The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-567
Author(s):  
Leslie Johns

International organizations (IOs) play a vital role in enforcing international law. I argue that collective-action problems and the design of legal-standing rules drive decisions about whether to enforce international law. When cooperation generates concentrated benefits—such as compensation for the expropriation of foreign investment—transnational standing can work well because the cost and benefit of enforcement are both fully internalized by the litigant. However, when cooperation generates diffuse benefits—like a cleaner environment—individuals and even governments have the incentive to free ride on enforcement, avoiding the cost of litigation in the hopes that another actor will step up. In such circumstances, supranational standing is necessary to uphold international law. Finally, hybrid regimes, which contain multiple forms of enforcement, are most needed when an IO has members that vary in their ability to enforce, or regulates issue areas that vary in their diffuseness.

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-17
Author(s):  
Max Pensky

The postwar era saw a remarkable transformation of international law, from a loose arrangement of agreements designed to reduce collective action problems to a normative commitment to the inherent dignity of the individual person. Seyla Benhabib’s new book shows the extent to which this transformation was a matter of deeply personal experiences. Understanding this dialectic between the personal and the universal is crucial for understanding not just the genesis of contemporary normative international law, but also its prospects for survival. This article focuses on Benhabib’s adoption of the process of jurisgenesis as an exemplary form of this dialectic, ending with a critical reading of Hannah Arendt’s attempt to contribute to this process.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

Abstract Human rights law does not appear to enjoy as high a level of compliance as the laws of war, yet is institutionalized to a greater degree. This Article argues that the reason for this difference is related to the strategic structure of international law. The laws of war are governed by a regime of reciprocity, which can produce selfenforcing patterns of behavior, whereas the human rights regime attempts to produce public goods and is thus subject to collective action problems. The more elaborate human rights institutions are designed to overcome these problems but fall prey to second-order collective action problems. The simple laws of war institutions have been successful because they can exploit the logic of reciprocity. The Article also suggests that limits on military reprisals are in tension with self-enforcement of the laws of war. The U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda is discussed.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Charnovitz

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have exerted a profound influence on the scope and dictates of international law. NGOs have fostered treaties, promoted the creation of new international organizations (IOs), and lobbied in national capitals to gain consent to stronger international rules. A decade ago, Antonio Donini, writing about the United Nations, declared that “the Temple of States would be a rather dull place without nongovernmental organisations.” His observation was apt and is suggestive of a more general thesis: had NGOs never existed, international law would have a less vital role in human progress.


2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 59-85
Author(s):  
Walter Glannon

AbstractIn light of the magnitude of interpersonal harm and the risk of greater harm in the future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued for pharmacological enhancement of moral behaviour. I discuss moral bioenhancement as a set of collective action problems. Psychotropic drugs or other forms of neuromodulation designed to enhance moral sensitivity would have to produce the same or similar effects in the brains of a majority of people. Also, a significant number of healthy subjects would have to participate in clinical trials testing the safety and efficacy of these drugs, which may expose them to unreasonable risk. Even if the drugs were safe and effective, a majority of people would have to co-operate in a moral enhancement programme for such a project to succeed. This goal would be thwarted if enough people opted out and decided not to enhance. To avoid this scenario, Persson and Savulescu argue that moral enhancement should be compulsory rather than voluntary. But the collective interest in harm reduction through compulsory enhancement would come at the cost of a loss of individual freedom. In general, there are many theoretical and practical reasons for scepticism about the concept and goal of moral enhancement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
P.P. Myslivsky ◽  
◽  
I.N. Shchurova

In international law, there are sources that do not formally have binding force, but may indicate the emergence of the opinio juris of states, as well as emerging practice. The Eurasian Economic Union also issues acts that are not formally binding: they are adopted by the Eurasian Economic Commission in the form of recommendations. In addition, the Union takes into account the recommendatory acts of other international organizations. At present, the practice of the EAEU Court indicates that this body takes into account “soft law” in the course of argumentation, but proceeds from the impossibility of challenging acts that are recommendations of the EEC. The authors give ways to establish the possibility of challenging the EEC recommendations in the EAEU Court.


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