Structuring Compensation Plans for Spinoffs

1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Edward D. Graskamp
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anaïs Thibault Landry ◽  
Marylène Gagné ◽  
Jacques Forest ◽  
Sylvie Guerrero ◽  
Michel Séguin ◽  
...  

Abstract. To this day, researchers are debating the adequacy of using financial incentives to bolster performance in work settings. Our goal was to contribute to current understanding by considering the moderating role of distributive justice in the relation between financial incentives, motivation, and performance. Based on self-determination theory, we hypothesized that when bonuses are fairly distributed, using financial incentives makes employees feel more competent and autonomous, which in turn fosters greater autonomous motivation and lower controlled motivation, and better work performance. Results from path analyses in three samples supported our hypotheses, suggesting that the effect of financial incentives is contextual, and that compensation plans using financial incentives and bonuses can be effective when properly managed.


Author(s):  
Debtanu Lahiri

The paper attempts at establishing alignment between compensation plans for employees in restaurants with customer preferences obtained by means of an exploratory research. The findings of the research indicate that food & beverage, cleanliness & comfort, assurance, personal attention, and special feeling are the dominant factors shaping customer expectations in India. Two different categories of customers were identified based on whether they prioritized dining experience or the tangibles associated with service. Ranking of priorities was done on the basis of the mean scores obtained in each of the factors mentioned above. For customers prioritizing tangibles, Special Feeling obtained the lowest score and featured at the bottom of the list. Food & Beverage, on the other hand, remained the top priority for customers across both categories. For the purpose of designing pay-for-performance plans, restaurants were categorized on the basis of their target customer segment. The percentage of variable pay was decided on two factors, (i) degree of control enjoyed by the employee and (ii) strategic importance of the particular function. The kitchen staffs were assumed to have suitable control over the Food & Beverage factor and the front-house staffs over the factors Assurance, Personal Attention and Special Feeling. To ascertain the strategic importance of a particular factor, the score obtained by it as well as its rank in the priority list were taken into consideration. Following this, suitable parameters for assessing the performance of employees were identified and their relevance discussed in some detail.


1992 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne T. Coughlan ◽  
Chakravarthi Narasimhan

1938 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
Frederic A. Russell

1985 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 267-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amiya K. Basu ◽  
Rajiv Lal ◽  
V. Srinivasan ◽  
Richard Staelin

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 777-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn M. Pfeiffer ◽  
Timothy W. Shields

SYNOPSISWe study equity price reactions to compensation contracting in experimental markets. Motivated by research reporting positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans for executive managers, but postulating competing reasons as to why, we design an experiment that allows us to manipulate variables separately to examine the effect of adverse selection and moral hazard on equity prices. We find that managers select contracts based on their private information, sometimes differing from predicted choices, and that private information is conveyed to the market by the choice of compensation contract and is reflected in stock prices. We refer to this as the sorting effect. Additionally, we find that managers do not always exert costly effort in spite of favorable incentives to do so. The design also allows us to assess if the market rationally prices managers' actual choices. We find market prices are consistent with the empirically observed manager choices. Our results imply that to properly assess the impact of compensation plan on market prices, the sorting, as well as the incentive effects of compensation contracts, should be considered, and that the market anticipates errors in managers' choices.JEL Classifications: C92; D82; G12; J33; M52.Data Availability: Available upon request.


2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey B. Sprinkle ◽  
Michael G. Williamson

With over $15 billion in annual sales, John Deere is one of the largest equipment manufacturing and distribution organizations in the world and is widely known as the world's premier producer of agricultural equipment. In the wake of significant downturns in the U.S. agriculture industry during the 1980s, John Deere believed it needed to change the manner in which employee performance was measured and rewarded. Specifically, after decades of using an individual-based, standard-hour compensation plan in its manufacturing facilities, John Deere decided to install a teambased gain-sharing plan that it believed would encourage more cooperation, innovation, and higher levels of motivation from its employees. This case provides students the opportunity to experience real-world conflicts of interest between employees and employers and the integral role that accounting-based performance measurement and reward systems play in resolving these conflicts. This case also provides students the opportunity to critically evaluate the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of two common compensation plans from the perspectives of both John Deere and its employees. Such juxtaposition allows students to see the inherent trade-offs in designing compensation systems, thereby improving students' understanding of optimal control system design.


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