The Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: Why the Macroeconomic Policy Regime has become so Unfavorable to Labor

1993 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
TON NOTERMANS
Author(s):  
Kent Eaton

This chapter elaborates the book’s theoretical framework by focusing on the three critical variables—structural, institutional, and coalitional—that help explain the outcome of the two types of subnational policy challenges conceptualized in Chapter 1. It argues that a subnational jurisdiction’s structural significance is critical for the ability to influence the national policy regime (the second type of policy challenge), while its institutional capacity is essential for the defense of ideologically deviant subnational policy regimes (the first type of policy challenge). The third variable, internal and external coalitional strength, matters for both types of challenges. After situating these hypotheses relative to a variety of political science literatures, the chapter then introduces the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian cases by focusing on the similarities that make these countries a productive site for small-N comparison. The chapter also scores each country on the dependent variable and describes the book’s data-collection methods.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-232
Author(s):  
Gurbachan Singh

Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to improve policy, and also to simplify theory and policy. Design/methodology/approach – Theory is used in a simple and yet powerful way. Stylized facts are used. This paper reconsiders the prevailing macroeconomic policy regime, and proposes an alternative policy regime. Findings – The low interest rate policy of the central bank in a recession is tantamount to imposition of tax on lenders’ interest income and a subsidy for borrowers implying an implicit tax-subsidy scheme. This scheme may be replaced by a different and explicit tax-subsidy scheme. This may also be supplemented by lower consumption taxes in a recession. From the viewpoint of stabilization of aggregate demand, the prevailing policy regime and the proposed policy regime can be equivalent. However, from the viewpoint of general macroeconomic and asset price stability, the proposed policy regime is superior, though it has (additional) cost of administration. Social implications – Macroeconomic and financial instability has large social cost. This paper can be useful in this context, as it has suggestions for improved macroeconomic policy. It also has policy implications for developing countries and highly indebted countries. Originality/value – This paper’s innovation goes well beyond refinements to prevailing theories and policies. Also, it paves the way for further research.


Author(s):  
Kent Eaton

This chapter focuses on subnational policy challenges in Bolivia and on the important victories achieved by neoliberal challengers located in the country’s most powerful department: Santa Cruz. The first half of the chapter traces the strength of Santa Cruz’s neoliberal policy regime to the economic elites who invested heavily in local institutional capacity beginning in the 1950s. When this policy regime came under attack with the rise of President Evo Morales in 2005, local elites grouped together in the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee, and, led by Governor Rubén Costas, successfully maintained it by broadening its internal support coalition. The second half of the chapter explains how neoliberals in Santa Cruz also forced Morales to accept meaningful changes in his preferred, statist national policy regime, an outcome explained by the department’s structural leverage as a producer of foodstuffs and by the coalition Costas built with opposition governors in other eastern departments.


Author(s):  
Eckhard Hein ◽  
Judith Martschin

AbstractWe contribute to the recent debates on demand and growth regimes in modern finance-dominated capitalism linking them to the post-Keynesian research on macroeconomic policy regimes. We examine the demand and growth regimes, as well as the macroeconomic policy regimes for the big four Eurozone countries, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, for the periods 2001–2009 and 2010–2019. First, our approach supports the usefulness of the identification of demand and growth regimes according to growth contributions of the main demand components and financial balances of the macroeconomic sectors. This allows for an understanding of the demand sources of growth, or stagnation, if there is a lack of demand, of how these sources are financed and of potential financial instabilities and fragilities. Second, when it comes to the macroeconomic policy drivers of demand and growth regimes, as well as their respective changes, we show that the exclusive focus on fiscal policies, as in the previous literature, is too limited and that it is the macroeconomic policy regime which matters here, i.e. the combination of monetary, fiscal and wage policies, as well as the open economy conditions.


2018 ◽  
pp. 89-107
Author(s):  
Viktor KOZIUK

Introduction. Prediction that price stability as well as inflation targeting in commodity rich countries is very fragile typically based on logical relation between commodity prices fluctuations and macroeconomic instability. But in the same time, while counter-cyclical instruments appear, commodity prices shock should be taken as supply shock. Thus, inflation instability in resource rich countries should be taken as consequences of macroeconomic mismanagement. Purpose. The purpose of the paper is to validate rejection of fatalism in negative influence of resource richness on price stability. Also it is important to show that inflation targeting regime compatible with large commodities export. In the same time it is necessary to take into account political regime as a supporting factor of adoption that regime of macroeconomic policy that is consistent with price stability. Results. It is proved empirically that commodity abundance per se is not in conflict with price stability. We rich such conclusions basing on simple multifactor regression model that combine macroeconomic policy regime dummies (maturity of inflation targeting, sovereign wealth fund in operation, central bank independence, exchange rate regime) and structural features of the resource rich economies like commodity export, economic complexity, financial depth, democracy. On example of 68 resource rich countries it is shown that price stability parameters (mean inflation, 1999-2017 and standard deviation of it) are not in undoubtfull relation with fraction of nonmerchandise export, but they are in opposite relation with inflation targeting and sovereign wealth funds dummies. Resource endowed countries are not homogenous from political regime point of you. Such regime is important driver of macroeconomic policy choice. Advanced democracies are likely to choose inflation targeting, flexible exchange rate and central bank independence, while wealthy autarkies are likely to prefer fixed exchange rates and sovereign wealth funds. It is mean that price stability is not just vulnerable to commodity factor but is to unstable political regime under which it is hard to implement counter-cyclical regime of macroeconomic policy. Conclusions. Commodity wealth is not precondition to price instability. But political regime is important activate that type of macroeconomic policy regime that consistent with low and stable inflation. By the structural features Ukraine is closer to democracies with mean level of economic complexity and financial depth. Due this inflation targeting regime is more appropriate meaning priority of price stability and exchange rate flexibility.


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