scholarly journals Re-evaluating the Collateral Challenge in the Era of Statutory Interpretation

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-91
Author(s):  
Jules O’Donnell

A collateral challenge impugns the validity of an administrative decision in a proceeding that is not specifically designed for the modification or setting aside of that decision. On the current state of the law, there is a presumption in favour of collateral challenge in an inferior court, which can be displaced by a contrary legislative intention. I argue, however, that the current presumption lacks a clear doctrinal basis, and that it places too much emphasis on statutory interpretation as a useful tool for rebutting, or indeed vindicating, the starting presumption (let alone determining what administrative law ‘grounds’ a collateral challenge might encompass). I suggest a rearticulation of the presumption as an expression of a defendant’s entitlement to vindicate legal rights. I point out, however, that contemporary norms of administrative law may otherwise demand a stricter approach to permitting collateral challenges. On this alternative view, a challenger must identify clear legislative authorisation for what is essentially a judicial review function.

Author(s):  
Richard Clements

The Q&A series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each chapter includes typical questions; diagram problem and essay answer plans, suggested answers, notes of caution, tips on obtaining extra marks, the key debates on each topic and suggestions on further reading. This chapter is about judicial review. This is the means by which the citizen can use the courts to ensure that a public body obeys the law. The questions in the chapter deal with issues such as the erratic development of administrative law; the procedure to apply for judicial review; the right to apply (locus standi), procedural ultra vires; natural justice; and substantive ultra vires.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Lewans

The doctrine of judicial deference has been a touchstone in Canadian administrative law for thirty-five years. Put simply, the doctrine recognizes that administrative officials have legitimate authority to interpret the law, which means that judicial review is warranted only if an administrative decision is demonstrably unfair or unreasonable. While the tide of deference has ebbed and flowed over this period, most administrative decisions these days are assessed according to a standard of reasonableness instead of correctness.


1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Feldman ◽  
Mark Gould

In a recent issue of this journal (Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 1990), Susan Sterett examined the role of the Law Commission in the development of English administrative law. She suggested that the Commission mimicked a “peak association” and adopted an “idiom of legalism” in order to justify its reform proposals. This comment disagrees with Sterett on three grounds. First, the role and constitutional position of the Commission is far more complex than Sterett suggests, and this affects the way in which the Commission works. Second, judges and academic lawyers were central to the reform of substantive principles of judicial review in the 1960s and 1970s, making it unnecessary for the Law Commission to act in this field. Finally, it is wrong to ignore the fact that much administrative law occurs outside the judicial review procedure.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Benjamin Joshua Ong

Abstract The Singapore courts often state that judicial review of executive decision-making ought only to involve an inquiry into the ‘legality’ of a decision or the ‘decision-making process’, and not the ‘decision itself’ or its ‘merits’ – let us call this the ‘Distinction’. This article argues that the Distinction should be expunged from Singapore law. The Distinction has its roots in English case law which aimed to prevent the courts from arbitrarily substituting their decision for the executive's by reason of mere disagreement. But Singapore case law has gone further and treated the Distinction as a general principle applicable to all of administrative law. However, the Distinction is too vague for this purpose (as seen from Singapore cases which have interpreted the distinction inconsistently). It is conceptually problematic, incompatible with the practicalities of judicial review (particularly substantive review as recognised in Singapore law), and has occasionally been paid lip service but not followed in substance. The Distinction cannot form a coherent principle to guide the courts and ought to be replaced by a more nuanced application of constitutional principles relevant to determining the appropriate scope of review. Whatever these principles may be, and however they are to be balanced, the Distinction can be but an over-inclusive rough approximation of them which hampers the development of the law.


Author(s):  
Paul Daly

This book has three goals: to enhance understanding of administrative law; to guide future development of the law; and to justify the core features of the contemporary law of judicial review of administrative action. Around the common law world, the law of judicial review of administrative action has changed dramatically in recent decades, accelerating a centuries-long process of incremental evolution. This book offers a fresh framework for understanding the core features of contemporary administrative law. Through comparative analysis of case law from Australia, Canada, England, Ireland and New Zealand, Dr Daly develops an interpretive approach by reference to four values: individual self-realisation, good administration, electoral legitimacy and decisional autonomy. The interaction of this plurality of values explains the structure of the vast field of judicial review of administrative action: institutional structures, procedural fairness, substantive review, remedies, restrictions on remedies and the scope of judicial review, everything from the rule against bias to jurisdictional error to the application of judicial review principles to non-statutory bodies. Addressing this wide array of subjects in detail, Dr Daly demonstrates how his pluralist approach, with the values being employed in a complementary and balanced fashion, can enhance academics’, students’, practitioners’ and judges’ understanding of administrative law. Furthermore, this pluralist approach is capable of guiding the future development of the law of judicial review of administrative action, a point illustrated by a careful analysis of the unsettled doctrinal area of legitimate expectation. Dr Daly closes by arguing that his values-based, pluralist framework supports the legitimacy of contemporary administrative law which although sometimes called into question in fact facilitates the flourishing of individuals, of public administration and of the liberal democratic system.


Author(s):  
Leighton McDonald

Jurisdictional error is pivotal but not, in any substantive sense, ‘central’. It is pivotal because it marks important boundaries (drawn by reference to other ideas) in the law of judicial review of executive action. This pivotal but not central role has enabled jurisdictional error to function as a ‘conceptual totem’, emblematic of a determinedly ‘statutory approach’ to the articulation and elaboration of administrative law norms. After elaborating these claims, the article goes on to doubt the constitutional case for the retention of the statutory approach that, in recent years, has come to characterise the Australian approach to jurisdictional error. Recognition of the totemic function of jurisdictional error, it is concluded, is a helpful first step in better understanding and analysing administrative law norms which bear no obvious relation to statute.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Bateman ◽  
Leighton McDonald

This article analyses the normative structure of Australian administrative law through the prism of two distinct intellectual approaches to the law of judicial review: the ‘grounds approach’ and the ‘statutory approach’. We explore the development of both approaches and track the contemporary ascendance of the statutory approach in light of the political and constitutional context within which the practice of judicial review is situated. We then reflect on the ways that each responds to two central legitimacy problems which must be confronted by modern administrative law: the democratic legitimacy of judicial review and the legitimacy of the forms of law associated with contemporary administrative government.


Author(s):  
Joana Mendes

Despite operating in highly constrained legal environments, executive actors may act in a constitutive capacity. This observation prompts a critical assessment of the role of procedural principles in EU administrative law. As norms of conduct deployed by executive bodies during the process of implementing norms, procedural principles may have legal dimensions that, while constitutionally relevant, may not come to the fore in judicial review. The chapter develops this argument with regard to the multifaceted character of the duty to give reasons. It argues that the duty to give reasons ought to ensure the constitutional embeddedness of the constitutive action of EU executive bodies. Such role is consistent both with the original relevance of the duty to give reasons to the law of integration (in the context of the European Coal and Steel Community) and with the current EU constitutional framework. The latter justifies reinstituting the original constitutional function of the duty to give reasons, irrespective of its current scope in the context of judicial review.


Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter examines the procedural grounds of judicial review. It discusses how the courts have used the procedural fairness doctrine by reviewing a number of leading cases to identify the values that appear to be shaping the content of the law. The analysis focuses on case law drawn from the ‘modern’ (ie post-1960) era, but several seminal decisions from earlier periods are also considered. The concept of procedural fairness has generated a vast body of case law in the modern era and will continue to do so in future. But the law on this point, even when seen in conjunction with the law relating to the traditional substantive grounds on which government action can be held unlawful, offers only a partial picture of the way in which administrative law fits into the broader constitutional principles of the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament.


2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 703-779
Author(s):  
Pierre Issalys

Looking at Swiss administrative law from a Quebec perspective, this paper outlines some aspects of the Swiss system that provide useful models or references for the discussion and resolution of current issues in Canadian and Quebec administrative law. These issues are identified as (1) the proliferation of independent administrative agencies, and the means to control or at least systematize the growth of such structures ; (2) the desirability and feasibility of enacting general standards of procedure for administrative action ; (3) the simplification of remedies in the field of judicial review of administrative action ; (4) the desirability and feasibility of allocating judicial review powers to a specialized court, either within or outside the Superior Court ; and (5) the desirability and form of a procedure allowing for political intervention in the decision-making process of independent agencies. In the light of these issues, the paper describes the allocation of review functions between administrative and judicial bodies in Swiss federal law. The structure and activity of the Swiss Federal Court (Tribunal fédéral), and especially of the division of the Court that deals with most administrative law cases, are outlined in some more detail. A short historical sketch leads to a discussion of the corresponding features of the law in some of the cantons, and to consideration of the special position given to social security matters in the general scheme of administrative law. The paper then focusses on administrative action itself, commenting on the most significant provisions in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (Loi fédérale sur la procédure administrative) of 1968. Special attention is paid to the process of review within the administration, up to the level of the federal cabinet (Conseil fédéral). Corresponding provisions in the law of some of the cantons are also briefly discussed. The description of the federal review process is then completed by an outline of the procedure for judicial review of administrative action by the Federal Court (Recours de droit administrative). Finally, notice is again taken of the special position of social security as regards administrative procedure. The paper draws attention, in its concluding part, to the most interesting insights provided by Swiss law into the current problems of Canadian and Quebec administrative law. The growth of administrative tribunals has been brought under control by structural arrangements, especially in the field of social security. The introduction of general standards of procedure has brought greater uniformity and clarity, has emphasized the unity of administrative process including the review phase before administrative or judicial authorities, and has strenghtened the rule of law over government action. The existence of a single procedure to invoke judicial review eases access to the court. While in many cases review by the court is excluded, these exclusions have to be specific, and leave full opportunity for review within the administration, with adequate safeguards provided by the Administrative Procedure Act. Specialization occurs within the Federal Court, and does not involve a rigid separation between judges applying administrative law and judges applying other branches of the law, as in France or Germany. Finally, ultimate political control over certain types of decisions is admitted as a part of life in Swiss federal law, but is at the same time subjected to a quasi-judicial procedure which makes it an acknowledged source of administrative justice.


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