Article 336 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Klamert
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
Conditions Of Employment

Article 283 EC The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the other institutions concerned, lay down the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union.

Time is of the essence: Explaining the duration of European Union lawmaking under the co-decision procedure

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110364
Author(s):  
Adam Kirpsza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
European Parliament Elections

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.

Article 262 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Schima
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Legislative Procedure

Article 229a EC Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to confer jurisdiction, to the extent that it shall determine, on the Court of Justice of the European Union in disputes relating to the application of acts adopted on the basis of the Treaties which create European intellectual property rights. These provisions shall enter into force after their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Moving Beyond Procedure

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 784-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMIE KREPPEL
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Decision Procedures ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Legislative Influence

This article examines the influence of the European Parliament (EP) within the legislative process of the European Union. Although debate over the impact of the cooperation and co-decision I procedures continues, this article argues that, in part, the current theoretical debate is a false one that has caused many of the other important variables that affect EP legislative influence to be ignored. This article briefly revisits the current debate, then proceeds to an analysis of the success of more than 1,000 EP amendments under the cooperation and co-decision procedures. This evidence suggests that numerous other variables, such as internal EP unity and type of amendment made, have a significant impact on EP success, even controlling for procedure. In addition, this comparison points out some empirical differences between the two procedures that have been largely ignored in the theoretical debate but that nonetheless have a significant impact of EP success and merit further study.

Article 14 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Maxian Rusche
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Shared Values ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Member States ◽  
Financial Conditions ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
General Economic Interest ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure

Article 16 EC Without prejudice to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union or to Articles 93, 106 and 107 of this Treaty, and given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of application of the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their missions. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish these principles and set these conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member States, in compliance with the Treaties, to provide, to commission and to fund such services.

Kto i z kim? Analiza rozbieżności stanowisk w głosowaniach w Radzie Unii Europejskiej, w latach 2009–20141

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 175-198
Author(s):  
Adrian Gorgosz
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Multidimensional Scaling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dominant Culture ◽  
Scaling Technique ◽  
The North ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
North And South ◽  
South Europe

The purpose of the article is to analyse the cases of contestation of decisions in the Council of the European Union during voting on legislative acts in the ordinary legislative procedure, in the period 2009–2014. In the first step, two research hypotheses were delineated. The first one assumed the dominance of the coalition culture in voting, the second one assumed the opposite, the dominance of the culture of consensus. In addition, two further hypotheses were delineated which assumed conflicts in the European Union between the countries of the north and south and between the “old” vs. “new” Union. In order to verify the hypotheses, a multidimensional scaling technique was applied. Empirical analysis confirmed that the dominant culture of voting is the culture of consensus. Despite this, several countries strongly emphasised their separate positions, trying to form coalitions. Moreover, conflicts between the north and south Europe and the “new” and “old” Union were not confirmed.

Power and transparency in political negotiations

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-129
Author(s):  
Philipp Broniecki
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
Relative Influence ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Legislative Influence

Who gains legislative influence in early agreement negotiations (trilogues) between the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union? Practitioners from both institutions suspect that it is the other side. Meanwhile, critics point at trilogues’ lack of transparency. This article proposes that legislative power and institutional transparency are inversely related: Opacity makes an actor more influential in political negotiations. The argument is tested on a matched sample of legislative files from the 1999–2009 period. The findings suggest that the European Parliament became more influential in early agreement negotiations – where it became opaque vis-à-vis the Council. In such negotiations, the relative influence of the European Parliament substantially increased; by contrast, the European Parliament did not gain influence in negotiations where it remained transparent.

Die neunten Direktwahlen zum Europäischen Parlament: Rahmenbedingungen, Parteien und Bürger in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 715-735
Author(s):  
Daniela Braun ◽  
Markus Tausendpfund
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
European Integration ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Significant Loss ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Elections ◽  
The One ◽  
European Parliament Elections

Despite a higher turnout, the ninth elections to the European Parliament can still be considered as second-order elections . In Germany, the governing parties - in particular the CDU and SPD - experienced a significant loss compared to the 2017 Bundestag elections and the 2014 European elections, whereas the Greens are the winners . The article provides information on the conditions framing the European Parliament elections and focuses on political parties and citizens . The empirical findings show, on the one hand, that the European integration issue is more salient in the manifestos than generally assumed and, on the other hand, that citizens’ knowledge of the European Union continues to be low . Against this background, turnout, electoral choices and reasons for these are discussed . Moreover, the composition of the newly elected European Parliament and possible implications are described . [ZParl, vol . 50 (2019), no . 4, pp . 715 - 735]

scholarly journals Special legislative procedure in EU law: areas of regulation and specifics of interinstitutional cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-95
Author(s):  
I. V. Astapenko ◽  
N. N. Mazaeva
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Public Relations ◽  
General Rule ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dual Nature ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

The article is devoted to the issue of cooperation between the institutions of the European Union in the process of adopting legal acts within the framework of a special legislative procedure. Authors analyzed the scope of application of special legislative procedure and ordinary legislative procedure in the EU. It was revealed that the adoption of acts in accordance with one or another type of legislative procedure reflects the dual nature of the European Union, which contains both supranational and interstate principles of legal regulation of various spheres of public relations. The main types of special legislative procedure (consultation, approval) are considered, within the framework of which, in practice, there is intense inter-institutional interaction in the process of developing the final text of the draft act, including through informal consultations and other procedures not directly enshrined in the EU primary law. Although the Council continues to dominate in most cases of the use of special legislative procedure, Parliament nevertheless has relatively wide opportunities to influence the position of the Council. De facto, the expansion of the Parliaments powers within the framework of a special legislative procedure is facilitated by both the position of the EU Court, expressed in a number of decisions on specific cases, and the increased degree of Parliaments influence on the activities of the Commission (which, as a general rule, has the right to initiate legislation), enshrined in the provisions of the constituent agreements.

scholarly journals Podstawa traktatowa przyjmowania aktów prawa pochodnego z dziedziny środowiska i energii w prawie UE

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Przemysław Siwor
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Greenhouse Gas Emission ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Secondary Importance ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Legislative Procedure

Despite the considerable volume of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case-law on Treaty basis for secondary legislation, the claim that any doubts concerning the choice of the Treaty basis for secondary legislation in the area of environment and energy in the EU law have been clarified is incorrect. On several occasions, the choice of the proper legal basis for such a legal act gave rise to serious doubts. It was unclear whether the subject matter of the act determined the application of Article 192(1) TFEU (ordinary legislative procedure) or Article 192(2), first paragraph of the TFEU (special legislative procedure). The aim of this article is to analyse the control criteria for the check of the Treaty basis for secondary legislation in the area of environment and energy conducted by the CJEU. This issue is considered in a broader context of the Treaty provisions, practice and the CJEU case law. The utmost attention is given to the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union issued on 21 June 2018 in the case C-5/16, Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, where the Court dismissed the action for annulment of the Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC. The Author of the article comes to the conclusion that the Court, when reviewing the choice of the Treaty basis for a legal act, considers mainly its purpose and content, while the likely impact is of secondary importance. According to the Author, the judgement of the Court in the case C-5/16, Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union is likely to impede the application of Article 192(2)(c) TFEU (special legislative procedure) as a proper legal basis for legal acts in the area of environment which may affect a Member State’s energy mix.

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