Time is of the essence: Explaining the duration of European Union lawmaking under the co-decision procedure

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110364
Author(s):  
Adam Kirpsza

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.

Author(s):  
Marcus Klamert

Article 283 EC The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the other institutions concerned, lay down the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Senninger

Governments redistribute ever larger shares of their budgets to enhance the economic performance of specific areas within their jurisdiction. However, there is little evidence about one of the most fundamental questions arising from such place-based policies: Do citizens reward politicians for funding that benefits their local environment? To answer this question, I turn to the European Union and leverage quasi-experimental data from an initiative that distributed vouchers to European municipalities to establish free and high-quality WiFI connectivity before the European Parliament election in 2019. Moreover, I analyze geolocated data about beneficiaries of two major European Union funds, European Parliament election results along with register data from polling stations, and a city-wide survey experiment in Denmark. The results show that European place-based policy has little to no impact on turnout and Eurosceptic voting in European Parliament elections. The findings are discussed in the light of the recently introduced European Union recovery fund to combat economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.


Author(s):  
Bernhard Schima

Article 229a EC Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to confer jurisdiction, to the extent that it shall determine, on the Court of Justice of the European Union in disputes relating to the application of acts adopted on the basis of the Treaties which create European intellectual property rights. These provisions shall enter into force after their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.


Author(s):  
Tim Maxian Rusche

Article 16 EC Without prejudice to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union or to Articles 93, 106 and 107 of this Treaty, and given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of application of the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their missions. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish these principles and set these conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member States, in compliance with the Treaties, to provide, to commission and to fund such services.


2020 ◽  
pp. 146511652097028
Author(s):  
Carolina Plescia ◽  
Jean-François Daoust ◽  
André Blais

We provide the first individual-level test of whether holding supranational elections in the European Union fosters satisfaction with European Union democracy. First, we examine whether participation at the European Parliament election fosters satisfaction with democracy and whether, among those who participated, a winner–loser gap materializes at the EU level. Second, we examine under which conditions participating and winning in the election affect satisfaction with European Union democracy, focusing on the moderating role of exclusive national identity. Our approach relies on panel data collected during the 2019 European Parliament elections in eight countries. We demonstrate that while participating and winning increase satisfaction, such positive boost does not materialize among those with exclusive national identity. These findings hold an important message: elections are no cure to deep-seated alienation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 175-198
Author(s):  
Adrian Gorgosz

The purpose of the article is to analyse the cases of contestation of decisions in the Council of the European Union during voting on legislative acts in the ordinary legislative procedure, in the period 2009–2014. In the first step, two research hypotheses were delineated. The first one assumed the dominance of the coalition culture in voting, the second one assumed the opposite, the dominance of the culture of consensus. In addition, two further hypotheses were delineated which assumed conflicts in the European Union between the countries of the north and south and between the “old” vs. “new” Union. In order to verify the hypotheses, a multidimensional scaling technique was applied. Empirical analysis confirmed that the dominant culture of voting is the culture of consensus. Despite this, several countries strongly emphasised their separate positions, trying to form coalitions. Moreover, conflicts between the north and south Europe and the “new” and “old” Union were not confirmed.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS KÖNIG ◽  
BJORN LINDBERG ◽  
SANDRA LECHNER ◽  
WINFRIED POHLMEIER

This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (54) ◽  
pp. 56-71
Author(s):  
Wojciech Dąbroś ◽  
Janusz Kudła

AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between the voting behaviour of European Parliament members on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal and economic characteristics of their respective countries. We are concerned about the political and economy factors behind policy and decision making of CCCTB in European Parliament. The analysis is conducted with Logit model identifying factors affecting the voting consultation decision of the Parliament of the European Union in 2018. Particularly, we investigate the impact of four components taken from tax benefit index proposed by W. Orłowski. We have found that economic factors alone are responsible the voting behaviour of the European Union deputies, not their personal characteristics.


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