Reconsidering Family Policy

1982 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN SCANZONI
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Family Policy ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Family Problems ◽  
Policy Alternative ◽  
The Status

The question of family policy is considered in terms of “conventional-progressive” interest group perspectives. The conventional perspective is that “family problems” are the result of “breakdown” and can be resolved by reestablishing the status quo ante. Progressive interest groups contend that family “difficulties” are the result of “slippage” between morphogenetic society and morphostatic (or “conventional”) family. Progressive advocates also argue that current and projected pervasive changes in citizens' marital/familial behaviors can be accepted, and that a theoretically informed, socially responsible model of family can be offered as a viable policy alternative to the conventional one.

scholarly journals The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo ◽  
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Resource Based View ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Competing Interest ◽  
Interest Group Strategies

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.

scholarly journals Defending the status quo across venues and coalitions: evidence from California interest groups

2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédéric Varone ◽  
Karin Ingold ◽  
Charlotte Jourdain
Keyword(s):  
Stem Cell ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Social Network Analysis ◽  
Network Analysis ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Network Position ◽  
The Status ◽  
Central Network

AbstractThis study investigates the conditions under which pro-status quo groups increase their advocacy success during an entire policymaking process. It scrutinises whether pro-status quo defenders who are involved in multiple institutional venues and who join many coalitions of interest groups are able to achieve their policy preferences. A case study focussing on the regulation of stem cell research in California traces the policymaking process and the related advocacy activities of interest groups in legislative, administrative, judicial and direct democratic venues. The empirical results, which are based on a formal social network analysis, reveal that very few groups are multivenue players and members of several coalitions. In addition, occupying a central network position is insufficient for the pro-status quo groups to improve their advocacy success.

How to measure interest group influence: Italy’s professional orders and liberalization policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-202
Author(s):  
Andrea Pritoni
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Conceptual Definition ◽  
Liberalization Policy ◽  
Interest Group Influence

The question of who wins or loses in the policy process lies at the heart of recent research into both interest groups and public policy. However, one of the most difficult challenges when empirically analysing interest groups consists in knowing exactly how to measure their influence: despite the fact that this question has been addressed by political scientists for decades, significant problems remain regarding both the conceptual definition and empirical measurement of influence. In order to develop a better understanding of interest group influence, I recommend as follows: (a) that such influence be conceptualized as a degree of preference attainment; (b) that the degree of generality of the concept be downgraded, by breaking it up on the basis of two fundamental dimensions: the lobbying direction (pro-status quoor anti-status quo) and the policy-making stage (agenda setting; decision making; implementation); (c) to proceed with a manual hand-coding in order to obtain a list of the policy issues around which interest groups lobby; (d) to resort to an expert survey in order to evaluate these issues. This methodological approach is used to empirically measure the influence that Italy’s professional orders had on the liberalization process championed by the second Prodi government in 2006.

scholarly journals The political economy of health financing reform in Malaysia

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (10) ◽  
pp. 732-739 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Croke ◽  
Mariana Binti Mohd Yusoff ◽  
Zalilah Abdullah ◽  
Ainul Nadziha Mohd Hanafiah ◽  
Khairiah Mokhtaruddin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Health Financing ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Political ◽  
Policy Feedback ◽  
Financing System ◽  
Feedback Effects ◽  
The Status

Abstract There is growing evidence that political economy factors are central to whether or not proposed health financing reforms are adopted, but there is little consensus about which political and institutional factors determine the fate of reform proposals. One set of scholars see the relative strength of interest groups in favour of and opposed to reform as the determining factor. An alternative literature identifies aspects of a country’s political institutions–specifically the number and strength of formal ‘veto gates’ in the political decision-making process—as a key predictor of reform’s prospects. A third group of scholars highlight path dependence and ‘policy feedback’ effects, stressing that the sequence in which health policies are implemented determines the set of feasible reform paths, since successive policy regimes bring into existence patterns of public opinion and interest group mobilization which can lock in the status quo. We examine these theories in the context of Malaysia, a successful health system which has experienced several instances of proposed, but ultimately blocked, health financing reforms. We argue that policy feedback effects on public opinion were the most important factor inhibiting changes to Malaysia’s health financing system. Interest group opposition was a closely related factor; this opposition was particularly powerful because political leaders perceived that it had strong public support. Institutional veto gates, by contrast, played a minimal role in preventing health financing reform in Malaysia. Malaysia’s dramatic early success at achieving near-universal access to public sector healthcare at low cost created public opinion resistant to any change which could threaten the status quo. We conclude by analysing the implications of these dynamics for future attempts at health financing reform in Malaysia.

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