scholarly journals Mainstream Voters, Non-Voters and Populist Voters: What Sets Them Apart?

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110492
Author(s):  
Cédric M Koch ◽  
Carlos Meléndez ◽  
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

Three different constituencies are becoming increasingly common across Western European electorates: mainstream voters, non-voters and populist voters. Despite their distinct behaviours in electoral politics, we have limited empirical knowledge about the characteristics that distinguish these three groups, given the typical underrepresentation of non-voters in surveys and the relative recency of large-scale research on populist voters. To address this gap, we analyse novel survey data from contemporary Germany that oversamples non-voters and includes a sizeable share of both populist radical left and populist radical right party supporters. Two main findings with broader implications stand out. First, populist voters resemble their mainstream counterparts in their expectations about democracy but correspond more closely to non-voters regarding (dis-)satisfaction with democracy. Second, non-voters and populist voters seem to reject mainstream democratic politics in distinct ways, throwing doubt on the (further) mobilization potential of abstainers for populist projects.

Author(s):  
Eelco Harteveld ◽  
Andrej Kokkonen ◽  
Jonas Linde ◽  
Stefan Dahlberg

Abstarct Populist radical right (PRR) parties are increasingly included in coalition governments across Western Europe. How does such inclusion affect satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in these societies? While some citizens will feel democracy has grown more responsive, others will abhor the inclusion of such controversial parties. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018) and panel data from the Netherlands, we investigate how nativists’ and non-nativists’ SWD depends on mainstream parties’ strategies towards PRR parties. We show that the effect is asymmetrical: at moments of inclusion nativists become substantially more satisfied with democracy, while such satisfaction among non-nativists decreases less or not at all. This pattern, which we attribute to Easton’s ‘reservoir of goodwill’, that is, a buffer of political support generated by a track-record of good performance and responsiveness, can account for the seemingly contradictory increase in SWD in many Western European countries in times of populism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Castanho Silva

Radical parties have been found to succeed under conditions of mass polarization. It is argued that their message resonates better with voters at the extremes of an ideological spectrum. This paper investigates if the reverse also holds, meaning that radical parties may contribute to the polarization of the public. I test this claim in the Netherlands, a country that has experienced the rise of populist radical right parties since 2002, using a synthetic control model built with a pool of comparable countries and Eurobarometer survey data. Results show that, after the rise of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, the level of polarization among the Dutch public increased more than it otherwise would have. These findings contribute to understanding the connection between elite- and mass-level polarization, and the consequences of populist radical right parties’ emergence in Western Europe.


2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881988014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Whiteley ◽  
Erik Larsen ◽  
Matthew Goodwin ◽  
Harold Clarke

Recent decades have seen an upsurge of interest in populist radical right (PRR) parties. Yet despite a large body of research on PRR voters, there are few studies of the internal life of these parties. In particular, there is a dearth of research about why people are active in them. This article uses data from a unique large-scale survey of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) members to investigate if drivers of voting support for these parties are also important for explaining party activism. Analyses show that traditional models of party activism are important for understanding engagement in UKIP, but macro-level forces captured in an expanded relative deprivation model also stimulate participation in the party. That said macro-level forces are not the dominant driver of activism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Dilling

In 2017, the AfD became the first party explicitly positioned to the right of the CDU/CSU to enter the Bundestag since 1957. As the AfD was founded by former CDU members and rose against the backdrop of Merkel’s European and refugee policies, the AfD may appear primarily to threaten the CDU/CSU. I argue that this view is overly simplistic. Analyzing the AfD’s platform, survey data, and factionalism, I find: (1) while the AfD started as a conservative challenger to the Christian Democrats, it moved away from this platform toward becoming a populist radical right party; (2) this transformation is reflected in its vote base, which includes characteristics associated with social conservatism but also encompasses nativist, populist, and even leftwing elements; (3) the AfD has so far been unable to integrate these different positions and stop forces pushing it away from being an option for discontented Christian Democrats.


Author(s):  
Elisabeth Ivarsflaten ◽  
Scott Blinder ◽  
Lise Bjånesøy

The “populist radical right” is a contested concept in scholarly work for good reason. This chapter begins by explaining that the political parties usually grouped together under this label are not a party family in a conventional sense and do not self-identify with this category. It goes on to show how political science scholarship has established that in Europe during the past thirty or so years we have seen the rise of a set of parties that share a common ideological feature—nativism. The nativist political parties experiencing most electoral support have combined their nativist agenda with some other legitimate ideological companion, which provides deniability—a shield against charges that the nativist agenda makes the parties and their supporters right-wing extremist and undemocratic. The chapter goes on to explain that in order to make progress on our understanding of how and why the populist radical right persuades citizens, we need to recognize: first, that nativism is the only necessary ingredient without which the populist radical right loses its force; and second, that nativism in contemporary established democracies has tended not to persuade a large share of voters without an ideological companion.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. A343-A344 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.L. Able ◽  
V. Haynes ◽  
K. Annunziata ◽  
H. Upadhyaya ◽  
W. Deberdt

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

Abstract Populist radical right (PRR) parties have been steadily expanding, not only in the number of supporters they gain and the seats they win in governments, but more importantly they have been increasingly elected into governmental coalitions as well as presidential offices. With the prominence of these authoritarian, nationalistic and populist parties, it is often difficult to discern what kind of policies they actually stand for. Particularly with regards to the welfare state and public health, it is not always clear what these parties stand for. At times they call for a reduction of health-related welfare provision, despite the fact that this goes against the will of the “ordinary people”, their core supporters; they often promote radical reductions of welfare benefits among socially excluded groups - usually immigrants, whom are most in need of such services; and finally they often mobilize against evidence-based policies. The purpose of this workshop is to present the PRRs actual involvement in health care and health policies across various countries. As PRR parties increase and develop within but also outside of the European continent it is necessary to keep track of their impact, particularly with regards to health and social policies. Although research surrounding PRR parties has significantly expanded over the last years, their impact on the welfare state and more specifically health policies still remains sparse. This workshop will present findings from the first comprehensive book connecting populist radical right parties with actual health and social policy effects in Europe (Eastern and Western) as well as in the United States. This workshop presents five country cases (Austria, Poland, the Netherlands, the United States) from the book Populist Radical Right and Health: National Policies and Global Trends. All five presentations will address PRR parties or leaders and their influence on health, asking the questions “How influential are PRR parties or leaders when it comes to health policy?” “Do the PRR actually have an impact on policy outcomes?” and “What is the actual impact of the health policies implemented by PRR parties or leaders?” After these five presentations, the participants of the workshop will be engaged in an interactive discussion. Key messages As the number of PRR parties increase worldwide and their involvement in national governments become inevitable, new light must be shed on the impact these political parties have on public health. Politics needs to become better integrated into public health research. The rise of PRR parties in Europe might have serious consequences for public health and needs to be further explored.


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