Rates the Ships Must Pay to Deliver the Oil Sludge as an Incentive to Improve Port Waste Green Logistics

Vessels of the shipping industry produce sludge during the operation of the main engine, various types of auxiliary engines, and the handling of fuel oil on board ships. The sludge can be stored in special tanks and disposed of ashore or burned on board. In the European Union, according to the Port Reception Facilities Directive (EU) 2019/883, ships have to pay a port waste fee for the delivery of ship waste, which is calculated according to the size of the ship. Such an approach does not take into account the capacity of port green waste logistics. In this paper, the case of delivery of ship sludge to ports that are similar in terms of waste logistics capacity is analysed. It is presented as a mathematical game between ships and ports to improve green waste logistics and match the amount of oil sludge that can be discharged from ships to the capacity of ports. The goal of the game is to discourage free-riders, which can occur on both sides, between suppliers and ports. The waste rate can be used as a regulator and incentive that discourages sludge dumping when recycling is not feasible. A model evaluation is proposed using a numerical example.

PDE boundary conditions that eliminate quantum weirdness: a mathematical game inspired by Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing

Although boundary condition problems in quantum mathematics (QM) are well known, no one ever used boundary conditions technology to abolish quantum weirdness. We employ boundary conditions to build a mathematical game that is fun to learn, and by using it you will discover that quantum weirdness evaporates and vanishes. Our clever game is so designed that you can solve the boundary condition problems for a single point if-and-only-if you also solve the “weirdness” problem for all of quantum mathematics. Our approach differs radically from Dirichlet, Neumann, Robin, or Wolfram Alpha. We define domain Ω in one-dimension, on which a partial differential equation (PDE) is defined. Point α on ∂Ω is the location of a boundary condition game that involves an off-center bi-directional wave solution called Æ, an “elementary wave.” Study of this unusual, complex wave is called the Theory of Elementary Waves (TEW). We are inspired by Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing who built mathematical games that demonstrated that axiomatization of all mathematics was impossible. In our machine quantum weirdness vanishes if understood from the perspective of a single point α, because that pinpoint teaches us that nature is organized differently than we expect.

At Lunch with Freeman Dyson

This is the story of a minor discovery in mathematical game theory. It concerns the prisoner’s dilemma game, which, played once, involves little strategy. But consider the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. In the IPD, there is information in the previous plays, which each player can use to devise a superior strategy that remains self-interested.

The resistance to Aristotelianism in Jewish culture: game-theoretical analysis of the conflict around Maimonides' manuscripts in the 13th century

The Maimonidean Controversy at the beginning of the 13th century was one of the most significant conflicts in the midst of the Jewish diasporas in the Middle Ages. The conflict followed a vivid discussion on the treatises of Maimonides and the interpretation of Judaism in the light of Aristotelian philosophy. Almost all of major Jewish communities in Europe were drawn in this conflict. Moreover, at some point the conflict expanded outside of the Jewish world, so that some works of Maimonides were burnt by the Christian Inquisition as heretical books. Despite the significance of these events and the trace left in the memory of the Jewish people, there is not much reliable evidence about them. The authors aim to discuss the history of this conflict, focusing on the problematic aspects of the Maimonides’ teaching, and to make a reconstruction of the events occurred, to provide a specification of main characteristics of the conflict interaction (the players, their strategies and preferences, possible outcomes of the conflict, conflict dynamics, etc.), to design a game-theoretical model of the social conflict under consideration and to explore this model using the methods of mathematical game theory. It turns out that the majority of the players' actions correspond to optimal behavior concepts employed in game theory (bargaining solutions, Pareto efficiency, Nash equilibria). However, some actions obviously contradict the concept of rational behavior (one of the fundamental assumptions in mathematical game theory), and namely these actions induced the conflict escalation and such a tragic outcome.

Perspective about Medicine Problems via Mathematical Game Theory: An Overview

This chapter provides an overview of Game Theory with applications to medicine problems, including evolution of tumor cells and their competition, applications to neocortical epilepsy surgery and schizophrenic brain. Recent studies related to microarray games for cancer problems will be considered. These models may be used for applications to neurological and allergic diseases. At the end, the model of kidney exchange via the Matching Theory proposed by Alvin Roth, Nobel prize 2012, will be discussed.

Accounting for current and expected weather risks in crop production based on mathematical game theory

Тенденции климатически обусловленных изменений – потепление, аридизация земель, деградация криолитозоны и т.п. могут быть учтены при стратегическом планировании АЛСЗ – адаптивно-ландшафтных систем земледелия (климат – одна из важнейших характеристик агроландшафтов). Однако наибольшую опасность представляют погодные риски, связанные с повышением нервозности климата. В настоящей работе нами рассматривается метод учета погодных рисков, где (внешне парадоксально) собственно метеопрогнозирование объявляется вторичным (а в условиях полной неопределенности по прогнозам – даже необязательным!). Описываемый метод компенсации рисков можно отнести к тактическим. В рамках математической теории игр, как условные игроки рассматриваются А (агроном) и П (природа/погода). Придерживаясь рассчитанной оптимальной стратегии, А минимизирует потери урожая при любых «капризах» П. Засевая 25% по технологии для влажного года (Х1), а 75% - по технологии для засушливого года (Х2), агроном гарантированно имеет цену игры 0,85 (условно-чистый доход), тогда как придерживаясь какой-либо только одной стратегии он гарантированно получит лишь 0,7 (для Х1) или 0,8 (для Х2). Оптимальным агрономическим решением будет применение на трети площадей технологии для засухи, а на двух третях – технологии для влажного года с осадками в неблагоприятный период. Полученные решения не носят характер универсальных региональных рекомендаций, но позволяют успешно оптимизировать агрономические решения в масштабах хозяйства. Для небольших (фермерских) хозяйств метод будет менее востребован. Однако крупные хозяйства (агрохолдинги) крайне заинтересованы в получении именно гарантированного уровня дохода, и организовать одновременное применение двух технологий на их достаточно развитой базе вполне возможно. Trends of climate-related changes – warming, aridization of land, degradation of the cryolithozone, etc. can be taken into account in the strategic planning of adaptive landscape systems of agriculture (climate is one of the most important characteristics of agricultural landscapes). However, the greatest danger is posed by weather risks associated with increased climate nervousness. In this paper, we consider a method for accounting for weather risks, where (seemingly paradoxical) the actual forecast is declared secondary (and even optional in conditions of complete uncertainty according to forecasts!). The described method of risk compensation can be classified as tactical. Within the framework of mathematical game theory, A (agronomist) and P (nature/weather) are considered as conditional players. Adhering to the calculated optimal strategy A minimize crop losses in any «whims» of the P. Sowing 25% of the technology for the wet year (X1) and 75% - technology for dry years (X2), the agronomist has guaranteed the price of the game 0,85 (conditionally net income), while any only one strategy guaranteed to get only 0.7 (for X1) or 0.8 (for X2). The optimal agronomic solution will be to use technology for drought in one third of the area, and technology for a wet year with precipitation in an unfavorable period in two thirds. The obtained solutions do not have the character of universal regional recommendations, but they allow us to successfully optimize agronomic solutions on a farm scale. For small farms, this method will be less popular. However, large farms (agricultural holdings) are extremely interested in obtaining a guaranteed level of income, and it is quite possible to organize the simultaneous use of two technologies on their sufficiently developed base.

Coalition power estimation. Overview from the mathematical and philosophical perspectives

The paper studies the problem of measuring the strength of a coalition in terms of the mathematical game theory and social philosophy. This work is an interdisciplinary study.