Comparison of Methods for Allocating Costs of Empty Railcar Movements in a Railcar Pooling System

2005 ◽  
Vol 1916 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-95
Author(s):  
Yao Cheng ◽  
Wei-Hua Lin
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Computational Efficiency ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Comparison Of Methods ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Cost

Allocating the cost of empty railcar miles to partners in a railcar pooling system is an important pricing problem in railway management. Recently, the authors of this paper proposed a cost allocation scheme for empty railcar movements based on game theory that explicitly considers the level of participation and contribution from each partner, the costs generated before and after cooperation, and the overall benefit obtained by each partner because of cooperation. This paper compares the performance of the model with three other cost allocation models with respect to fairness, stability, and computational efficiency. The comparison is made with two scenarios adapted from examples documented in the literature. The results indicate that the cost allocation scheme based on game theory outperforms other methods in ensuring fairness and enhancing stability in a coalition. Most remarkably, it yields reasonable results even in situations in which other models behave poorly. Computationally, it is manageable for practical problems.

The Concept of the Shapley Value and the Cost Allocation Between Cooperating Participants

2018 ◽  
pp. 2095-2107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kolker
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Bundled Payment ◽  
Bundled Payments ◽  
Healthcare Settings ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Mathematical Game ◽  
Episodes Of Care ◽  
The Cost

The goal of this chapter is to illustrate two mathematical game theory concepts for allocating costs (savings) between cooperating participants, specifically in healthcare settings. These concepts are the nucleolus and the Shapley value. The focus of this chapter is on the practical application of the Shapley value for the cost sharing within the bundled payments model for the episodes of care mandated recently by the Center for Medicare Services (CMS). The general Shapley value methodology is illustrated, as well as an important particular case in which each participant uses only a portion of the largest participant's asset (the so-called airport game). The intended readers are primarily leaders of organizations and hospitals involved in the implementation of the CMS mandated bundled payment model for the episodes of care.

A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertrand Crettez ◽  
Régis Deloche
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Sharing Rule ◽  
Sharing Rules ◽  
The Cost

Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules.

The Concept of the Shapley Value and the Cost Allocation Between Cooperating Participants

2019 ◽  
pp. 624-639
Author(s):  
Alexander Kolker
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Bundled Payment ◽  
Bundled Payments ◽  
Healthcare Settings ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Mathematical Game ◽  
Episodes Of Care ◽  
The Cost

The goal of this chapter is to illustrate two mathematical game theory concepts for allocating costs (savings) between cooperating participants, specifically in healthcare settings. These concepts are the nucleolus and the Shapley value. The focus of this chapter is on the practical application of the Shapley value for the cost sharing within the bundled payments model for the episodes of care mandated recently by the Center for Medicare Services (CMS). The general Shapley value methodology is illustrated, as well as an important particular case in which each participant uses only a portion of the largest participant's asset (the so-called airport game). The intended readers are primarily leaders of organizations and hospitals involved in the implementation of the CMS-mandated bundled payment model for the episodes of care.

Price-Directed Cost Sharing and Demand Allocation Among Service Providers with Multiple Demand Sources and Multiple Facilities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanlin Liu ◽  
Yimin Yu ◽  
Saif Benjaafar ◽  
Huihui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Capacity Sharing ◽  
Equilibrium Market ◽  
Service Collaboration ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Service Fulfillment ◽  
Demand Allocation

Problem definition: We consider capacity sharing through demand allocation among firms with multiple demand sources and multiple service facilities. Firms decide on the allocation of demand from different sources to different facilities to minimize delay costs and service-fulfillment costs possibly subject to service-level requirements. If firms decide to operate collectively as a coalition, they must also decide on a scheme for sharing the total cost. Academic/practical relevance: We study capacity sharing through demand allocation in service systems in the presence of service-fulfillment costs. Our problem is motivated by service collaboration in healthcare involving public–private partnerships. Methodology: We formulate the problem as a cooperative game and identify a cost allocation that is in the core. Results: The cost-allocation scheme we identify is price-directed, and the cost of each firm consists of three components: (1) the delay cost incurred within the firm; (2) a cost paid for the capacity used by the firm at facilities owned by other firms; and (3) a payment received for fulfilling demand of other firms at facilities owned by the firm. Interestingly, we show that the cost-allocation scheme is equivalent to a market equilibrium—that is, it can be implemented in a decentralized fashion. We extend our analysis to settings where the capacity of each facility is endogenously determined and to settings where a service-priority policy is deployed. Our results are robust to a variety of generalizations: partial sharing, partial transfer, facilities modeled as general queueing systems, and convex delay costs. Managerial implications: Our findings provide guidelines for and insights into how to carry out demand allocation and cost sharing among different firms in the presence of service-fulfillment costs to foster service collaboration. In particular, the equilibrium market prices can be viewed as the prices/subsidies for service collaboration in a public–private partnership.

Developing the adaptive process-based budgeting through TD-ABC and TD-ABB as part of strategic management accounting

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 1182-1194
Author(s):  
A.A. Akhmetzyanov ◽  
A.Yu. Sokolov
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Management ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Management Accounting ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Common Time ◽  
Strategic Management Accounting ◽  
Scientific Papers ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Cost

Subject. The article focuses on the advanced time-driven tools for allocating overhead expenses, which are based on process-based budgeting. Objectives. We articulate a technique for cost allocation so as to assess the cost of each process with reference to the common time driver. Methods. The study relies upon methods of systematization, classification, analogy and comparison, and summarizes the scientific literature on the subject. Results. The article presents our own suggestions on implementing TD-ABC and TD-ABB into the strategic management accounting process of developer companies. The principles were proved to help more effectively allocate overhead expenses and assess the capacity load of each process performed by functions, departments and employees. Carrying out a comparative analysis, we found certain reserves for utilizing resources more effectively. Conclusions and Relevance. The findings are of scientific and practical significance and can be used by developer and construction businesses. The conclusions can prove helpful for scientific papers, student books, and further research.

A claims problem approach to the cost allocation of a minimum cost spanning tree

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ◽  
Josep E. Peris ◽  
Begoña Subiza
Keyword(s):  
Spanning Tree ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Claims Problem ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Stability Analysis of R&D Cooperation in a Supply Chain

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luyun Xu ◽  
Dong Liang ◽  
Zhenjie Duan ◽  
Xu Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Stability Analysis ◽  
Knowledge Spillovers ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Collaborative Process ◽  
Level Of Knowledge ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Inherent Quality

R&D outsourcing becomes the often-adopted strategy for firms to innovate. However, R&D cooperation often ends up with failure because of its inherent quality of instability. One of the main reasons for cooperation failure is the opportunistic behavior. As the R&D contract between firms is inherently incomplete, opportunistic behavior always cannot be avoided in the collaborative process. R&D cooperation has been divided into horizontal and vertical types. This paper utilizes game theory to study opportunistic behavior in the vertical R&D cooperation and analyzes the equilibrium of the cooperation. Based on the equilibrium and numerical results, it is found that the vertical R&D cooperation is inherently unstable, and the downstream firm is more likely to break the agreement. The level of knowledge spillovers and the cost of R&D efforts have different effects on firms’ payoffs. When the level of knowledge spillover is low or the cost of R&D efforts is high, mechanisms such as punishment for opportunism may be more effective to guarantee the stability of cooperation.

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