Putting trust into antitrust? Competition policy and data-driven platforms

2021 ◽  
pp. 026732312110283
Author(s):  
Stefan Larsson

Anti-competitive notions, it seems, are increasingly informing the critical debate on a data-driven economy organised into scalable digital platforms. Issues of market definitions, how to value personal data on multisided platforms, and how to detect and regulate misuses of dominant positions have become key nomenclature on the battlefield of addressing fairness in our contemporary digital societies. This article looks at the central themes for this special issue on governing trust in European platform societies through the lens of contemporary developments in the field of competition law. Three main questions are addressed: (1) To what extent are the platforms’ own abilities to govern their infrastructures, that is, to be de facto regulators over both human behaviour and market circumstances, a challenge for contemporary competition regulation? (2) In what way is the collection, aggregation, or handling of consumers’ data of relevance for competition? (3) How can the particular European challenges of governing US-based digital platforms more broadly be understood in terms of the relationship between transparency and public trust? Of particular relevance – and challenge – here are the platforms’ abilities to govern their infrastructures, albeit through automated moderation, pricing or scalable data handling. It is argued that this aspect of coded, and possibly autonomously adapting, intra-platform governance, poses significant anti-competitive challenges for supervisory authorities, with possible negative implications for consumer autonomy and wellbeing as well as platform-dependent other companies.

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-89
Author(s):  
Roberto Augusto Castellanos Pfeiffer

Big data has a very important role in the digital economy, because firms have accurate tools to collect, store, analyse, treat, monetise and disseminate voluminous amounts of data. Companies have been improving their revenues with information about the behaviour, preferences, needs, expectations, desires and evaluations of their consumers. In this sense, data could be considered as a productive input. The article focuses on the current discussion regarding the possible use of competition law and policy to address privacy concerns related to big data companies. The most traditional and powerful tool to deal with privacy concerns is personal data protection law. Notwithstanding, the article examines whether competition law should play an important role in data-driven markets where privacy is a key factor. The article suggests a new approach to the following antitrust concepts in cases related to big data platforms: assessment of market power, merger notification thresholds, measurement of merger effects on consumer privacy, and investigation of abuse of dominant position. In this context, the article analyses decisions of competition agencies which reviewed mergers in big data-driven markets, such as Google/DoubleClick, Facebook/ WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn. It also reviews investigations of alleged abuse of dominant position associated with big data, in particular the proceeding opened by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook, in which the German antitrust authority prohibited the data processing policy imposed by Facebook on its users. The article concludes that it is important to harmonise the enforcement of competition, consumer and data protection polices in order to choose the proper way to protect the users of dominant platforms, maximising the benefits of the data-driven economy.


Pravovedenie ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 522-572
Author(s):  
Ioannis Lianos ◽  
◽  
Zingales Nicolo ◽  
Andrew McLean ◽  
Azza Raslan ◽  
...  

The article reveals new problems arising in the digital economy and the need for antimonopoly regulation. It also analyzes the legal remedies and procedures for competition law in the context of digitalization. Redesigning competition law procedures for the digital economy can take two forms: 1) ensure the rate of competition law enforcement so as to avoid acting in situations when market tipping has already occurred and it is almost impossible to reverse the anticompetitive outcome; 2) develop remedial action that takes into account the scale of anticompetitive behavior, which might better reflect the complexity of digital markets. Competition authorities should consider utilizing interim measures and commitment decisions in the digital economy, both instruments playing a complementary role. Interim measures can be used within a revised framework with lower thresholds, but this should only be reserved for complicated and lengthy investigations where there is risk of irreversible harm to competition. These measures should be applied to the most harmful violations, such as cartels and abuse of dominance. Commitment decisions can be utilized to address less serious violations where it is also beneficial to the competition authority to reach a swift resolution. The article analyzes the division of companies as a way to eliminate violations. Division can take different forms and need not be structural. A certain ‘light-touch’ separation may be achieved by policies mandating that digital platforms not use personal data that has been harvested by the members of their ecosystems unless they have the explicit consent of their users. The article also addresses issues such as data portability and cross-platform compatibility. The authors have proved that the BRICS countries need to supplement their national legislation on the protection of personal data in terms of norms on their portability. Although it is not mainly designed as a tool to combat monopolies and market power, data portability will have a significant impact on competition in digital markets. Multisided digital platforms are characterized by a high network and lock-in effects. In a winner takes all, or most, where undertakings compete for the market rather than in the market, the right to data portability may provide some relief from the power that large digital platforms hold.


Author(s):  
Fatma Arvas

In order to sustain their presence in the market, personal data acquirers must obtain, store, and process personal data from sources that feed data such as social media shares, shopping records, and sensor networks. On the other hand, the problem of conformity of real and legal persons whose personal data are processed within the framework of personal data law brings about many legal problems and requires a profound research rather than a limited examination. The fact that a small number of enterprises create dominant power by using big data in market strategy has led to data-dependent companies or markets. Due to the effects that big data caused in the market, there is a need to address many problems in the field of competition law as well as the dimension of privacy and personal rights. In this context, the conflict of interest between the economic interest created by big data and the legal principles of personal data will be addressed and compared with regard to Turkish law and foreign law practices by discussing the relationship between big data and competition law.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Huang ◽  
Yandong Zhao ◽  
Liang Mei ◽  
Peiyi Wu ◽  
Zhihua Zhao ◽  
...  

Car-hailing platform governance is an emerging topic of research and practice. The governance of the data-driven platform economy is challenging the research paradigm of competition regulation in the context of open innovation. This research is trying to reveal the market allocation structure of China’s online car-hailing industry from the perspective of personal data allocation by the study of Application Programming Interface (API) of sample platforms. On the basis of the networked nature of personal data allocation via APIs, this research constructs a mathematical model of the edge weight of data resource connections between platforms. Furthermore, this research optimises the structural hole analysis of complex networks to discuss the state of personal data resource allocation in China’s car-hailing industry. Results reveal that there are obvious structural holes within the sample network. When compared with related indicators, we found that accessing personal data resources is an essential component of the sample network competition capability and sustainable innovation. Social media platforms and online payment platforms more greatly impact car-hailing platform competition than other types of platforms within the multi-sided market context. This research offers a research perspective of personal data allocation for further study of competition, regulation and sustainable innovation of data-driven platform economies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Noel Beale ◽  
Paschalis Lois

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement broadly sets out the nature of the relationship contemplated between UK and EU competition law and policy following Brexit. The question is whether the UK will capitalize on its newfound discretion to deviate its competition policy from the EU in the future. This article considers some of the potential new directions that might be taken within the UK's competition law landscape, specifically in relation to merger control, antitrust and subsidy control. It explores some of the problems and opportunities created in the wake of Brexit, as well as the legal and practical ramifications of future divergences between UK and EU competition policy. Furthermore, it considers how the Competition and Markets Authority may fare in enforcing new policy, as well as its potential interactions with regimes both within and outside the EU.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-497
Author(s):  
Peter C. Carstensen

The relationship between law including competition policy and the goal of advancing innovation and entrepreneurship is complex. Bert Foer’s chapter identifies the many ways that competition law and policy directly and indirectly can affect positively or negatively the advancement of that goal. The comment seeks to highlight that range and complexity by using the categories from the traditional I-O Paradigm to show where and how antitrust law and policies it seeks to advance can be used to shape the conditions, structure, and conduct in markets to facilitate outcomes that will advance the public interest in innovation and entrepreneurship.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

Abstract In view of a growing number of competition law investigations into the gathering and use of personal data by digital platforms, this article discusses the extent to which consumer sovereignty can be given greater weight in concentrated marketplaces where firms employ multi-sided business models and compete along quality dimensions such as privacy rather than price. The article explores the concept of direct consumer influence as a novel approach vis-à-vis switching or choosing differently in the public enforcement of competition law. Direct consumer influence constitutes a distinct avenue for embedding consumers’ choices into the market when consumers have few possibilities to act and holds the potential to shape digital markets in unanticipated ways. Using the example of the German Federal Cartel Office’s investigation into Facebook’s data-gathering practices, the article illustrates how direct consumer influence may clarify the relationship between data protection, consumer rights, and competition law.


Author(s):  
Klaus Wiedemann

AbstractThis contribution argues that a coherent and consistent interpretation of data protection and competition law is both possible and adequate. To illustrate this need, the ongoing abuse-of-dominance investigation by the French Autorité de la Concurrence against Apple is analysed. Representatives of the online advertising industry lodged a complaint against the introduction of Apple’s “App Tracking Transparency framework”. The latter includes a de facto obstacle to third-party tracking which shuts down advertisers’ access to those precious personal data that can be used for online advertising. With the Apple case in mind and by way of example, this paper argues that the regulation of consent to the processing of personal data under the GDPR serves as a dogmatic link between data protection and competition law, as this legal basis is at the heart of many digital business models. The GDPR provides a normative framework to determine when consent has been “freely given”. This can be a fruitful starting point for a competitive assessment, too, as both legal regimes pursue the objective of protecting consumer autonomy and consumer choice. The paper finishes by finding that its dogmatic approach corresponds to recent developments within competition law legislation and enforcement.


2019 ◽  
pp. 352-392
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law; state aid; and EU merger control.


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