scholarly journals The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo ◽  
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Resource Based View ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Competing Interest ◽  
Interest Group Strategies

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.

Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited

1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Maloney ◽  
Grant Jordan ◽  
Andrew M. McLaughlin
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Development ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Group Status ◽  
Privileged Status ◽  
Consultative Process ◽  
Interest Group Strategies ◽  
Group Term

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the place of groups in the consultative process in British policymaking. It stresses the importance of consultation even under the Thatcher government and distinguishes between consultation, bargaining and negotiation. The paper identifies the important divide between the relatively few groups with privileged status and the greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less influential positions. The discussion revisits the insider/outsider typology often used to differentiate interest group strategies and status in policy development. It suggests that the insider group term is associated with a particular style of policy making, and offers amendments to the existing use of the terms to avoid the difficulties which occur from the conflation of group strategy and group status.

scholarly journals Uncovering interest group participation in Germany: web collection of written statements in ministries and the parliament

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Rasch ◽  
Florian Spohr ◽  
Rainer Eising ◽  
Simon Ress
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Web Pages ◽  
Group Participation ◽  
Collection Process ◽  
Data Source ◽  
German Parliament

Abstract This article discusses web collection of interest group statements on bills as a data source. Written statements allow the identification of actors active in policy-making as well as those actors’ positions, lobbying coalitions and issue saliency. These data also can contribute to the measurement of interest groups’ influence on legislation. Taking web collection from the German parliament’s and ministries’ web pages as an example, we demonstrate the collection process and the merits and limitations of employing written statements as identificatory data. Our analysis of statements submitted by interest groups, private firms and policy experts to four federal ministries and the respective parliamentary committees in the years 2015 and 2016 reveals differences between parliamentary and ministerial consultations. Although ministries have invited written statements for fewer draft laws than parliamentary committees, they received far more statements from interest groups. The reason is that German ministries often issue open calls, in which all actors are given the opportunity to comment on legislation, whereas the German parliament invites selected interest group representatives and other experts. As a further result, ministries are mostly contacted by business groups, whereas parliamentary committees use their gatekeeper function to balance interests.

17. Organized Interests

2020 ◽  
pp. 316-332
Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Central Component ◽  
European Level ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
The Eu

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union (EU) institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest group access to the EU institutions.

Reconsidering Family Policy

1982 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN SCANZONI
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Family Policy ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Family Problems ◽  
Policy Alternative ◽  
The Status

The question of family policy is considered in terms of “conventional-progressive” interest group perspectives. The conventional perspective is that “family problems” are the result of “breakdown” and can be resolved by reestablishing the status quo ante. Progressive interest groups contend that family “difficulties” are the result of “slippage” between morphogenetic society and morphostatic (or “conventional”) family. Progressive advocates also argue that current and projected pervasive changes in citizens' marital/familial behaviors can be accepted, and that a theoretically informed, socially responsible model of family can be offered as a viable policy alternative to the conventional one.

scholarly journals Standing in a Crowded Room: Exploring the Relation between Interest Group System Density and Access to Policymakers

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Jens van der Ploeg ◽  
Joost Berkhout
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Population Ecology ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Interest Representation ◽  
Policy Domain ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Policy Fields ◽  
Group Density ◽  
Gain Access

The numerous presence of interest groups may be a recipe for policy deadlock or, more optimistically, indicate the vibrancy of a political community. Population-ecology theory suggests that the number of interest groups active in a policy domain is relevant for strategies and political outcomes, such as policy access, and interest group density is expected to reduce access for individual organizations. Competitive pressures in dense domains necessitate groups to specialize to gain access to the policy access. We empirically assess this argument and indeed find lower levels of access in denser policy fields, moderated by specialization of organizations in lobbying. Furthermore, we identify important differences between mature (the Netherlands and Belgium) and young (Slovenia and Lithuania) interest group systems. These findings address theoretical concerns about the lack of linkages between micro- and macro-studies on interest representation.

scholarly journals Review of Grossman and Helpman's Special Interest Politics

2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 1221-1229 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P Baron
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
Supporting Evidence ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Special Interest Politics ◽  
Interest Group Politics ◽  
Group Politics ◽  
New Research

In Special Interest Politics Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman examine how special-interest groups influence political outcomes for the benefit of their members. The authors take interest groups seriously by considering a range of theories and supporting evidence on interest group activity. Their book provides perspectives on how to study interest group politics and a set of methods for that study. Although the authors present a number of standard models, the book contains much that is new. The reader takes away a multitude of results, tools, models, and new research ideas. The result is an outstanding book full of insight, useful methods, and perspective.

Public Policy Making and Interest Groups Politics in the U.S: An Analysis of IRCA

2001 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang-Soo Choe
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Traditional Group ◽  
American Society ◽  
The U.S

Several theories have been introduced to explain American politics along the historical development of American society. It has been told that any one theory tends to prevail in explaining American politics at any given period. Is it possible then to describe the structure of American politics by any one theory? Which theory or theoretical perspective is valid to understand the U.S. policy making system in 1980s? The purpose of this paper is to show that American politics in any given period cannot be explained by any one prevalent theoretical framework. Despite the arguments between interest group stasis and “countervailing forces,” (McFarland 1992) some policy area can still be explained only by the traditional group theory framework. The Imigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 is a case in point. In the following, theoretical frameworks concerning policy formation will be presented first. Second, the process of IRCA formation will be briefly reviewed with special reference to the role of interest groups. Finally, by summarizing the gain and loss of each interest group, the characteristics of IRCA formation will be suggested.

How to measure interest group influence: Italy’s professional orders and liberalization policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-202
Author(s):  
Andrea Pritoni
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Conceptual Definition ◽  
Liberalization Policy ◽  
Interest Group Influence

The question of who wins or loses in the policy process lies at the heart of recent research into both interest groups and public policy. However, one of the most difficult challenges when empirically analysing interest groups consists in knowing exactly how to measure their influence: despite the fact that this question has been addressed by political scientists for decades, significant problems remain regarding both the conceptual definition and empirical measurement of influence. In order to develop a better understanding of interest group influence, I recommend as follows: (a) that such influence be conceptualized as a degree of preference attainment; (b) that the degree of generality of the concept be downgraded, by breaking it up on the basis of two fundamental dimensions: the lobbying direction (pro-status quoor anti-status quo) and the policy-making stage (agenda setting; decision making; implementation); (c) to proceed with a manual hand-coding in order to obtain a list of the policy issues around which interest groups lobby; (d) to resort to an expert survey in order to evaluate these issues. This methodological approach is used to empirically measure the influence that Italy’s professional orders had on the liberalization process championed by the second Prodi government in 2006.

scholarly journals Campaign Spending and Lobbying

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Sasso ◽  
Dan Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Multiple Channels ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Interest groups can influence governmental policy through multiple channels. First, they may spend money before elections to help elect their preferred candidate. Second, they may also lobby after the election to affect the implemented policy. We analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign spending and lobbying to understand the strategic relationship between these two means of outside influence. We consider how several lobbying environments, each featuring different access to the elected politician, affect both the willingness to spend during the campaign and the final policy. Campaign spending is a function of both expected final policy due to lobbying and also expected lobbying effort costs. We find that increased policy moderation often, but not always, accompanies decreased campaign spending. When extreme interest groups give campaign contributions in exchange for access, campaign spending decreases as policy becomes more extreme. Open-access lobbying, where all interest groups lobby regardless of ideological alignment, is always best for the voter. We then show that caps on campaign contributions may have minimal effect on policy because of later lobbying efficacy. Finally, we highlight comparative statics that predict different empirical patterns of contributions depending on whether politicians grant lobbying access to all interest groups or only to ideologically-aligned groups. Our results demonstrate that interest-group and candidate polarization must be considered relative to one another; the effect of greater interest-group polarization depends to a large extent on whether it implies more or less ideological proximity to the group's aligned candidate.

17. Organized Interests

2014 ◽  
pp. 308-326
Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Central Component ◽  
European Level ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
The Eu

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest-group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest-group access to the EU institutions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document