; permissible inferences drawn from false alibis put forward by the defendant.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002201832097753
Author(s):  
Liz Heffernan

This paper explores select themes relating to legal culture in European criminal justice post-Brexit by focusing on aspects of the common law trial process in the Irish courts. The incorporation of EU law and the ECHR within the domestic legal order has necessitated the nurturing of a constructive co-existence with the country’s longer standing constitutional and common law traditions. Ireland and the United Kingdom have collaborated closely as common law Member States and the departure of the UK from the EU will affect Ireland’s position in EU criminal justice in many and varied ways. Using the examples of victim participation in criminal trials and pre-trial access of suspects to legal assistance, the paper seeks to illuminate trends of consonance and dissonance in Ireland’s relationship with European law. Drawing on the shared commitment to the protection of fundamental rights in the EU and the ECHR, the discussion reflects on some of the longer term implications of Brexit for the common law presence in European criminal legal culture.


2021 ◽  
pp. 89-99
Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

This chapter explains the substantive law governing a defendant’s silence at the police station under ss. 34, 36, and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994. It covers the risks associated with s. 34 CJPOA 1994; drawing inferences from a failure to account under ss. 36 and 37 CJPOA 1994; and the practical aspects associated with remaining silent.


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